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INTRODUCTION 
The farm problem in the United States seems to be a com­
bination of many problems each different from but by no means, 
independent of the rest. Further, most of these individual 
problems are rooted in the central problem of excess produc­
tive capacity which is reflected in price-depressing surpluses 
(see e.g., 20, p. 114; 97» PP« 1-17, 89-114). One of the re-
* 
suits of this problem about which many farmers are concerned 
is their continuing unfavorable income-position relative to 
other sectors of the economy. 
In 1959» nearly 40 percent of the commercial farms in the 
United States had gross sales of over |:5»000 per farm and 
received an average net income per farm from all sources of 
$7,763* With an average farm family size of 4.2 persons, this 
is a per capita net income of #1,848 - 81 percent of per cap­
ita nonfarm income from all sources. The remaining commercial 
farms in the United States produced a per capita net income 
of only #893 - 38 percent of per capita nonfarm income from 
all sources (97, pp« 74, 80-81). Thus per capita income of 
many commercial farm families seems to be substantially lower 
than comparable per capita incomes in the nonfarm sector. 
Furthermore Shepherd (97, ?• 81) concludes that: "Farm in­
comes have remained low since the early 1950's, while incomes 
in most other lines have been steadily rising." 
Shepherd further argues that the real farm problem is an 
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agricultural adjustment problem resulting from 1) continued 
over-production relative to demand which keeps gross national 
farm income low, and 2.) an excessive supply of farmers which 
tends to keep income per farmer low (.97, pp. 89-114J. Farmers 
and some marketing specialists, however, would add a third 
factor to this list - the inferior bargaining position of 
farmers. 
It is generally admitted that nearly all farmers are mem­
bers of an industry approaching conditions of perfect competi­
tion. From'a.structural standpoint, there are a large number 
of producers who individually supply a very small proportion 
of total industry output, entry and exit barriers are rela­
tively low, there is negligible product differentiation be­
tween farm firms, and quality differences are detected by • 
grading'and standardization, output beir.g priced accordingly. 
Further, as Lanzillotti (66, pp. 1243-1244) points out, 
under short-run price .fluctuations during the crop year, 
farmers are not in a position to hold or adjust large inven­
tories as are manufacturing firms. Nor are- they able- to 
"escalate" cost increases forward as are manufacturers and 
processors during periods of. low or declining demand. 
There is abundant evidence showing that agricul­
tural income behaves very differently from that 
of manufacturers and processors over the course 
of business fluctuations—even over the relatively 
mild recessions characteristic of the post World 
War II period. It is well established that the 
decline of agricultural income results essen­
tially from a sharp decline in prices of agricul­
3 
tural products, whereas variations .in incomes of 
manufacturers and processors is brought about 
largely through adjustments in production and 
• employment, with prices held fairly constant, or 
even increasing. Furthermore, . . . profits of 
large manufacturing firms are likely to be more 
durable* than farm profits. (66, pp. 1243-1244) 
In Lanzillotti's viev7, there is little doubt that the 
fundamental reason for,these differences lies in the "struc­
tural inferiority" and in the "inferior bargaining position of 
farmers vis-a-vis both buyers and sellers." (66,p. 1244) 
Farmers are, individually, unable to influence the prices 
they receive for their products. The firms to which farmers 
sell their products, on the other hand, are generally price-
setters, i.e., are monopolistic or oligopolistic. Conse­
quently there is widespread belief that the resulting weak 
market-power position of farmers is one of the principal fac­
tors in their farm marketing and income problems. Reflecting 
this belief is an increasing interest in farmers' bargaining 
power as an important policy measure with which to help ame­
liorate farmers'- income position. 
Farmers and farm groups have long had an interest in in­
creasing their bargaining power through collective action. 
Different approaches hâve been advocated by various farm 
*By durability of profits of large manufacturing firms, 
Lanzillotti is referring to the.rather high degree of year-to-
year stability in profit margins or in net income as a per­
centage margin on sales of the leading firms in most of the 
food Tsrocessinp- and agricultural surnDly industries during 
1949-1959. ' . 
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groups. The Farm Bureau would seek to increase farmers* eco­
nomic position by assuming or threatening to assume some of 
the marketing functions—i.e., make the marketing system more 
competitive, increase firm efficiency which will reduce costs 
and increase net farm revenue, and retair some of the profits 
now going to other marketing agencies. The National Farmers 
Organization espouses social conflict or "holding actions". 
The Farmers Union's approach is through political conflict or 
through seeking favorable legislative action (61, 63, 10?) • 
The American Agricultural Marketing Association (an 
affiliate of the American Farm Bureau Federation) acts as a 
service-type organization. Its objectives'have beer, outlined 
by Hood (52, p. 4-1) as follows: 
1-to assist State Farm Bureaus in organizing and 
servicing bargaining associations, 
2-to provide a means to coordinate the efforts of 
the state and ragional bargaining associations, 
.3-to conduct research; analyze contracts and con­
tract terms; and to furnish information on supply, 
demand, contract prices, and the like, and 
4-to discuss—and if it becomes necessary, to nego­
tiate—contract terms, quality control, and re­
lated matters with individual companies that oper­
ate on a national or regional basis,-and with 
national and regional associations of canners, 
freezers, processors, packers, buyers and others 
engaged in, or associated with, the purchasing, 
handling, and selling of agricultural commodities. 
In addition to the national organizations, several indi­
vidual fcrm commodity groups have shown considerable interest 
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in increasing' farmers' bargaining power—most notably in the 
milk, fruit, and vegetable industries—through the development 
and operation of bargaining cooperatives (see Table 1.1). The 
major operating objective of these organizations is price 
enhancement through negotiations with processors. That is, 
they attempt to bargain for a per unit price which is higher 
Table 1.1. Estimated number of bargaining cooperatives in 
the United States, 1962 
u* 
Type of cooperative Number Percent of total 
Bairy& 207 59.5 
Fruit and vegetable" 63 18.1 
Sugar beets® 47 13.5 
EggG 30 8.6 
PulpwoodC .1 0.3 
Total 348 100.0 
^Source; see footnote on page 6. 
^Source: 92. Eighteen of these cooperatives were affil­
iated with the American Agricultural Marketing Association in 
1962, however their exact bargaining status is unknown at the 
present time. 
^Source; 92. 
than farmers would have obtained for the same quantity of 
produce in the absence of the organization» 
It is in this manner that such organizations seek tq im­
prove the income position of farmers relative to that of non-
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farmers and to help offset farmers' alleged "structural in­
feriority". Thus cooperative "bargaining associations are con­
sidered to be a partial solution to the complex farm problem 
and will be the principal subject of this study—particular 
attention being given to dairy bargaining cooperatives. 
Though there is at present a great deal of interest in 
cooperatives of the bargaining type, this form of cooperation 
is by no means new. Two bargaining cooperatives in the pro­
cessed fruit and vegetable industry in California and Utah 
date back more than 40 years. However, most of the fruit and 
vegetable bargaining cooperatives have been organized within 
the past ten years (74, p. $). The farm value of crops repre­
sented ir negotiations by fruit and vegetable bargaining coop­
eratives in 1958 was estimated at $90 million (not including 
the American Agricultural Marketing Association affiliates).* 
One of the most important of this type of cooperative, 
in terms of numbers as well as in terms of value of produce 
handled, especially in the Eastern and Midwestern sections of 
the United States is, however, the dairy bargaining coopera­
tive. Although the exact volume of milk handled and the exact 
number of dairy bargaining cooperatives is unknown, a 1957 
*McKlllen, Wendell M., Assistant Director Marketing Divi­
sion, United States Department of Agriculture, Washington, 
D.C. Data from cooperative study. Private communication. 
August 16, 1963. 
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survey by the Farmer Cooperative Service of the United States 
Department of Agriculture indicated that about 207 associa­
tions bargained over the price of approximately I.3 billion 
dollars worth of milk.* 
Simultaneous nith the growth of fluid milk markets as 
cities became more heavily populated was the growth in the 
size of the leading milk dealers in each market. These condi­
tions led to a ^ rcT/çing proportion of the milk business being 
concentrated in the hands of a few distributors, and most pro­
ducers in the m&rket found themselves solely dependent on one 
dealer for a milk outlet. This was particularly true of pro­
ducers located at a considerable distance from the city whose 
milk had to be handled through a receiving plant owned by a 
large milk dealer or wl;o were dependent on a particular 
dealer's milk hauler (4o, p. 21; p. 20). 
In such circumstances producers apparently felt they were 
getting unfair treatment, had too little to say about the 
prices they received, and were suspicious of the weights and 
tests made by distributors. Individual dairy farmers, recog­
nizing their weakness in bargaining as individuals, organized 
into dairy bargaining cooperatives as early as the 1880's (see 
88, p. 133) in order to offset the bargaining advantages pre­
sumably held by the relatively few large distributors and pro­
*Ibid. 
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cessors. In Iowa 14 dairy bargaining cooperatives were 
organized prior to 1935 (86, p. 13)- Some of these 14 Iowa 
cooperatives have merged with others or have disbanded, but 
seven are still in existence today. 
THE PROBLEM 
The focus of attention of research on bargaining power 
to date has centered largely around questions of 1) the theo­
retical framework within which generalizations can be made 
about the bargaining process and with which predictions of the 
bargaining outcome can be made, 2) the extent to which farmers 
have been- or will be able to secure higher prices through the 
process of collective bargaining, and 3) the factors which 
affect farmers' bargaining power. After defining the relevant 
concepts involved, each of these points will be considered in 
order to establish the nature of our problem and the specific 
objectives of this study. 
General Concepts 
As can be anticipated from the various approaches advo­
cated to increase bargaining power, the term denotes different 
things to different people. To individual X, bargaining power 
may mean monopoly power or supply control, while individual Y 
may equate bargaining power with skill and ability to nego­
tiate over the terms of trade or with the power to withhold a 
product until his terms are met (see also 34). Such meanings, 
however, tend to confuse bargaining power with its determin­
ants; and the determinants of bargaining power do not consti­
tute a definition. A definition is a statement which estab­
lishes the meaning of an expression by relating the expression 
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it defines to other expressions already available (106, p. 
152). Thus bargaining power must be defined in terms of its 
component parts or primitive concepts—"bargaining" and 
"power". Power, in common usage, may be defined simply as 
the influence one has over others. Bargaining, on the other 
hand, is a slightly more complicated concept. 
According to Fellner (32, p. 15), 
The situation in which the behavior of all parties 
concerned depends on the assumed reactions of the 
other parties is typically that leading to "bargain­
ing". In all cases in which bargaining (in the 
everyday sense of the word) takes place we are faced 
with conjectural interdependence. Bargaining in the 
usual sense presupposes conjectural interdependence, 
but bargaining 3^ the usual sense does not take place 
in all cases in which conjectural interdependence 
exists. Bargaining in the usual sense requires 
direct contact and negotiations between the parties 
concerned, in addition to conjectural interdepend­
ence . 
Pellner goes on to argue that there is no fundamental differ­
ence between those instances of conjectural interdependence 
which lead to explicit bargaining and those that do not—i.e., 
between bargaining and quasi-bargaining. In what follows we 
shall be concerned only with the former. 
Fellner's concept of bargaining, then, does allow the 
behavior of a bargainer to be conditioned by the reaction or 
assumed reaction of an outsider or of a "third party" to the 
bargain. It does not, however, make, explicit note of two 
other very important elements of a bargaining relationship— 
1) a conflict of interest between the different parties to the 
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"bargain, and 2) an attempt by each to resolve the conflict as 
favorably as possible to himself. In the absence of a con­
flict of interest, there will obviously be no conflict to 
resolve. If, on the other hand, a conflict of interest exists 
but no attempt by any party is made to resolve the conflict, 
bargaining cannot be said to exist for resolution will be 
effectuated only if done so by outside authority. It is the 
attempt by each party to resolve the conflict as favorably as 
possible to himself which requires direct contact and negotia­
tions (or indirect contact and negotiations in the case of 
quasi-bargainine) between the parties concerned as well as 
conjectural interdependence. 
Bargaining thus requires the existence of a conflict of 
interest and an attempt by each party to resolve that conflict 
as favorably to himself as possible. Since a conflict of 
interest is postulated,'bargaining may be viewed simply as 
the simultaneous effort by each party to the bargain to win 
the consent of the other(s). That is, each party is trying 
to resolve the conflict; but, more importantly, he is trying 
to convince the other(s) that the conflict should be resolved 
in his favor. Negotiation has a similar interpretation al­
though a more restricted reference than bargaining. Negotia­
tion refers to the exchange of messages which serves as a 
means for eliciting contermoves and is therefore a part of 
bargaining. Only a given exchange transaction—either the 
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exchange of new demands or offers or of other information— 
during the bargaining process is effected by negotiation. 
The outcome of the bargaining process (i.e., whether or 
not an agreement is reached and if it is on what terms) de­
pends on how much one or both parties to the bargain can be 
led to move from some preferred position which is favorable to 
the party in question toward a less preferred position which 
is more favorable to his opponent (see 25, p. 81). Hence an 
"integrative relationship" is entered into which Boulding (l6, 
p. ^ 25) describes as involving a convergence of the "images 
and utility functions of the parties towards each other." The 
degree of influence one party has over another to force such 
concessions or the ability to effect agreements on one's own 
terms we shall refer to as bargaining power. One's bargaining 
power will be greater the more favorable he can make it for 
his opponent to accept his offer or the more unfavorable he 
can make it for his opponent if this opponent refuses to 
accept and- refuses to bargain further (64, p. l4). 
Chamberlain (25s P* 81 )_ argues that, operationally, one's 
bargaining power is an opponent's inducement to agree or is 
the ratio of the costs of disagreeing to the costs of agree­
ing: on the former's terms. 
The tenus proposed are sometimes understood rather 
than made explicit, but the principle is not thereby 
vitiated. And the costs, both of agreement and dis­
agreement, must be regarded as the subjective esti­
mates of the parties, the expected probabilities of 
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the consequences which are expected to affect the 
realization of their aspirations. (25, ?• 81) 
If both parties' inducement to agree is less than unity, no 
agreement will be forthcoming unless some concession is made. 
Chamberlain argues that as a condition for agreement, the 
inducement to agree for at least one of the parties' must be 
unity or greater. Further, if both parties' inducement to 
agree is greater than unity, whichever has the lesser induce-
ment to agree will have the greater bargaining power. 
Even though this ratio may serve as an important con­
ceptual device, we must recognize that any attempt to attach 
a numerical magnitude to it will generally fail since a com­
parison of the costs of agreement and disagreement generally 
involves a comparison of incommensurable items. In addition, 
uncertainty will likely play an important role in each 
parties' estimate of his relative bargaining power if the 
estimates are made by this device. 
Neither party can ever be sure of its' own bargain­
ing power, since this depends on the subjective 
estimates which the other has made. The nature of 
which can only be surmised. X's estimate of the 
relative bargaining powers, for example, depends 
on his calculation of the costs of agreement and 
disagreement on Y's terms, laid alongside his esti­
mate of Y's estimate of the costs of agreement and 
disagreement on his own (X's) terms. Because of 
the high degree of uncertainty involved here, as 
each party tries to gain the advantage in the final 
terms of settlement, it is possible that if one's 
bluff is called a disagreement may be precipitated 
which neither wishes, involving both in expected 
costs greater than if they had conceded the whole 
difference between their respective demands to 
the other. (25, p. 83) 
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Attempts to use the relatively undefined, concepts of 
costs of agreement and disagreement will, therefore, encounter 
the same type of difficulties that have confronted the pro­
ponents of bargaining theories as will be noted later. We 
shall, consequently, refrain from using these concepts in con­
junction with our definition of bargaining power. 
It should be noted that the definition we have adopted is 
sufficiently general so as to encompass all of the means at 
the bargainers' disposal with which to force concessions or 
with which to effect agreements on one's own terms during the 
bargaining process. In addition as Ladd and Strain (64, pp. 
14-20; 65, p. 3) have pointed out, and as implied in the above 
definition of bargaining power, there are two different types 
of bargaining power. The first stems from advantages that can 
be offered to the opponent in return for accepting one's terms 
or as a result of accepting one's terms. Such advantages may 
be in the form of savings that can be offered the opponent or 
in the form of extra services that can be provided. This kind 
of bargaining power is called Type I or "opponent-gain" power. 
. 
The second type of bargaining power—Type II of "opponent-
pain" power—consists of the bargainer's ability to enforce 
unfavorable consequences upon the opponent if he refuses to 
accept the stated terms. In order to exercise this type of 
bargaining power, the bargainer must be-able to subject the 
opponent to some added costs or losses for refusal to accept 
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his terms. The higher the costs or the larger the losses that 
can be imposed on an opponent, the greater is one's bargaining 
power. 
The two types are not unrelated concepts, and may be used 
in conjunction by a bargainer. For example, a milk bargaining 
cooperative may offer a bottler a full-supply contract spec­
ifying time and delivery of all the milk needed by the bottler 
for the next three months if the bottler agrees to pay a cer­
tain premium per hundredweight for class I milk. Otherwise 
the cooperative could by.withholding milk force this bottler 
to get its milk from producers, say, 200 miles.away which may 
be quite costly to the bottler in terms of transportation and 
in falling to get adequate supplies to meet its bottled milk 
demand (see also 64, pp. 18-20). 
The e ffort to win the consent of an opponent—bargaining— 
is conditioned by the bargaining strategy or tactics one 
employs during the bargaining process. The elements of one's 
bargaining strategy- have been outlined by Stevens (103» pp. 
57-96) as follows; 
A. Information, giving and seeking tactics 
1. representing one's own preferences—the 
satisfactions one associates with various 
outcomes of the negotiations, 
2. attempts to discover the opponent's 
preferences, 
B. Persuasion 
1. attempts to alter the opponent's prefer­
ences, 
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2. attempts to alter or establish the opponent's 
expectations about one's own negotiation or 
extra-negotiation environment, 
C. Coercion 
1. attempts to alter or establish the opponent's 
- expectations about one's intended course of 
action including one's accurate representation, 
misrepresentation, and/or concealing of his 
- own preferences, 
2. Attempts to alter or establish the*preferences-
and courses of action of "third parties" where 
these may affect the outcome of the negotia-
' t i o n s .  
. * 
These means or instruments are used by a particular bar­
gainer to exploit the base of one's bargaining power (see 29» 
p. 202; 4-7, p. 70). The base of one's bargaining power in­
cludes all of the opportunities, alternatives, economic 
assets, constitutional or military forces, etc., at one's dis 
posai with which to force concessions or to effect an agree­
ment on one's own terms. The components of the base of one's 
bargaining power then are the factors used to influence an 
opponent'-s behavior during the bargaining process. How they 
are used depends on the bargaining strategy or means selected 
This discussion has highlighted four important aspects 
of the bargaining problem—the bargaining outcome, bargaining 
power, bargaining strategy, and the base of one's bargaining 
power. One may expect the outcome of the bargain to be 
dependent upon the bargaining power of the individual bar­
gainers. Bargaining power will in turn be expected to depend 
on the bargaining strategy adopted. In addition the indi­
17 
vidual's bargaining strategy will be conditioned, in part, 
-by the base of his bargaining power. Finally it is not un­
reasonable to suspect that the bargaining outcome will, in 
most cases, affect or alter the components of the base of 
.one's bargaining power. Hence these four factors may be 
interdependent, and if so, a study of the bargaining process 
must focus on this interdependency as well as on the exo­
genous variables affecting each factor. 
Bilaterally Restricted Competition 
The predictive models of value theory are designed to 
answer the following questions: 1) what quantity of output 
will be produced and 2) at what price will this output be 
traded? However the traditional tools of value theory are 
unable to provide a complete and satisfactory answer to these 
two questions for situations characterized by bilaterally 
restricted competition. In general it is argued that in such 
cases a'ranee of "indeterminacy" exists—i.e., with their 
traditional tools economists can do no better than establish 
the ranp-e within which the terms of trade will fall. Any 
further generalizations must rest on a consideration of addi­
tional factors and thus traditional value theory is not suf­
ficient to make the desired predictions. 
The theoretical model of value theory most closely re­
flecting the structure of producer-processor markets in which 
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a single cooperative bargaining association and a single • 
processor are attempting to determine the terms of exchange 
for the product of the bargaining association is that of 
bilateral monopoly. Esnce i^e will review this case in some 
detail. Although a thorough discussion of the situation where 
oligopolistic elements exist on one or both sides of the 
market is not available, this' situation will also be men­
tioned . 
One of the first complete treatments of the bilateral 
monopoly problem is due to Bowley (1?) and will be briefly 
# 
reviewed here. Let us assume that firms are motivated by the 
profit maximization goal, and that static conditions prevail 
so that the consumer demand and producer cost functions are 
fixed for any given time period. Further, we assume the exis­
tence of a fixed coefficient of production equal to unity.* 
Finally, we ignore the monopsonist* s cost of production other 
than for the raw product. Let 
P = price received by the monopolist for his raw 
product 
X = quantity of the raw product 
C(X) = Xg(X) = monopolist's total cost function for 
output X • 
H(X) = Xf(X) - monopsonist*s total revenue function 
from the sale of the produce of the output X 
Ti^ = PX - C(X) = monopolist's profit function 
= B(X) - PX = monopsonist•s profit function 
TTi = 7T]L + = joint profit function of the two firms. 
^Relaxation of this assumption would involve working with 
average and marginal value functions instead of average and 
marginal revenue functions but does not contribute to the 
exposition. 
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If P is given, to maximize their respective profits, the 
monopolist must choose X to satisfy P = C'(X)* and the mon-
opsonist must choose X to satisfy P = H'(X). That is, a sup­
ply schedule, C'(X), and a demand schedule, R*(X), for the 
raw product will be independently established by the seller 
and buyer respectively. The apparent equilibrium at P = 
C'(X) = &'(X), however, is established under false assumptions 
concerning the firms * behavior—i.e., in bilateral monopoly 
price is not really, of course, "given" to both firms simul­
taneously—and it is inconceivable that the two firms should 
fail to discover this. 
Eowley postulated three different cases. In the first 
case the monopsonist dictates P. In so doing he is limited 
by the consumer demand function for his product, f(X), and 
the monopolist's supply function, C'(X)—he'could not afford 
a price higher than f(X) nor would the monopolist be willing 
to produce for a price less than C*(X). Thus 
(1.1) Tl^ = R(X) - PX = H(X) - XC'(X) 
since the monopsonist will choose a price, P, on the supply 
schedule, C*(X), of the monopolist. For profit maximization 
the necessary and sufficient conditions are: 
(1.2) R'(X) = C(X) + XC''(X), P = C'(X), and 
(1.3) Ii"(X)< 2C"(X) + XC"'(X). 
*The number of prizes on a function indicates the order 
of differentiation with respect to the indicated variable. 
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Thus price, P, will be located on the supply function of the 
monopolist while output, Â, will be located by the intersec­
tion of the monopsonist's demand function for the raw product 
and the curve which is marginal to the monopolist's supply 
function for the raw product. In the hypothetical situation 
depicted in Figure 2.1 the quantity traded in this case is 
and the price paid by the monopsonist for this quantity is « 
In the second case the monopolist dictates P. He is then 
limited by the demand function of the monopsonist, E'(X), and 
by his own cost function for the raw product. His profit will 
then be 
(1.4) 71^ = PX - C(X) = XC'(X) - G(X) 
since he will select a price, P, on the demand schedule, 
R*(X), of the monoposonist. The necessary and sufficient con­
ditions for profit maximization are: 
(1.5) E'(X) + XR-(X) = C'(X), P = fi'(X), and 
(1.6) 2B"(X) + XE"'(X)<C C"(X). 
In this case price, P, will be located on the demand function 
of the monopsonist for the. raw product while output, X," will 
be located by the intersection of the monopolist's supply 
curve and the curve marginal to the monopsonist 's demand curve 
for the raw product. In Figure 2.1 the quantity traded is now 
X2 and the price paid by the monopsonist for this quantity is 
P2. 
In the third case considered by Bowley, neither the 
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C (X) + XC"(X) 
C'(X) 
2" -
b 
O 
B(X)/X 
+> 
0} 
o 
o 
2'(X) + XE"(X) 
X 
Quantity of X 
fi(X)/X = average revenue curve 
fi* (X) = marginal revenue curve 
B* (X) + XB"(X) = curve marginal to the marginal 
revenue curve 
C(X)/X = average cost curve 
C*(X) = marginal cost curve 
C*(X) + XC"(X) = curve marginal to the marginal 
cost curve 
Figure 2.1. Illustration of the "indeterminancy".of the 
bilateral monopoly problem 
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monopsonist nor the monopolist act as a price leader, but 
rather they attempt to jointly maximize their combined 
profits, TVy The necessary and sufficient conditions that Tij 
be a maximum are: 
(1.7) • R'(X) = C'(X) = P, and 
(1.8) B"(X)< C"(X). 
Thus in this case output, X, will be determined by the inter­
section of the monopolist's supply function and the monopson­
ist* s demand function for the- raw product—X^ in Figure 2.1. 
Price, P, will also be established by the intersection of 
these two functions under the hypothesized maximizing behavior 
of the two firms—P^ in Figure 2.1. Bowley, however, con­
siders this case to be unstable since it would be to the in­
terest of the monopolist to increase price and lower output to 
the level of case two and of the monopsonist to lower price 
and output to the level of case one where their respective 
profits will be higher than in the present case.* Therefore 
the tools of value theory are unable to predict the terms of 
trade, according to Bowley, if neither firm is able to set the 
*By substituting first condition (1^), then condition 
(1.5), and finally condition (1.?) into /l]_ (as defined on 
page 18) and comparing the three results, it can be shown that 
the monopolist's profits will be higher in case two than in 
case one or three providing R'(X)<c"0, R"(X) <1 0, C(X) 0, 
and C"(X) !>0. Similarly it can be shown that the monopson­
ist* s profits, TT^, will be higher in case one than in case two 
or three oroviding R*(X) <. 0, R"(X) c 0, C*(X) >0, and 
C"(X) >0. 
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price unilaterally or if each party has equal bargaining 
strength—i.e., price and output are "indeterminant". 
Under conditions of no institutional advantage to one 
monopolist over another in the bilateral monopoly case, nego­
tiations to determine price and quantity will proceed under 
conditions of equal bargaining strength. Bowley, as we have 
seen, argues that the price and quantity at which exchange 
will take place are indeterminate. There are economists, how­
ever, who have argued that a determinate price-quantity- solu­
tion does exist under such conditions. 
Pouraker (36), for example, argues that price and quan­
tity will be determined by the intersection of R*(X) and C'(X) 
and that this solution is stable in contradistinction to Bow-
ley. Fouraker argues that it may be inappropriate to assume 
complete knowledge of the cost and revenue functions for one 
or both firms. Perhaps it is more realistic to assume that 
the seller knows his cost function but does not have knowledge 
of the buyer's revenue function, and similarly the buyer knows 
his revenue function but not the seller's cost function. 
Under these conditions the two parties will negotiate with 
price and quantity as variables when they have equal bargain­
ing strength. Pouraker then assumes that each party will make 
price and quantity concessions along their respective marginal 
functions until equilibrium is reached at C*(X) = H'(X). 
On the other hand, it has been argued that quantity is 
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determinate but price indeterminate under conditions of equal 
bargaining strength. If the two parties behave rationally and 
in their respective self-interests, it is argued by Pellner 
(32, pp. 33-41), they will be forced to a contract at that 
quantity which maximizes their joint profit. Joint profit 
will be maximized, as we saw before, at that quantity satis­
fying (1.7) and (1.8). If a contract at any other quantity 
were reached, it would be possible, by reopening negotiations, 
to increase the combined profits of both participants by mov­
ing to that quantity satisfying these two equations. 
Total revenue to the monopsonistic buyer of the raw 
product is represented by the area under his demand curve 
for the raw product, H'(X), between zero and X units of out­
put. Total cost to the monopolistic seller is represented by 
the area under his supply curve, C'(X), between zero and X 
units of output. Hence joint profits (total revenue to the 
buyer minus total cost to the seller) are represented by the 
area between these two curves and are a maximum at that output 
level where they intersect, Pellner's "zero-profit" limits 
at the maximum joint profit output level are then located on 
f(X) and e(X). That is, when the raw product price is estab­
lished on g(X), all profits go to the monopsonist while the 
monopolist makes none. Conversely when raw product price is 
on f(X), all profits go to the monopolist while the monopson­
ist makes none (see 32, p. 245). In Figure 2.1 joint profits 
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are a maximum at Xj and the "zero-profit" limits at this out­
put level are and P'y. 
Fellner argues in favor of joint profit maximization 
since 
. . . this proposition follows directly from the 
assumption (and from the observed fact) that bar­
gaining 'normally' leads to an agreement. When . 
it does, the parties will surely not be indiffer­
ent to the size of the pie they are now dividing.. 
Jointly they have the size of the pie under con­
trol. (32, p. 33) 
Whatever the sales contract, however, it will usually have to 
include an all-or-none provision according to Fellner (33» 
pp. 506-507), 
. . . otherwise, for any given price, the seller 
would prefer to deliver the quantity determined 
by the equality of marginal cost with that price, 
while the buyer would prefer to buy that quantity 
determined by the equality of marginal (revenue) 
with the same price. Consequently, the maximiza­
tion of joint profit without an all-or-none clause 
would be possible only at the price which equals 
marginal cost and, at the same time marginal 
(revenue). 
These, of course, are not the only suggestions possible. 
For example, if the monopsonist could dictate price as well as 
quantity he would obviously prefer to pay a price on g(X) 
rather than on the marginal cost curve since for a given out­
put his total profits would be higher if a price on g(X) were 
paid rather than on C*(X). Similarly if the monopolist could 
dictate price and quantity he would prefer a price on f(X) 
rather than on the marginal revenue curve. Under these 
assumptions equations (1.1) and (1.4) both equal R(X) - C(X) 
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and the first- and second-order conditions for a maximum are 
given by equations (1.?) and (1.8). Thus output, X, would be 
determined by the intersection of the monopolist's supply 
curve and the monopsonist's demand curve for the raw product, 
and both firms would desire to trade the same level of X. 
Price, however, would be indeterminant between Fellner's 
"zero-profit" limits as described before. 
This, or Pellner's, model of bilateral monopoly will be 
an appropriate theoretical model for our purposes if the 
behavior assumptions correspond to the actual behavior of a 
dairy bargaining cooperative and milk processor-distributor 
and if 1) the cooperative embraces all milk producers whose 
number is fixed, 2) the cooperative has complete control over 
its members* milk production so that there is no problem with 
surplus milk, 3) there is only one distributor of milk, entry 
to other distributors being closed, and 4) there is no inter­
ference by outside authority (e.g., government). 
If these assumptions are inconsistent with the actual 
structure of the market concerned, however, the bilateral 
monopoly model will be an inadequate theoretical framework. 
In particular if assumptions one or three or both are not 
met, the situation may be more realistically characterized by 
monopsonistic oligopoly, monopolistic oligopsony, or bilateral 
oligopoly respectively.* In such situations the relationships 
*Nicholls (80, o. 14) defines (continued on next page) 
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among buyers and among sellers (e.g., the degree of collusion) 
must be considered as well as the relationships between buyers 
and sellers. The appropriateness of assumptions two and four 
will be examined at some length in the next chapter. 
Theoretical treatment of the situation in which oligo­
polistic elements are present on one or both sides of the 
market is conspicuously absent from the economic literature. 
This is undoubtedly due in part to the extreme difficulty of 
coping with interrelationships among oligopolistic firms. 
Hegardless of such interrelationships, however, the same con­
flict of interest between firms on different sides of the 
market as was hypothesized to exist in the case of bilateral 
monopoly can be expected here. Thus as Nicholls (80, pp. 
166-167, 179-180, 191-192) and Pellner (32, pp. 10-15, 240-
251) conclude, the indeterminacy noted in the case of bi-
lateral monopoly will persist in other ca^es of bilaterally 
restricted competition as well. 
Bargaining Theories 
The authors whose work we have just reviewed do not hesi­
tate to say that the bargaining power of each party will 
(footnote continued from previous page) monopsonistic oli­
gopoly to be the market situation in which a single buyer is 
facing a few sellers, monopolistic oligopsony to be the market 
situation in which a single seller is facing a few buyers, and 
bilateral oligopoly to be the market situation in which a few 
sellers are facing a few buyers. 
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affect the final terms of trade. That is, the problem of 
bilaterally restricted competition is taken to be one of bar­
gaining in order to reach an agreement between the previously 
described "zero-profit" limits. In general, however, these 
authors say nothing about what bargaining power is nor how or 
why it will affect the outcome within these limits. 
It is by no means impossible to make reasonable 
statements about what may happen in such circum­
stances, that is, about how things become deter­
minate in so-called ranges of indeterminateness. 
But proper understanding must rest partly on the 
kind of judgment one would prefer not to rely on 
in a search for dependable answers, namely on 
judgment concerning the toughness, or the popu­
larity, or the political advantages of certain 
persons and institutions in relation to others. 
The proposition that under fewness we are faced 
with ranges of indeterminateness merely means 
that within the ranges in question we obtain 
determinate results by "using this kind of mate­
rial". This is not the most desirable kind of 
material with which to work, but an attempt to 
avoid it leads to disregarding some of the most 
important problems of contemporary economic 
systems. (32, P'o. 14-15) : 
Pellner (32, pp. 24—33) argues that the outcome between 
these zero-profit limits will be determined by four factors 
relating to the relative bargaining strength of the two 
parties. These four factors are: 1) the immediate political 
consequences of a stalemate, 2) the long-run social conse­
quences of faring too well, 3) the ability of the parties to 
receive and inflict loss during a stalemate, and 4) the rela­
tive toughness of the parties to the bargain in the sense of 
unwillingness to yield in a range in which the other is 
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expected to yield if one fails to do so. The effect of fac­
tors 1), 2), and 3)» if correctly appraised by each party, is 
to reduce the ranee of indeterminateness over price. The out­
come in the remaining range is, then, dependent on the rela­
tive toughness of the bargainers. 
Hicks (50) analyzes the outcome within this bargaining 
range with resistance and concession curves by centering his 
attention upon the key importance of an essentially political 
weapon—the ability of the parties to call a strike. When 
the monopolist demands a price increase or resists a price 
reduction, by threatening a strike, the monopsonist must 
either pay a higher price than he would have paid of his own 
volition or he must be prepared to endure the loss attendant 
to a stoppage in his raw product supply. Whether he resists 
his opponent or concedes to him will depend upon which act 
he considers to be less costly. The higher the price de­
manded by the seller, the greater the cost of concession, but 
the longer the buyer expects the threatened strike to last, 
the more likely he is to give way. At the seller's zero-
profit limit, the buyer would have no reason to prefer a 
strike. At the buyer's zero-profit limit, however, he would 
prefer a strike rather than be forced out of business (see 80, 
pp. 172-174). 
Let us construct a hypothetical relationship which shows 
for each strike of a given duration the highest price the 
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buyer is willing to pay rather than undergo à strike of that 
length, i.e., 
(1.9) . P = fb(&b) 
where P is the negotiated price between the zero-profit limits", 
Pl3 and Pg, E is the expected length of strike, and subscripts 
(b) and (s) refer to the buyer and^seller respectively. Hicks 
argues that at = 0, P' - Pg in (1.9.) or price equals the 
seller's zero-profit limit. Further, P is an increasing func­
tion of E-y reaching P^ at a sufficiently large S^. This rela­
tionship then traces out the buyer's concession curve. There 
is a similar relationship representing the seller's resistance 
curve which shows for each strike of a given duration the low­
est price the seller will accept rather than undergo a strike 
of that length, i.e., 
(1.10) P = fs(Eg). 
In this case P is postulated to be a decreasing function of 
Eg and at Eg = 0, P = P^. At a sufficiently large Eg, P = Pg. 
Hypothetical concession and resistance curves are shown in 
Figure 2.2. 
If each party correctly judges the length of time which 
the other is willing to strike in order to obtain the particu­
lar price exhibited by the intersection of these two curves, 
here is where the "negotiated" price will fall according to 
Hicks, P "in Figure 2.2. If the seller demands a higher 
price, the buyer will refuse to concede so long as he (the 
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0 
Expected length of strike 
fb(^b) = buyer's concession curve 
fsC^g) = seller's resistance curve 
Figure 2.2. Illustration of Hick's theory of bargaining 
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buyer) correctly concludes that the seller is unwilling to 
strike lone enough to obtain this price. The seller will then 
lower his demands realizing that by this policy he may avoid 
the necessity of carrying out his threat of striking as well 
as the added costs involved. However, due to the many uncer­
tainties involved, it is extremely unlikely that either party 
would correctly estimate his opponent's concession or resis­
tance curve. Thus it is extremely likely, as Nicholls (80, 
p. 175) points out, that instead of two we will get four 
curves—a curve representing" each party's estimate of the 
resistance and concession curves. 
Zeuthen (122) proceeds by examining the probability of 
each side breaking off relations at each given price.* Assume 
that the seller wants price while the buyer offers A2. 
Also let Uj_(Aj) be the utility gain to party 1 over the con­
flict situation if the bargain Aj is accepted by party i. 
Whether the seller will accept A2 depends on his estimate of 
the probability, p, that the buyer rejects A]_ and that his own 
insistance on A]_ would lead to a conflict. By assumption 
Us(Ai) >'Us(A2) and U^fA^) >U^(A2_). Now if the seller re­
jects A2 the probability of him obtaining A^ is (1-p). On the 
assumption that the two parties will maximize expected util­
*Zeuthen's theory is given as presented by Harsanyi (46) 
for reasons which will become evident in the next section. 
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ity, the seller will accept A2 only if UgfA^) > (l-p)Ug(A2_) or 
Us(Ai) - UgfAg) 
(1.11) p> 
Us(Al) 
If the inequality in equation (1.11) is reversed, the seller 
will hold out for A^. If equality holds in equation (1.11), 
the seller would be indifferent between accepting A2 and 
holding out for A-j^. The quotient in equation (1.11) was thus 
defined by Zeuthen as the maximum risk of a conflict that the 
seller would prefer to take in holding out for A^ rather than 
accepting the opponent's unfavorable terms, A2. Alternatively 
this quotient may be interpreted as an index of the seller's 
toughness in holding out for A^. 
Zeuthen's principle now states that a party will make à 
concession to his opponent once he finds that the latter's 
maximum risk of a conflict is greater than is his own. That 
is, the seller' will make a concession if 
- «s'Âg) , 
Us(Al) ^ Ut,(ji2) 
or equivalently if 
(1.13) Ug(A2)U^(A2) > U^(A^)U3(A^). 
The concession must be large enough to reverse the inequality. 
If the inequality is reversed, the buyer will concede so as 
to reverse the inequality again. T-he process stops and bar­
gaining terminates when A^ = A2. If equality holds in (1.12) 
or (1.13) but A^ y A2, Zeuthen assumes that each party will 
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concede in order to avoid a deadlock. It is readily seen that 
(1.13) reaches a maximum when equality holds between A]_ and A2 
since a concession by either party will reverse the inequality 
or, with the final negotiation, force an equality at the point 
= A2 • 
Pen (84) has also developed a bargaining theory which 
exhibits an equilibrium for the bargain. In Pen's theory, the 
parties' preferences are fully described by cardinal "ophelim-
ity" functions and choice is dictated by the hypothesized 
maximization of expected value of the outcome. The seller's 
preferences are described by the utility function, Ug, which 
has a maximum at the seller's most preferred bargain, Ag. 
The bargain A is supposed to be one which has somehow come 
under discussion and we assume Ug(Ag) >Ug(A). The improve­
ment in the position which the seller hopes to attain by bar­
gaining for Ag rather than accepting A equals Ug(Ag) - Ug(A). 
But bargaining also involves some expected risk, p, of a con­
flict with which is associated the utility function, Ug(C). 
If the seller continues to seek his most preferred bargain but 
the buyer refuses to yield so that a conflict results, the 
seller will lose the utility associated with bargain A and 
gain Ug(C). Thus the utility of a loss to the seller if the 
buyer refuses to concede is Ug(A) - Ug(C). 
Pen assumes the seller will continue to bargain only so 
long as the expected value of the gain anticipated is at least 
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UgU) - Us(c) 
equal to that of the loss feared, 
(1.14) (1-p) Us(As) - Us(A) > p 
or 
(1.15) Us(A)<(l-p)Us(As) - pUs(C). 
Now there is a maximum p at which the equality holds in 
equations (l.l4) and (1.15) so that when p = Pmax» the point 
of equilibrium for the seller is reached. Pen (84, p. 129) 
calls Pmax the "actuarial index of the propensity to fight". 
Similarly there is an equilibrium point for the buyer. Equi­
librium between the two bargainers will not be reached, how­
ever, until the equality holds for both bargainers simul­
taneously and both equations exhibit the same bargain, A. 
According to Pen (34, p. 137), 
The function of the bargaining process is to trans­
form the relevant magnitudes and relations in such 
a way that the equilibrium conditions are no longer 
in conflict. At the moment when both equations, 
which originally gave different values for (A), 
are transformed to such an extent that the solu­
tions of (A) display the same value, equilibrium 
has been reached and the contract is concluded at 
this value of (A). 
This transformation of equations comes about through an 
attempt by each party to effect a change in his opponent's 
utility functions by those means listed on pages 15-16 above. 
Thus we see that Pen's and Zeuthen's theories are similar in 
that they both depend on a probability of conflict. Zeuthen 
leaves p unexplained or assumes it to be known in advance of 
negotiations. . Pen, however, assumes each party will estimate 
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p based on some function of the expected preference of the 
opponent for A over C. 
Several other abstractions of the bargaining process have 
been suggested (see e.g., 103, PP• 13-26, 63-67, 147-152) 
including that of Von Neumann and Morgenstern in the Theory of 
Games and Economic Behavior (119) • Although they were unable 
to develop a determinate solution to the bargaining problem, 
several authors have succeeded- in using the Von Neumann-
Morgenstern theory as a basis for the development of such 
determinate solutions. In general, however, -the latter are 
formulated under different sets of assumptions and lead to 
quite different outcomes. 
A comprehensive review of the game-theoretical treatment 
of the bargaining problem will not be attempted here. It is, 
however, necessary to review the important assumptions which 
render the theory wholly or partially invalid as an analytical 
technique with which to study bargaining behavior. We shall 
limit our discussion of this topic to the "cooperative" theory 
of Von Neumann and Morgenstern and to the "non-cooperative" or 
arbitration scheme of Nash, both of which prescribe solutions 
in some sense to the non-zero-sum game. A knowledge of the 
underlying ideas of two-person game theory and of the method 
of solution of such games is assumed.* " " 
•'^To the individual unfamiliar with zero-sum and non-zero-
sum game theory, arbitration schemes, and decision theory, the 
book by Luce and fiaiffa (70) is (continued on next page) 
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A fundamental concept in game theory is that of a strat­
egy. A strategy for one player is a complete enumeration of 
all actions this player will take for every contingency which 
might arise as a result of some chance event or of a move by 
the opposing player(s). Thus a strategy is some rule which 
stipulates the player's i^^ move and takes into account every­
thing that has happened prior to this i^^ move (see 99» PP» 
5-7)• The strategy may be pure (consisting of only one pos­
sible choice of moves) or mixed (consisting of more than one 
possible choice, the selection of one being made by some 
random device in accordance with the probabilities in the 
mixture) and the number of possible choices are assumed to be 
finite and known. 
The second fundamental concept in game theory is that of 
the payoff. The payoff is a rule which stipulates how much 
utility one player may expect to gain if he plays any particu­
lar strategy from his set of available strategies and his 
opponent(s) plays any particular strategy from his (their) 
(footnote continued from previous page) highly recommended. 
Although a knowledge of Von Neumann-Morgenstern cardinal util­
ity is not essential to the analytical study of the struc­
ture of games and their solutions, it is essential to a know­
ledge of the foundations of game theory. An excellent pre­
sentation and critical evaluation of cardinal utility theory 
will be.found again in Luce and ftaiffa (70) as well as in 
Rothenberg (89, pp. 200-276). Finally Luce and Baiffa (70) 
and Bishop (14) present the best available summary of the 
various theories designed to analyze the bargaining problem 
in a game theory framework. 
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set. The payoff function is always evaluated in terms of 
appropriate utility units. If the solution to the game re­
quires a mixed strategy, then an expected payoff function is 
correspondingly introduced. In general it is assumed that 
each player knows with certainty his own and his opponent's 
possible strategies and corresponding payoffs. 
It has been suggested by Von Neumann and Morgenstern that 
the rational way to play a two-person zero-sum game is for a 
player to adopt a strategy from his strategy set which would 
guarantee him the maximum of the minimum possible payoffs 
that could be enforced by his opponent. Such a pessimistic 
strategy choice yields each player his maxmin payoff. Von 
Neumann and worgenstern call the maxmin payoffs the value of 
the game since in a two-person zero-sum game what oji£ player 
wins the other loses (see 70» P* 67)• 
Begardless of whether or not one accepts the above norma­
tive suggestion of Von Neumann and Morgenstern, there exist 
other and more important limitations of the applicability of 
this theory to the bargaining problem. In the first place a 
realistic bargaining situation is likely to involve more than 
two persons as suggested in the previous section and to fall 
outside the domain of the zero-sum restriction. Accordingly 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern attempted to develop an n-person, 
non-zero-sum theory. In such a situation they supgested that 
the players should "cooperate" so as to maximize their joint 
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gain and agree to make side-payments, if necessary, so long 
as their final (expected) payoff is at least as large as their 
respective maxmin payoffs. Hence they assumed that the util­
ity in which a player is paid serves as money, even if it is 
not, being infinitely divisible, freely transferable from one 
player to another, and conservable in the sense that the util­
ity gained by the recipient of a side payment exactly equals 
the utility lost by the player making the side payment (see 
69, pp. 159-160). 
According to these assumptions, the players will cooper­
ate and play that combination of strategies (not necessarily 
pure strategies) for which the sum of their utilities is a 
maximum. The solution, however, consists of a set of "impu­
tations", or possible final payoff vectors, such that (70, 
pp. 199-201); 
a-no one imputation in the set dominates another 
imputation in the set, and 
b-any imputation outside the set is dominated by 
one imputation in the set. 
If we let Vjj. be the k^^ player's maxmin payoff found by solv­
ing the game as if it were a zero-sum game in which player k 
opposed the coalition, T, of all other n-1 players, be the 
^th player's final payoff, and Vg be the maximum of the play­
ers' joint gains, then 7^ =(v£, V|, . . ., V*) is an imputation 
if and only if 
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(1.16) all k = 1, 2, . . n, and 
(1.17) ^ Vj = Vg. 
Further, we say that the imputation Y = (y^, yg, , y^) 
dominates the imputation X = (X]_, Xgj , with respect 
to the coalition C provided C is not empty (i.e., contains at 
least t%fo players) and that 
(1.13) V(C) > ^  y., V(C) being the maxmin value 
iec for coalition C, and 
(1.19) 71 for every icc. 
The first of these two conditions states that Y must be 
feasible in the sense that the members of C can expect to have 
the amount prescribed by Y to distribute among themselves. If 
/ yz exceeded the maxmin value for coalition G in or>Posi-
tion to coalition not-C, the members of C, being rather pes­
simistic, would not be convinced of the possibility of obtain­
ing what they are offered by Y. The second condition simply 
expresses that all clayers in C have a positive motive for 
preferring- Y to X. 
The von Neumann-Morgenstern theory thus finds its 
counterpart in Fellner's non-game-theoretical joint maximiza­
tion theory of bilateral monopoly described above. The "nego­
tiation set" (the set of feasible imputations) consists of 
all undominated imputations or payoff vectors (the Pareto-
optimal set) for which each player gets at least his maxmin 
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value. There may be an infinity of such imputations, but 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern feel that, within the 
framework of game theory, further restrictions are 
not possible and that in any bargaining context 
the actual selection of an outcome from the multi­
plicity of points in the negotiation set depends 
on certain psychological characteristics of the 
players. (70, p. 1$2) 
A second objection to the above formulation is that it 
assumes away the possibility that a player may threaten an 
opponent with some unfavorable action for refusing to accept 
the stated terms. In general, the threat involves mutual 
discomfort if carried out. 
The distinctive feature of this threat is that 
the threatener has no incentive to carry it out 
either before the event or after. He does have 
an incentive to bind himself to fulfill the 
threat, if he thinks the threat maybe success­
ful, because the threat and not its fulfillment 
gains the end; and fulfillment is not required if 
the threat succeeds. The more certain the con­
tingent fulfillment is, the less likely is 
actual fulfillment. But the threat's efficacy 
depends on the credulity of the other party, and 
the threat is ineffectual unless the threatener 
can rearrange or display his own incentives so 
as to demonstrate that he would, ex post, have 
an incentive to carry it out. (95» PD. 35-36) 
Frequently, in such situations, parties fail to reach an 
agreement, and the threats have to be carried out. Hence 
players are often willing to submit their conflict to an im­
partial arbiter who will resolve the problem by suggesting a 
solution which he must be prepared to defend. The principles 
used by this arbiter in settling disputes are not well defined 
nor are they necessarily the same from game to game. In gen­
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eral, they will include "fairness", "reasonableness", and 
"consistency" (70, p. 121). Regardless of the principles in­
volved, the result is to associate Kith the conflict of in­
terest a single solution. Therefore we define an arbitration 
scheme to be the rule(s) which associates a unique payoff (the 
arbitrated solution) to the players of the game. 
One "such arbitration scheme proposed by. Nash (79) results 
in a bargain which maximizes the product of the players' 
utility increments from the "threat point". In the absence 
of some mutually advantageous agreement, the parties have 
options as to the strategy they may unilaterally adopt. To 
determine these strategies the players enrage in a threat 
game and choose "optimal" threat strategies which determine 
Nash's threat point. 
The threat strategies chosen are optimal in the sense 
that they guarantee the largest amount of damage to the 
players' opponent no matter what action the opponent may take 
in the threat game, and at the same time yield the threaten­
ing player the largest possible payoff he can get regardless 
of the action his opponent chooses in the threat game (see 
.e.g., 99, pp. 50-51)' 
The bargain which maximizes the product of the players' 
utility increments from the threat point, Nash contends, is a 
"fair" division solution of the bargaining game in the sense 
that it satisfies the following axioms (70, p. 142): 
^3 
(1) the solution must be feasible—if H represents 
the closed convex payoff region, then the solu­
tion must be in R or on its boundary, 
(2) the solution must be Pareto optimal—there must 
be no other feasible payoffs in E which would 
give both players more than does the solution, 
(3) the solution must be invariant with respect to 
transformations of utility scales—i.e., inter­
personal comparison of utility is not allowed,* 
(4) the solution must be independent of the labels 
of the players if the bargaining game places 
the players in completely symmetric roles— 
i.e., suppose both players would receive the 
same payoff if they both played their optimal 
threat strategies (if both players had com­
pletely symmetric roles), then the solution 
of the bargaining same would award each player 
identical payoffs also, 
(5) the solution must be independent of irrelevant 
alternatives-—i.e.', if the solution to one 
game is a feasible solution for a game with 
fewer alternatives, then it should also be 
the final solution to the game with fewer 
alternatives providing both games have the 
same threat point, 
(6) the solution must not be increased for a 
player whose choice of strategies is restrict­
ed while at the same time the opponent's 
strategy choices remain unchanged, and 
(7) if one player is restricted to a single 
strategy, there exists a way of restricting 
his opponent to a single strategy without in­
creasing the return to the first player above 
that given by the solution. " 
Of the several non-game-theoretical "bargaining theories" 
that have been proposed, one of the first was that of Zeuthen. 
*It will be remembered from page above that the von 
Neumann-Morgenstern theory does allow interpersonal compari­
sons of utility. 
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Although the theories of Zeuthen and of Nash were based on 
quite different rationalizations, the former involving pat­
terns of concession when two bargainers have confronted one 
another with mutually incompatible initial demands and the 
latter based on a "fair" division scheme or on an axiomatic 
system, Harsanyi (46) has shown that both theories lead to a 
bargain which maximizes the product of the bargainers' gain 
over the threat point (see equation I.I3 above). The formal 
equivalence of the two theories may help explain some of the 
popularity of the Nash model, at least among economists. 
Nevertheless Nash's model is not entirely satisfactory as a 
rationalization of bargaining behavior for reasons we shall 
pursue in the next section. Each of these reasons are 
applicable, also, to the remaining game theoretical models 
that have been suggested; therefore, it seems undesirable to 
investigate any of the remaining models. 
Limitations of the Bargaining Theories 
Several different abstractions of the bargaining process 
have been proposed as we have seen above. However if the 
assumptions on which they are based are invalid or if impor­
tant variables have been omitted, derived conclusions are 
not likely to be very reliable. Indeed in this section we 
shall discover that most of the proposed theories do in fact 
disregard some important variables involved in the bargaining 
process. Further it will be argued that some of the assump­
tions on which these theories are based are subject to con­
siderable doubt. 
W e  have previously concluded that bargaining involves an 
alteration in or convergence of utility functions. Such 
alteration or convergence, it was argued, is to be effected 
by the particular bargaining strategy chosen. Investigations 
of the situation in a particular market may reveal that sig­
nificant gains are possible by bargaining. However, if the 
bargainer lacks the necessary skill and art of strategy to 
persuade his rival to concede, such gains may not be ex­
ploited (see 53» 'D• 26). The effectiveness of the selected 
bargaining strategy will then depend on the degree of influ­
ence one has over his opponent which in turn is a function 
of the factors available with which to influence an opponent's 
behavior during the bargaining process. Pellner (32), Pen 
(83, 84), Stevens (103) and others have pointed out in con­
siderable detail the importance of non-economic variables as 
determinants of bargaining strategy. Although such variables 
are generally recognized, they are not explicitly incorporated 
into the various theories proposed or are simply assumed away. 
Non-economic variables affect not only one's bargaining 
strategy, but also the way in which the opponent's behavior 
or utility function is altered during the bargaining process. 
This aspect has received virtually no consideration by the 
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proponents of bargaining theories to date. 
In an experimental study of bargaining and group deci­
sion making, Fouraker and Siesrel (37, 100) have drawn upon 
psychology for theoretical constructs in attempting to deal 
with the particular sorts of psychological factors which are 
significant in bargaining. One general conclusion of their 
work was that level of aspiration is an important determinant 
of the outcome within the bargaining rang-e. The authors state 
that 
As negotiations progressed, in the absence of 
information, the succession of bids served to 
(1) give experience to the subject, enabling, him . 
to establish a realistic level of aspiration, and 
(2) enable the subject to find means by which 
concessions could be made to the opponent without 
making offers below the aspiration level. Aspira- ' 
tion levels were modified as negotiations proceed­
ed, although it appears reasonable to suppose that 
the subject began the bargaining with an a priori 
minimum level of expectancy. (100, p. 90) 
Time or stage of negotiations, then, may have considerable 
influence on level of aspiration as suggested by Breimyer 
(19, p. 680; see also 98, p. 27). For example there may be 
some stage past which the possibility of any further gain 
will be more than offset by the added time and trouble re­
quired to continue bargaining. Thus a bargainer's level of 
aspiration will in part determine the level at which his 
initial demand or offer is established and how his demands or 
offers are revised as negotiations proceed. 
Further the possession of (or lack of) complete and accu­
gy­
rate information affects the outcome in the bargaining range 
by influencing one's toughness and aspiration level (see 37» 
p. 209; 100, p. 70). Increased knowledge may tend to increase 
one's confidence in his level of aspiration. As a result, he 
would "be more reluctant to make concessions below his aspira­
tion level—he would become more "tough" in the Pellner sense. 
An increase in information does not necessarily 
improve relations among the participants; it may 
causé them to identify contradictory goals and 
establish incompatible levels of aspiration. 
This may cause intense rivalistic behavior before 
the dispute can be resolved. (37» P. 209) 
Furthermore if either bargaining agent 
. . . does not have good information on supplies, 
the nature of derived demand, and the structure 
of the market, its bargaining power could be 
easily misused. If the . . 1 (bargaining agent) 
does not have good knowledge about supply re­
sponses, or consumers' tastes and desires, its 
bargaining power could be dissipated by its own 
activities in the long run. (26, p. 305) 
The kinds of information which a bargainer needs are: 
what demands would society consider too high or too low, what 
repercussions would result from governmental agencies should 
a strike result, what are the zero-profit limits of each 
party, and what are the conditions which determine the 
parties' ability to take and to inflict losses during a stale­
mate (e.g., each party's financial position, each party's 
ability to limit alternatives to his opponent, the monopo­
list's ability to limit supply of the product, governmental 
sanction of a particular method of inflicting a loss during 
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the stalemate, etc.). 
The assumption of complete knowledge is another serious 
limitation of the proposed bargaining models and particularly 
of the game theory models—i.e., complete knowledge of all 
one's own and all one's opponents' strategies and of the pay­
off matrix. A bargainer may use the tactics of bluff, per­
suasion, or committment in addition to threats as Schelling 
(95) points out although such tactics are generally ruled out 
in game theory. A bargainer may consider a strike of one 
week, two weeks, five weeks, eight weeks, or ten weeks as a 
strategy or he may consider them all as strategies. A. bar­
gainer's strategies may change during the bargaining process 
as additional information about his environment becomes 
clearer or becomes available. Hence not only is it likely 
that a bargainer will have incomplete knowledge about strat­
egies; he may not even be able-to make a reasonable list of 
the strategies with which the entire bargaining game will be 
played. 
In addition the bargainer may try to hide his true util­
ities or falsify his preferences which may lead to a non-
Pareto optimal solution contrary to most game-tjieory repre­
sentations of the bargaining problem. Further in the arbitra­
tion schemes, the arbiter must first attempt to discover the 
true utility functions of each player before he can decide on 
a "fair" division. Luce and kaiffa (70, p. 1J4) concluded 
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that 
. . . this reality is seriously idealized in game 
theory, and thereby the theory is severely re­
stricted. This is not to say that it is useless 
in all situations, but only that there is always 
the fear that the real problem may have been 
abstracted away. 
Finally a refusal to consider market situations charac­
terized as monopsonistic oligopoly, monopolistic oligopsony, 
or bilateral oligopoly has led to the absence of an adequate 
treatment of another feature of the bargaining problem in some 
situations. This is the relationship that exists among indi­
vidual sellers or among individual buyers and the resulting 
effect on the bargaining outcome. In what follows we will 
consider only the case of monopsonistic oligopoly—e.g., a 
few dairy cooperatives facing a single milk processor-
distributor—since the same considerations are applicable to 
the other two cases. 
At one extreme we may have absolute collusion among coop­
eratives (such as may occur if a central authority dictated 
all actions of all cooperatives) so that in effect bilateral 
monopoly -exists. At the other extreme, however, collusion is 
completely absent so that each cooperative acts entirely on 
its own and independently of the actions of other coopera­
tives. Between these extremes are in infinite array of de­
grees of collusion or cooperation. The case of complete 
collusion is evidently that advocated by the n-person non­
zero-sum p-ame theory of Von Neumann and Morgenstern and by the 
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joint-profit maximization theory of Pellner and is perhaps 
the most reasonable ideal to be attained. 
Suppose cooperative A decided to sell milk to cooperative 
E's handlers at a price lower than that for which cooperative 
B had previously bargained. Except in rare circumstances one 
would not expect cooperative B*s handlers to continue paying 
cooperative B a higher price than cooperative À. And in order 
to maintain its volume cooperative B may in turn underprice 
cooperative A. As a result the members of both cooperatives 
may suffer a loss in net income from the sale of milk. If 
however the two cooperatives were to work together so as to 
prevent such price-cutting tactics the members of both may 
benefit in the long run. 
This example is analogous to the "prisoners* dilemma" 
game described by game theorists. In such a game each player 
knows he will be better off if all players choose a coopera­
tive strategy rather than a non-cooperative strategy; how­
ever each player sees nothing to be gained (and in fact may 
lose) by playing a cooperative strategy unless there is some 
guarantee that opponents OT competitors will also (10, pp. 
361-362; 70, p. 95)' Hypothetically the payoff matrix for 
such a game may be: 
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Player B 
Cooperative Non-cooperative 
strategy strategy 
CD 
Cooperative 
strategy 
^ Non-cooperative 
cfi  ,  f  
strategy 
eu 
(5,5) (-4,6) 
(6,-4) (-3,-3) 
where the numbers in each parenthesis indicate the payoff to 
player A and to player B respectively. That is, if p'layer A 
plays his cooperative strategy while player B plays his non-
cooperative strategy the payoff to player A is negative four 
and to player E is six. In this game if player B played his 
non-cooperative strategy, player ^  would lose less by playing 
his non-cooperative strategy than by playing his cooperative 
strategy. Thus in order to protect himself for all con­
tingencies, player A may also choose his non-cooperative 
strategy causing both players to lose. 
In games of this nature, cooperation may not be 
achieved—i.e., the ideal may not be attained—unless outside 
forces encourage it. There are, evidently, instances in which 
such encouragement is provided by outside authority. Baumol 
(10, p. 362; 11, pp. 95-113), for example, argues that the 
"prisoners' dilemma" game is involved in the logic behind 
governmental control in a democratic society. That is anti-
inflationary measures, rationing, conscription, etc.. 
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. . . are designed, at least in part, to achieve 
the cooperation which alone can prevent the loss 
to each player from his trying to protect himself 
when he has no assurance that others will behave 
as required for their mutual interest. (10, p. 
362) 
In any event the degree of collusion present as well as 
the extent to which outside forces encourage or discourage it 
may have an important bearing on the bargaining problem. 
Hence for those cases where oligopolistic elements are char­
acteristic, the proposed bargaining theories may be inade­
quate. Other important limitations of the proposed theories 
are 1) the assumption that bargainers have complete knowledge, 
2) an inadequate explanation of the way in which utility func­
tions are altered during the bargaining process, and 3) an 
inadequate description of the participants' bargaining 
strategy. 
The Cooperative 
Since for the purposes of this study, at least one of 
the participants to the bargain will be a farmer cooperative 
rather than an individual bargainer, the distinguishing char­
acteristics of the cooperative need to be made explicit. Thus 
this section will be devoted to the relevant theory of the 
cooperative. 
Hulburt (5^» P- 1) defines an agricultural cooperative as 
. . .  a  b u s i n e s s  o r g a n i z a t i o n  u s u a l l y  i n c o r p o r a t e d ,  
owned and controlled by member agricultural pro­
ducers, which operates for the mutual benefit of 
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its members or patrons, on a cost basis after 
allowing for the expenses of operation and main­
tenance and any other authorized deductions for 
expansion and necessary reserves. 
A milk bargaining cooperative is no exception—its primary 
objective generally assumed to be that of obtaining for its 
members the highest possible price for their milk, or at least 
a price greater than.-.that which the , individual members would 
have received in the absence of the bargaining cooperative 
(see e.g., 88, pp. I3I-I34; 104-, p. 7). 
The literature on the theory of the cooperative is quite 
extensive, a thorough review of which will not be attempted 
here.* A particularly appealing and useful theoretical frame­
work for dealing with the cooperative is that adopted by Helm-
berger (48, pp. 42-56) in which the cooperative is viewed as 
a firm consisting of a physical plant and people whose activ­
ities are consciously coordinated toward achievement of the 
cooperative's goal. Guiding members toward achievement of 
this goal is the task of the "peak coordinator". 
Helmberger adopts Papandreou's (32) frame of reference 
for the study of the firm based on earlier work in organiza­
tion theory—notably the work of Barnard (5) and Simon (101). 
The purpose and desirability of such an approach has been 
*See Emelianoff (30), Nourse (81), Phillips (85), and 
jBobotka (87). An excellent review of Phillips' theory which 
is based largely on the work of Emelianoff, Nourse, and 
Bobotka will be found in Helmberger (48, pp. 26-42). 
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succintly stated by Boulding (15, pp. 11-15)î 
The traditional economic concept of the actor 
is that of the person—a single consumer or pro­
ducer, directing his behavior toward this or that 
variable as the conditions which surround him change. 
We have been increasingly aware that most decisions 
are made in a framework of organization, even though 
it remains true that decisions are actually made by 
persons. "A person acting in a role, however, is 
not the same thing as a person acting on his own 
behalf. 
• As we move toward more "realistic" theories of 
business behavior we find ourselves increasingly 
aware of what might be called the "larger environ­
ment" of the firm, both external and internal. Ex­
ternally the larger environment consists of atti­
tudes and opinions related to the firm on the part 
of government, other organizations, and the public 
at large. Internally the larger environment con­
sists of such factors as morale, self-confidence, 
and the attitudes toward the firm of those most 
intimately connected with it. This concern for the 
larger environment leads to "public relations" 
activity, directed both toward outsiders and in­
siders. This has been perhaps the fastest growing 
single item of business expenditures, yet it has 
received little attention from the theorists. 
In Papandreou's framework, it is not necessary that all 
members act in a rational manner but it is imperative that the 
peak coordinator do so for his decisions guide members toward• 
the common goal (see also 60, p. 9)• It is postulated that a 
specific goal exists, although not necessarily the goal of 
profit-maximization. Papandreou (82, pp. 205-213) was, in 
fact, in favor of substituting preference-function maximiza­
tion for the traditional profit-maximization hypothesis. 
The choice of the organization's goal as well as the 
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manner in which this goal is to be achieved, however, is a 
result of internal and external forces brought to bear on the 
organization (23, pp. 3^5-3^8). This goal must in some way 
be related to the desires of individual members, and the 
desires of individual members are conditioned by their pecu­
liar environment within and outside the organization. 
The essential feature of a goal is that it specifies 
a preferred state and guides action toward attain­
ment of this state. An individual goal specifies a 
preferred state for an individual and guides his 
action toward its attainment; a group goal specifies 
a preferred state for the group as an entity and 
guides collective action toward achieving it. The 
mere fact that individuals have similar preferred 
states for themselves does not mean that a pre­
ferred state for the groun exists. (23, pp. 348-
349) 
Thus a group goal which steers group activities toward, 
attainment* is conceived by Cartwright and Zander (23) at the 
group level in a manner similar to the conception of indi­
vidual goals at the individual level. This leaves open many 
questions as to how the choice of a group goal is made from 
among the alternatives or from among the individual goals-for-
the-group. But in most cases the group goal can be identified 
and we can immediately proceed to investigate the performance 
of the group in achieving its goal. 
Thus the group goal chosen will not necessarily corre­
spond to the goals of each and every member. This is more 
true in large heterogeneous groups, such as farm bargaining 
cooperatives, than in small homogeneous groups. In a farm 
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bargaining cooperative, for example, members will have differ­
ent sizes.and costs of operations, different combinations of 
enterprises, different product qualities, different attitudes 
toward governmental regulations, etc. (see 64, pp. 82-83). 
Such sources of group heterogeneity will contribute to intra-
group conflict through divergences between Individual and 
organizational goals and in-methods of achieving these goals. 
Intragroup conflict in many cases may lead to bitter, un-
resolvable differences which .can immobilize the organization 
and, therefore, is an undesirable attribute of the organiza­
tion (see also the footnote on page 58 below). 
Conversely in small, homogeneous groups such as unions 
of skilled craftsmen, differences in individual goals are apt 
to be low and, therefore, intragroup conflict is likely to be 
low. At the same time, however, it has been argued by March 
and Simon (76, pp. 121-122) that when mutual dependence on 
limited resources among members Increases as would be the case 
in a small craft union, the amount of felt need for joint 
decision-making will Increase resulting in increased intra­
group conflict. 
Two other factors leading to. Increased differences in 
individual goals and thus to increased Intragroup conflict are 
1) a small expectation of realizing the group's goal, and 
2) a low degree of member identification with the group (see 
76, pp. 65-66, 120). Thus several variables affect the- amount 
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of intragroup conflict found in an organization. The impor­
tance of this variable will be felt through the amount of sup­
port given to the organization's goal by its members. That 
is, intragroup conflict tends to reduce the amount of the 
group's control over its environment•as well as the uniformity 
of group opinion. And a reduction in these two factors tends 
to reduce the amount of pressure the group can exercise over 
its members to support the organization's.goal • (76, pp. $8-
61) . 
Whatever the group goal, it cannot be achieved unless the 
activities of members are consciously coordinated toward 
attainment. Such coordination Involves convincing members 
that the consequences associated with deviations from con­
formity with the organizational goal are more costly than non-
deviations. Thus, there must be some pressure over members to 
discourage such deviations. This pressure may originate from 
both internal and external sources. From the empirical 
efforts of researchers working in the area of group behavior, 
several'theoretical propositions have been suggested as to how 
such pressure may be strengthened or weakened. 
March and Simon (76, pp. 59-61) State that the strength 
of group pressures over members is a positive function of the 
group's control over the environment, member identification 
with the group, and uniformity of group opinion. Control over 
the environment restricts the number of alternatives available 
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to the group. Increased identification with the group and 
uniformity of group opinion decrease the desirability of seek-
'ing alternatives to the group's goal and reduce the possibil­
ity of receiving conflicting directions from the group. 
Empirical efforts have also suggested that the more unity 
and cohesiveness among members and the more frequent is inter­
action or communication within the group, the more uniform 
will be group opinion (76, pp. 59-61, 65-71) • That is, the 
greater the unity of purpose among members and the stronger 
is their desire and ability to discuss current issues and 
even attempt to persuade nonconforming members to seek the 
objectives of the group as a whole, the greater will be uni­
formity of opinion on the group goal.* 
Further the more cohesive the group, the more willing 
are its members to enforce group demands on the individual 
thus restricting intragroup conflict which would otherwise 
•weaken the group's control over the individual (76, pp. 60-
61). 
Frequency of interaction is postulated to be a positive 
function of several variables including the strength of cul­
tural pressures to participate, number of individual needs 
•^"Interaction is not to be confused with intragroup con­
flict. The former is essential to organizational progress and 
survival for the reasons mentioned. The latter, however, 
tends to stifle organizational progress and threatens organi­
zational survival (see 76, pp. 112-121). 
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satisfied in the group, extent to which goals are perceived 
as shared, group cohesiveness, and homogeneity of member back­
ground . Frequency of interaction is, in addition, a negative 
function of the size of the group since in large groups inter­
action is extremely more difficult than in small groups. 
Finally, in addition to inducing more uniformity of opinion, 
frequent interaction strengthens- member identification with 
the group and tends to encourage unity and cohesiveness within 
the group (see 76, pp. 64-71). 
An outline of the major propositions discussed above is 
provided in Figure 2.3» The positive and negative signs on 
the arrows indicate whether the functional relationships are 
positive or negative. More detail is available from March and 
Simon (76) on the theory of organizations, from Cartwright 
and Zander (23) on proup dynamics, and from Homanns (51) on 
the theory of interaction within a.group. The outline pic­
tured in Figure 2.3 is believed to emphasize most of the im­
portant variables we need to recognize in adopting "Papandreou' s 
concept of the firm. 
Thus the dairy bargaining cooperative shall at least 
initially be viewed as an organization which has as its pri­
mary poal attaining the highest possible price for its mem­
ber's milk. Further we shall take the manager of the coopera­
tive .to be the "peak coordinator" since he has been chosen to 
manage the affairs of the cooperative whether by directly 
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making decisions or by delegating authority to make decisions 
on behalf of the members of the cooperative. This conception 
of the bargaining cooperative does not, however, in and of 
itself require any modifications on the theory of bilaterally 
restricted competition so long as the cooperative and the 
processor-distributor are still motivated by the profit max­
imization principle. 
Objectives of the Study 
The situation as depicted by Zeuthen (122), Von Neumann 
and Morgenstern (119)» Pen (84) et is a gross oversimpli­
fication of the real-world bargaining situation. This criti­
cism follows from the fact that the proposed theories are in­
complete—i.e., a host of variables which may materially 
affect the- outcome of the bargaining process are treated exo-
genously- or are simply abstracted away. Part of this diffi­
culty can be traced tc a lack of a thorough consideration of 
the dynamic aspects of the bargaining process, to the extreme 
difficulty of incorporating the omitted variables into a theo­
retical framework, and to an insufficient knowledge of the 
parties' bargaining strategy as well as of the means at their 
disposal with which to secure their bargaining objective. 
As Fellner has argued (see page 28 above) the kind of 
variables with which we must be concerned are not the most 
desirable kind of variables with which to work, but by avoid­
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ing them we may be disregarding some of the most important 
economic problems of the day. Further even if sufficient data 
were available with which to predict the bargaining outcome 
by the use of any one" of the proposed bargaining theories re­
viewed, predictions are not likely to be very reliable. 
The importance of the exogenously treated variables has 
been recognized by those attempting to reach a conclusion on 
the question of whether or not agricultural bargaining coop­
eratives can secure positive economic gains for their members 
(21, 53» 73)' An answer to this question necessarily involves 
solving the problems of measuring the performance of the bar­
gaining cooperative. It has been recognized that performance, 
however, is a function of not only price but also many non-
price terms of sale which directly or indirectly affect 
farmers' income. In addition to the economic factors, there 
are leral considerations as well as the complex of psycho­
logical variables affecting decision making and human rela­
tions amon^r members and between members and processors. . Fin­
ally the intangible factor of bargaining skill in devising 
and using various strategies must be considered. 
It seems plausible that before an adequate abstraction 
of the bargaining process can be attempted, a thorough know­
ledge of these specific factors is required.- Several of the 
items to which we refer have been discussed directly or in­
directly by various researchers and practitioners; however. 
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there has been no empirical work of which the author is aware 
establishing the specific factors used by milk bargaining 
cooperatives, nor of the extent to which they are used. 
Such omissions or gaps in our present state of knowledge 
points up the need for a comprehensive study and analysis of 
the economic and non-economic factors directly or indirectly 
affecting the performance of a bargaining cooperative. 
Accordingly it shall be the purpose of this dissertation to 
investigate the various factors at dairy bargaining coopera­
tives* disposal with which to secure their bargaining objec­
tive, and the extent to which these meajis are utilized in 
negotiations with processors and distributors of milk and milk 
products. 
Usefulness of Hesults 
The results of this study could be used by dairy bargain­
ing cooperatives themselves in an attempt to improve their 
bargaining effectiveness in seeking higher prices. In addi­
tion other researchers may find the results of this study use-
» 
ful in evaluating and in working out methods of improving the 
performance of the dairy industry. 
• Finally it is hoped that this study will provide some of 
the information needed for a better understanding of the com­
plex bargaining process. It is not inconceivable, for in­
stance, that these results will ultimately pave the way for 
6^• 
a more realistic model that would provide refutable hypoth­
eses, and that could subsequently be used to predict the 
effect of changes in various structural and behavioral vari­
ables on negotiated prices. 
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HYPOTHESES 
In the preceding chapter it was assumed that the objec­
tive of the cooperative would be to secure the highest pos­
sible price for its members' produce by bargaining with 
processor-distributors. The purpose of this chapter then is 
to develop specific hypotheses as to the means at dairy bar­
gaining cooperatives' disposal with which to exact this higher 
price from processors and distributors through the bargaining 
process. 
The relevant theoretical groundwork on bilaterally re­
stricted competition, bargaining, and the cooperative has been 
set out in the previous chapter. The problem now is to 
utilize this theory and the concepts described in developing 
•these hypotheses. Also in this chapter the peculiar environ­
mental and institutional characteristics of the bargainers 
will need to be established in sufficient detail in order to 
judge the applicability of,this theory to our problem and to 
determine what modifications, if any, are required. 
The Cooperative 
Securing recognition . 
In the absence of the dairy cooperative, it was pre­
viously argued, dairy farmers sell in essentially pure compe­
tition with one another. In such a situation they are price-
takers and subject, they argue, to possible unfair treatment 
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from the processors and distributors of milk and milk prod­
ucts. For this reason farmers form a bargaining cooperative 
for the purpose of enhancing the price received for their 
milk. The basic reason for the formation of this coopera­
tive, however, is that the individual farmer is not powerful 
enough to bargain with the processor over the price of milk— 
i.e., he cannot secure recognition as an exclusive bargaining 
agent. 
Now if there is only one cooperative (which embraces all 
dairy producers and can control their production) dealing with 
a single distributor of bottled milk, it is appropriate.to 
treat cooperative bargaining within the bilateral monopoly 
framework outlined in the previous chapter. Under the Fellner 
hypothesis, the two parties will exchange that output of milk 
at which their joint profits are a maximum and will settle 
for a price lying somewhere between their zero-profit limits. 
If the cooperative did not exist, farmers would be price-
takers and have to settle for a price on their aggregate 
average cost curve or for the zero-profit limit of the coop­
erative . 
If the cooperative is.to secure a price for its members 
higher than the members could have received individually, it 
will have to be able to bargain with the milk dealer for this 
price—and that is what Fellner suggests will happen. Hence, 
one of the first things the cooperative will need to do is 
secure recognition from this dealer as the exclusive bargain­
ing agent of its members. Under our assumed conditions, there 
should be no difficulty in securing this recognition. The 
dealer will know (or soon find out) that there is no other 
source of milk available to it; consequently, it will have to 
bargain with the cooperative or, presumably, receive no milk 
at all. That is, the cooperative could, by an exercise of 
its type II bargaining power, call a milk strike. Just as 
importantly, some authors argue as we have seen before, the 
cooperative could threaten to call a milk strike. 
If, on the other hand, there are alternative sources of 
milk available to the dealer (i.e., more than one cooperative), 
this result is not necessary unless absolute collusion exists 
betweer all cooperatives supplying milk to the individual milk 
dealer. We saw in the first chapter that there are at present 
seven differert dairy cooperatives in Iowa handling fluid 
milk. Further, as we shall see later, there are several dairy 
farmers in Iowa who are not members of any dairy cooperative. 
Therefore, we conclude initially that there are alternative 
sources of milk available to milk dealers in Iowa. 
One way for at least partial collusion to come about is 
through mergers and federations of cooperatives (see 4-3, 105) • 
Mergers simply involve, the collapsing of two or more coopera­
tives into, one new, larger cooperative. Thus in a merger, 
cooperatives must jrive up their rights, prestige and preroga-
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tives as individual associations. 
In a federation, on the other hand, individual associa­
tions do not lose their identity and will continue a number of 
local activities including bargaining with handlers. 'Activ­
ities involving the group, however, will be handled by a 
central authority. Such activities nay include group bargain­
ing, pooling arrangements, and other agreements between the 
cooperatives. In those instances where interarea milk ship­
ments are possible or where intermingling of market areas have 
become commonplace, federations and mergers provide one means 
of increasing control over the supply of milk. 
If, however, such collusive tactics between a group of 
cooperatives are not possible, an individual cooperative will 
have to resort to other means of securing recognition as 
exclusive bargaining agent. Several questions may be involved 
in determining whether or not the cooperative can secure such 
recognition. Spaeth (102, p. 119)5 for example, notes that 
there is a continuing question in the negotiations between the 
Michigan Milk Producers Association and milk dealers in 
Detroit and Southern Michigan of whether or not it is legal 
for bottlers to meet in a body to negotiate with the associa­
tion over the price of milk. A large majority of the dealers 
contend that such a-mee.ting is illegal. As a result, only a 
small proportion of the dealers showed up for the I962 nego­
tiations. Further, as noted by McMillan (72, pp. 30-31)» 
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recognition as the exclusive bargaining agent generally in­
volves a test of the question whether or not the cooperative 
h-as a sufficient volume to be of concern to the opponent (see 
also 21, pp. 8-9; 67» p. 49). If the. cooperative is unable 
to secure this recognition, it will fail to achieve its pri­
mary objective and, in the absence of any other services it may 
perform for members will cease to be a useful organization. 
Volume 
Thus in order to be effective in attempting to secure the 
higher price the cooperative is seeking, it must have a sig­
nificant control over something the other party wants or 
needs—in our case milk—for the successful operation of this 
party's business. The way for dairy bargaining cooperatives 
to get this control is to attract as many dairy producers as 
possible into membership and to discourage them from resigning 
once they have become members. 
The milk bargaining cooperative as a collection of small 
unorganized firms must then be large enough to bargain effec­
tively with other organizations or firms which are larger and 
more powerful than the individual unorganized farmer firms. 
This strength is not derived from capital assets as is often 
the case with its opponents, but rather, we hypothesize, from 
the uniform contracts it has with members. These contracts 
enable the cooperative to bargain over the price of the aggre­
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gate amount of milk produced by the individual members?—any 
one of whom may resign at a prescribed time. Each individual's 
decision to remain in the cooperative or to resign is likely 
to be in part a function of the costs of being a member of 
the cooperative and of the estimated .returns achieved over 
and above the returns that could have been achieved had he 
negotiated a price on his own. 
In addition, however, the individual's decision to remain 
in the cooperative is a function of the pressures exerted by 
the cooperative to discourage resignation. Membership con­
tracts provide one source of such pressure. In the first 
place, these contracts serve as the vehicle through which 
members legally bind themselves together in order to jointly 
market their product and hence through which bargaining power 
may be obtained. Further it is through the use of such con­
tracts that cooperatives can assess members damages for 
breach of contract or for sej.ling- their produce contrary to 
the provisions of the agreement (72, pp. 2^—30). Granting 
the cooperative.the right to punish members for breach of 
contract is itself a factor discouraging violation of agree­
ments, but it is also a result of or a reflection of unity 
and cohesion within the cooperative (64, p. 87). Members 
would not be willing to join the cooperative which had such 
powers or vote such authority to the cooperative unless they 
were sure they wanted to support the organization knowing 
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full well that such authority may be used on them. Thus mem­
bership contracts are hypothesized to be of crucial importance 
to milk bargaining cooperatives for two reasons—1) they serve 
to bind members together and 2) they are symptoms of the exis­
tence of other important factors within the organization. 
The entry of non-cooperating milk producers introduces 
further complications into the problem of treating cooperative 
bargaining in a bilateral monopoly framework. In the first 
place, it behooves the bottler or processor of milk from a 
strategic point of view to pay nonmember producers a price no 
lower than it nays member producers. Otherwise the nonmember 
producers would also join the cooperative. Nonmembers who 
sell their milk to the same bottlers as do members would, 
thus, receive a price no lower than the price negotiated by 
the bargaining cooperative but, of course, would not have to 
pay a percentage of their gross income paid by members to sup­
port and maintain the cooperative. Thus it may be tempting 
for members to resign and increase their income by the amount 
of the fee required by the cooperative. Secondly, members may 
be lured away from the cooperative as a result of a handler 
agreeing to pay an individual nonmember a price exceeding that 
which he pays members providing the individual agrees to re­
main a nonmember. The effect of this strategy on the part of 
the handler is to reduce short-run profits, but over the long-
run enough producers may be encouraged to resign from the 
cooperative so that the cooperative no longer has enough 
volume to be of concern to the handler (see e.g., 24, p. 
1299). 
Under such conditions- it will probably be to the member's 
advantage to withdraw from membership unless he claces above 
individual advantage, good standing or prestige in the group. 
If this is-the case he will 'proba,bly remain in the cooperative 
only if he -is confident that the other members will; and, as 
Pellher- (.32, p. 42) points out with regard to violating agree­
ments, "in an atomistic group he cannot be confident unless he 
knows of himself and believes of the others that he and they 
consider it repulsive to benefit at each other's expense." 
Hence in such situations, unless the cooperative is particu­
larly adept at developing "esprit de corps" within the organi­
zation, effective member coordination will not be obtained and 
the organization may not survive. Bargaining associations 
are quite aware of this problem as exemplified by the follow­
ing statement by Freeman (39» p* 56) concerning the vegetable 
industry: "Developing and maintaining grower support in a 
voluntary cooperative bargaining association is the perennial 
problem that is the greatest single weakness in the concept of 
a bargaining association." 
One way to develop "esprit de corps" within the organiza­
tion, as we saw before, is to strengthen members' identifica­
tion with the group and to increase the amount of interaction 
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or communication within the group.. Both of these variables, 
organizational theorists argue, increase with the number of 
individual needs satisfied within the organization. Hence, 
to develop and maintain membership support, we hypothesize 
that dairy bargaining cooperatives will actively engage in 
the provision of services to its members in addition to price 
negotiation. These additional services may include such 
thinsrs as conducting quality-improvement work and keeping 
members,informed of the results of such work, assembling 
market information for use by farmer-members in production 
planning, acquiring and maintaining control over facilities 
or outlets for handling surplus milk, distributing bottled 
milk to retail units, etc. 
The cooperative's exercise of Type 11 bargaining power 
It was previously argued that if there is only one coop­
erative which embraces all milk producers and controls its 
members' supply, only one bottler, and no outside interfer­
ence, the cooperative can by an exercise of its type II bar­
gaining power in calling a milk strike, create a situation 
in which the bottler receives no milk. This is obviously 
unfavorable from the bottler's standpoint since he would have 
to stand the fixed costs of remaining idle. With the intro­
duction of other cooperatives, a milk strike would still be 
costly to the bottler, but now he may be able to obtain a 
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supply of milk in spite of the striking cooperative. The 
bottler may, for example, obtain this milk by going outside 
his usual market area and paying the additional costs of 
transporting milk over the longer distance. The smaller the 
cooperative's percentage control of the milk supply in the 
normal milkshed, the less far the distributor has to go to 
secure an equal volume of milk and therefore, the less is the 
cooperative's type II bargaining power. 
Cne of the earliest known milk strikes was recorded in 
New York. In February, I883, an association of Grange County, 
New York dairymen withheld their milk from dealers for a one-
half cent per quart increase in the price of fluid milk. 
Within three days the producer association had contracted for 
nearly all tney had demanded and, further, they maintained 
this price for more than a year (3I, p. 139). For the next 
thirty years milk strikes were practically non-existent; how­
ever, during the period of rapidly rising prices after war 
broke out in Europe, producers frequently used the strike to 
enforce their demands. Lrdman (3I, pp. I6O-I6I) reports that 
between 1915-1921 there was hardly a large city which escaped 
the experience of a milk strike. Outstanding examples were 
the Chicago strike in the spring of I916 and the New York 
strike in August, I916. Most of these attempts at striking 
were successful in the sense that producers received higher 
prices. However, both parties sustained considerable losses 
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in monetary terms as well as in terms of consumer good will. 
Similar attempts to force bottlers to pay higher prices 
for milk were recorded in Iowa (44, pp. 42-43, 50-51)* 1% 
July, 1917 the Des Koines Milk Producers' Association called 
a milk strike only to be contested as a combination in re­
straint of trade. In September, I920 the Iowa Dairy Marketing 
Association of Oskaloosa called a milk strike. Within three 
months the distributor agreed to pay the cooperative a higher 
price. In July, 1922 the newly formed Sioux City Dairy Mar­
keting Association called a milk strike, but abandoned the 
idea when the milk dealer secured milk from cities as far 
away as Dubuque, Iowa, and Lincoln, Nebraska. 
Even though some of these attempts resulted in the sign­
ing of a contract between producers and milk dealers which 
stipulated, among other things, how prices would be deter­
mined and how much of the producers* milk the dealer would 
take, producers suffered a considerable loss during the time 
the strike was in effect. Dealers also sustained a loss by 
having to pay higher transportation costs for securing out­
side milk. In addition, the general public was antagonistic 
as a result of having to pay a higher price for their milk at 
retail during the strike period. 
More recently dairy farmers have attempted to utilize 
the tactics of labor unions and the leadership of organized 
labor in bargaining for milk prices. During 1955-1957 groups 
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of producers in New Jersey, Michigan, and Ohio were so organ­
ized—the first two actually calling a strike. These attempts 
at organization and striking either failed or were unable to 
survive the formative stages, however. In late 1959 a similar 
attempt was made in the Pittsburgh area in which 25 dairy pro­
ducers organized a union and became affiliated with the Team­
sters Labor Union. As a result of a strike called by this , 
union of farmers, a contract was negotiated with the milk 
dealer which stipulated that the dealer would purchase all of 
the milk produced by these farmers and how prices would be. 
determined fcr-this milk (see 3» 56, 118). 
Cn the whole, however, there seems to have been only 
limited interest among farmers in calling a milk strike. In 
the first place, milk is a very perishable product not adapted 
tc storing. Consequently, if held off the market for any 
length of tize it must be dumped or utilized as livestock 
feed. In either case, the returns are likely to be substan­
tially lower than the costs of production. Because of the 
small financial reserves and the typically large debt load of 
farmers as well as the. relatively low profitability of farming 
in recent years, farmers are' undoubtedly in no position to 
sustain such losses fcr any length of time. Further, if a 
milk strike should materialize, the general public through 
the press and legal action may exert a considerable amount of 
pressure on farmers tc put a stop to the strike. Thus 
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farmers, in general, are probably not in a very good position 
tc suffer the consequences of a strike. As Fellner and others 
have suggested this may be an important factor affecting the 
cooperative's bargaining ability. 
In addition, for this to be an effective weapon we 
hypothesize that the bargaining cooperative must have alterna­
tive outlets for its members' milk in order to eliminate the 
necessity of keeping milk off the market that it is withhold­
ing from one or more milk dealers—i.e., to prevent the neces­
sity of dumping milk. Hence the cooperative must know where 
its alternative outlets are ard what additional costs would be 
involved in selling milk to each, what alternative sources of 
milk are available to the bottlers and what additional costs 
the bottlers would have to sustain in securing this milk, and 
the conditions of demand for the final product. This informa­
tion would enable the cooperative to determine a reasonable 
asking price in the face of these conditions of the bargainer's 
"extra-negotiation" environment. If the cooperative had no 
information about the demand for the final product, nor con­
sequently of the derived demand for milk produced by its mem­
bers, the price it de.cided to ask for its members' milk could 
only be determined from past bargaining experiences or else 
set arbitrarily. .Further if the cooperative was uninformed 
about the costs it had to incur in selling milk to other 
bottlers and about the cost to the bottlers of securing milk 
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from other cooperatives, it may be demanding a price higher 
than that for which the bottler could get an alternative sup­
ply of milk, or it may be refusing an offer that is higher 
than the net price it could get by selling its milk to an 
alternative outlet. Thus, as was emphasized in the previous 
chapter, the amount of information possessed and the accuracy 
of this information may play an important role in the coop­
erative's ability to.attain its bargaining objective. 
The cooperative's exercise of tybe I bargaining rower 
We have just considered some of the means at the coop­
erative's disposal with which it can exercise its type II bar­
gaining power and thereby make the consequences of disagree­
ing with its terms so unfavorable to the bottler that the 
latter will be forced to agree on the former's terms. The 
next question is are there other means at the cooperative's 
disposal with which to force concessions or to effect agree­
ments on its terms—namely by making its opponent an offer 
so favorable that the opponent cannot afford to refuse. 
This kind of bargaining power requires enough producers 
so organized that they can offer advantages to bottlers that 
individual producers could not offer and thereby justify 
higher returns for their milk supply. A milk bargaining coop­
erative may, for example, offer services to several bottlers 
at a cost lower than these bottlers could achieve by provid­
ing the service themselves. Such services might include 
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producer check writing, product standardization, fat tests, 
more efficient marketing or hauling methods, and offering milk 
of higher quality than individual members could supply as a 
result of the cooperative's stricter control over sanitary 
conditions. In addition a merger or federation of several 
bargaining cooperatives may be able to offer better quality 
control through laboratory testing and plant supervision and 
may be able to eliminate some of the wide fluctuations in 
milk supply by covering a wider area (65, p« 3» 105» PP-
3-17). 
Prom the point of view of its applicability to coopera­
tive bargaining, a limiting assumption of the traditional 
bilateral monopoly theory is that the cooperative can control 
the output of its meinbers and therefore has no problem with 
"surplus" milk.* On the contrary dairy bargaining coopera­
tives generally do not attempt to limit production but rather 
agree to find a market for the entire volume of their members' 
milk (86, pn. 67-72). Further, the existence of large quan­
tities of surplus milk since the Korean War has presented new 
problems to bargaining cooperatives and bottlers in recent 
years (121, 55). 
•^Surplus milk is defined as milk of such quality approved 
by health regulations for fluid purposes that was in excess of 
the amount used in fluid milk and fluid milk products. Such 
milk is utilized in various manufactured dairy products in­
cluding ice cream., butter, and cheese (121, p. 6). 
A study'bf 97 markets'in the North Central Region in 1955 
(121), revealed that 27 percent of the total fluid milk supply 
in this region was surplus milk. In addition six percent of 
these markets reported 35 percent or more surplus milk—some 
as much as 50 percent. Since dealers must dispose of milk in 
excess of that quantity needed for fluid milk purposes, they 
will use the lower returns received for milk used in manu­
factured products (whether they must find another outlet for 
it or whether they have facilities for processing it them­
selves), and the relatively higher costs of handling an irreg­
ular quantity of milk as arguments for lower prices to farmers 
for surplus milk. 
If, however, the milk dealer does not have facilities for 
processing surplus milk, he will have to divert it to other 
processing firms. Thus another advantage the cooperative can 
offer handlers in return for the higher price sought is to 
divert milk not needed by bottlers for fluid purposes. 
Alternative outlets for the diversion of surplus milk may be 
the processing facilities of the cooperative itself, or of 
other firms or cooperatives equipped tc manufacture this milk. 
To assure bottlers that, it will divert this surplus milk, 
the cooperative may also use a full-supply contract. Such a 
contract specifies the time and place of delivery of milk and 
is an agreement between cooperative and bottler under which 
the cooperative supplies the bottler only as much milk as the 
bottler; needs for his regular operations. With such a contract 
the cooperative usually is the only source of the bottler's 
milk and must -secure' outside milk when supply is short. Thus 
the bottlér is relieved of handling an irregular supply of 
milk, of the added cost and trouble of disposing of any sur-' 
plus, and of finding extra sources of milk when supply is 
short (121, p. 29). 
The cooperative's bargaining objectives 
Nicholls (80, pp. 181-196) and Karris (^5» PP- 50"-53) 
argue that with the existence of surplus milk, a cooperative 
whose objective is to maximize member's net returns may want 
to negotiate a two-price plan—one price for fluid milk and 
a lower price for surplus milk. In other words the coopera­
tive may prefer to practice crice discrimination. 
It is well known that if a monopolist is able to sell 
his output in two distinct markets, if the elasticity of 
demand in the two markets is not equal, and if arbitrage by 
the consumers of his product is not possible, then it will be 
profitable for him to practice price discrimination by charg­
ing different prices in the two markets. Further, to maximize 
profits, he will sell that quantity in each market so as to 
equate marginal revenues, and charge' a higher price in that 
market in which demand is less elastic (49, pp. 170-171)* 
In. our case, however, the cooperative is assumed to have 
a fixed quantity of milk and that this quantity must be 
, 82 
marketed. Let us retain our previous assumption of fixed 
coefficients of production equal to unity and ignore the milk 
dealer's cost of production other than for the raw product. 
In addition assume that the cooperative will seek a price on 
the milk dealer's average revenue functions. Let 
= price received "by the cooperative for fluid milk 
P2 = price received by the cooperative for surplus milk 
X]_ = quantity, of fluid milk sold 
X2 = quantity of surplus milk sold 
X = X]_ + X2 
XQ = fixed quantity of milk which the cooperative 
must market 
C(X) = Xg(X) = cooperative's aggregate total cost function 
for X 
HjCXi) = Xnf^CXj) = milk dealer's total revenue function for 
the produce of X^ 
H2(X2) = ^ 2^2(^2) - dealer's total revenue function for 
the produce of X2 
TTj = X][P]_ + X2P2 - C(X) = cooperative's profit function. 
The cooperative's profit equation which is to be maxi­
mized is then 
(3.1) TTi = ki(Xi) + 82(^ 2) - C(X). 
But now we have a restriction on the profit equation--the 
cooperative's total quantity of milk must be sold, i.e., 
XQ - Xi + X2« Thus the equation to be maximized is 
(3.2) Tr° = &i(Xi) + &2(X2) - C(X) - A(Xq - X^ - Xg) 
where A is a La^rrangian multiplier. The necessary conditions 
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that equation (3.2) be a maximum are (49, pp. 272-274): 
(3.3) • 0 = - C*(X) + A = fi(Xi) + Xifî(Xi) -
• g(X) - Xg'(X) + X 
(3.4) 0 = ^2^X2) - C'(X) + X = f2(X2) + ^ 2^2(^2) " 
g(X) - Xg'(X) + X 
(3.5) 0 = Xg - Xl - Xg 
and the sufficient condition is that the sum of the slopes of 
the marginal revenue curves be negative, i.e., H"(X]_) + R2(X2) 
<:o. 
Cn taking the total differential of (3.I) with respect 
to XQ and substituting from the first order conditions, we 
dTtl \ 
find T-y- = - A. Further on solving eauations (3.30)-(3.5) 
a^o 
simultaneously for the unknowns X^, X2, and A in terms of 
the average revenue and cost functions and their slopes, we 
have : 
^2(^2) ~ ^^^2(^2) 0 
fl(Xi) - f2(X2) + ^ o^l('^l)l # 
(3'.6) 
(3.7) 
(3.8) 
Xi -
^2 -
A — ?(X) + Xg'(X) - f]_(X2_)f2(X2) + f2(X2)f2_(X2_) 
(1 + Xo) 0 
where 
0 = 
dTii 
fl(Xi) + ^ 2(^2) -1 
Since 3^ = - A, if A<0 increasing XQ will increase TT. while 
dAo -L 
i f  A > 0  i n c r e a s i n g  XQ will decrease TTi-
The condition for price discrimination to be profitable 
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to the cooperative is provided by equations (3*3) arid (3*4). 
Solving these two equations simultaneously in terms of 
and H2(X2) we find that the marginal revenue for X]_ and X2 
must be equal—the same result as for the unconstrained case. 
Further sinceand will normally be nega­
tive and since fjCX^), "^l* .^2 ^ ^st be nonnegative 
to be economically meaningful, the condition, 
derived from equations (3.6) and (3«7) must also be fulfilled. 
This condition states that, for example, if the monopolists' • 
average revenue from X2, i.e., f2(^^2) » is quite low compared 
to that from X^ so that the quantity within the brackets of 
equation (3«9) is less than X^f^fX^), X2 will be negative. 
Hence in our case, if nonnegative outputs are to be attained 
and the usual case of downward sloping demand functions and 
positive prices prevails, price discrimination will be pos­
sible if and only if the elasticities of demand in the two 
markets are unequal and equation (3«9) is fulfilled. 
Similar but more complicated results can be derived for 
the case where total output is not constrained. To the 
author's knowledge a condition similar to (3*9) has not been 
rigorously treated in the literature on price discrimination— 
rather it is simply assumed that the profit maximization solu­
tion will yield positive outputs and prices and this assump­
tion is in general not even made explicit. . Harris (45, p. 52) 
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is cognizant of the problem when he states that 
. . .  i f  p r i c e s  i n  t h e  m a n u f a c t u r e d  m i l k  o u t l e t s  
are too low, there may be no opportunity for profit­
able price discrimination even though elasticities 
of demand are greater in these outlets than in the 
fluid market. 
Harris has- also worked out. several examples which indicate 
that profitable price discrimination is not always possible 
even if demand elasticities are unequal in the two markets. 
À final noteworthy conclusion results from the additional 
assumption that the milk dealer's objective is to purchase 
and ^2 for a price on the cooperative's average cost function, 
g(X), and that it bases its decisions on the expectation that 
this objective will be realized. If this is the case, its 
profit equation to be maximized is identical to that of the 
cooperative. Hence the profit maximization solution for the 
milk dealer also is identical to that of the cooperative. 
But since each firm will desire a different price for both 
and X2, they will presumably bargain over two prices rather 
than one. 
Now, of course, the monopsonist* s coefficients of produc­
tion are not likely to be unitary nor independent of the level 
of output. Therefore in a realistic application of this model 
we nee^ to substitute derived demand curves for the consumer 
demand curves and ^2(^2)' j^stimates of the elasticity 
of derived demand are given by Brandow (IS, p. 59) for several 
farm commodities. For fluid milk and cream, cheese, and 
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butter they are -0.1^^5» -0*5357» and -0.6648 respectively. 
Thus assuming equation (3-9) to hold, we conclude that it will 
be profitable for the cooperative to seek a lower price for 
milk used in manufactured dairy products than for milk used 
in fluid milk and cream. 
Up to now it has been assumed that when a dairy coopera­
tive bargains with a milk dealer it is bargaining over price 
or is seeking to obtain the highest possible price for its 
member's milk. This bargain may involve a two-price plan as 
we have just seen or it may involve seasonal, grade or qual­
ity, weight, volume, and location price differentials. Price, 
however, does not have to be the only subject for bargaining. 
Method of farm-to-plant delivery or plant efficiency may 
also be appropriate topics for bargaining. Also if extreme 
day-to-day variations in bottler milk requirements exist, the 
cooperative may insist that the bottler construct adequate 
storage facilities. In this way the cooperative may prevent 
the additional costs of storing milk over the long weekend or 
of diverting milk to lower valued uses from falling on 
farmers. Finally the cooperative may attempt to encourage 
the milk dealer to initiate or participate in various promo­
tional programs designed to increase the demand for milk (64, 
pp. 69-70) . 
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Governmental Influence in Cooperative Bargaining 
Contrary to the assumptions of the bilateral monopoly 
model presented in the previous chapter, there is considerable 
influence from outside authority in cooperative bargaining in 
the dairy industry. This influence has been exerted both in 
the development of bargaining cooperatives and in the pricing 
of milk. Here we are concerned primarily with legislative 
enactments which have evolved largely at the insistence of 
farmers or farm groups. 
Securing appropriate legislation may serve as an impor­
tant means at a bargaining cooperative's disposal with which 
to increase its bargaining power. labor unions have found 
this to be the case. Prior to the enactment of various 
statutes during the 1930's, employers could use several tech­
niques to prevent laborers_from supporting unions--e.g., 
black-listing, "yellow-dog" contracts, arid discriminatory 
treatment of union supporters—as well as the injunction to 
prevent a strike. The injunction directly weakened the . 
union's type II bargaining power while the discriminatory 
tactics of employers indirectly weakened the union's bargain­
ing power by reducing member consensus over group goals and 
the means of achieving group p-oals. A lack of concensus over 
group goals and the means of achieving these goals, as we 
saw before, decreases the strength of group pressure over the 
individual members and thus leads to a decline in the amount 
88 
of support given to the group's goal. If as a result, mem­
bership declines, the organization's ability to secure recog­
nition from its bargaining opponent may be seriously im­
paired and, consequently, its bargaining power may be weak­
ened. 
Labor has been highly successful in the past through 
militant and aggressive effort in securing such statutes as 
the Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932, the National Industrial He- ' 
ccvery Act in 1933> and the Wagner Act in 1935- Collectively 
these statutes outlawed the discriminatory tactics of em­
ployers mentioned above and restricted the use of the injunc­
tion procedure. Thus it became extremely difficult for em­
ployers to use economic force or fear to prevent workers from 
.supporting unions. Further the requirement that employers 
bargain in good faith (provided by the Wagner Act) did much 
to increase the likelihood that a union would meet with suc­
cess in bargaining with emx)loyers and, therefore, increased 
workers' incentives to support their union (see 64, pp. 97-
105). 
Dairy bargaining cooperatives may well experience rewards 
from securing similar legislation or changes in existing 
legislation which is to their advantage in bargaining with 
processors and'distributors. Such legislation or changes in 
existing legislation may contribute directly to bargaining 
power. It may, for example, serve as a substitute for bar­
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gaining- power by providing the things a bargaining cooperative 
attempts to accomplish through an exercise of its type I 
power—i.e., by regulating seasonal marketing of milk, by 
bringing about quality improvements in milk, or by promoting 
the orderly marketing of milk. In addition it may reduce 
the "bargaining range" by establishing minimum prices to be 
paid farmers for milk. Finally, it may eliminate contro­
versies of the sort we noted before as to whether it is legal 
for bottlers to meet in a body to negotiate with the associa­
tion over the price of milk (see 64, pp. 107-110). 
Further securing such legislation may serve as an effec­
tive means of increasing the cooperative's control over mem­
bers' environment. Control over the environment is sought • 
so that realization of the organization's goal becomes pos­
sible or more probable, AS a result of an increase in the 
probability of realizing the group's goal, differences in 
goals ar.d methods of achieving goals among members tend to be 
reduced—unity of nuroose' among members is strengthened (see 
Figure 2.]). 
Cooperative legislation 
With the passage in I890 of the Sherman Act which was 
designed to -promote free "competition in open markets, fear was 
expressed by farm groups that this law might be applied so 
that farmers organized into marketing cooperatives would be 
viewed as combinations in restraint of trade (I3, 35» 94). 
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The conditions incident to agriculture, however, induced 
Congress and various state legislatures to recognize and 
encourage the formation of associations of farmers for the 
purpose of collectively marketing their products. To effec­
tuate this policy, the application of the Sherman Act to bar 
the existence and operation of.farmer cooperative associa­
tions was waived beginning in 1914 with the inclusion of sec­
tion 6 in the Clayton Act. This section provided that 
Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall . . . 
forbid the existence and operation of . . . agricul­
tural, or horticultural organizations, instituted 
for . ". . mutual help, and not having capital stock 
or conducted for profit . . . nor shall such organiza­
tion, or the members thereof, be held or construed to 
be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint 
of trade, under the antitrust laws. (109)' 
This exemption was subsequently expanded by enactment in 
1922 of the Capper-Volstead Act to exempt organizations having 
capital stock, and to include among exempt practices the col­
lective processing, handling, and marketing of products in 
interstate and foreigr commerce. In addition to these pro­
visions, the Cooperative Marketing Act of 1926 authorized 
agricultural cooperatives to "acquire, exchange, interpret 
and disseminate" crop, market, statistical, economic and other 
similar data; and the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 em­
powered the Secretary of Agriculture to exempt agricultural 
agreements and orders from the antitrust laws (I3, 35» 9^) 
As a result of such special status under anti-trust laws, 
it is easily seen why cooperatives are often suggested as 
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devices for providing- farmers with bargaining power. However, 
agriculture's exemption from the antitrust laws is not without 
limitation. In fact one observer(90, pp. I8-I9) notes that • 
Bit by bit, and piece by piece, the bureaucracy of 
the United States Department of Justice and the Fed­
eral Trade Commission is attempting to strip away 
every vestige of the cooperative exemptions con­
tained in Section 6 of the Clayton Act, the Gapper-
Volstead Act, the Agricultural Marketing Agreement 
Act of 1937 as amended, and in the cooperative mar­
keting association laws of almost every state in the 
United States. This is particularly true in the • 
field of cooperative milk marketing, where these 
two agencies appear to be concentrating their 
efforts at the present time. • . 
The "stripring away" of these exemptions began in I916 
(United States vs. King), when a potatoe growers' coope-ra-
tive, although recognized as a legal entity, was prohibited,, 
by a district Court from blacklisting and boycotting dealers 
(94, p. 42). In 1939 the Supreme Court in United States vs. 
Borden ruled that the Capper-Volstead Act did not give qual­
ified cooperatives a license to violate the anti-trust laws 
by combining or conspiring with other persons not classed as 
cooperatives (90, p. 20). 
In the 1954 Cape Cod Food Products vs. National Cran­
berry Association and the 1958 April vs. National Cranberry 
Association cases, the Massachusetts District Court made it 
quite clear that cooperatives are not immune to antitrust 
prosecution for purely predatory practices such as securing 
a dominant share of the market through a restraint of trade 
which was prohibited, or for using otherwise legitimate 
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methods in bad faith. The Court emphasized that purely preda-
tory practices by which the cooperative seeks to monopolize, 
' knd which are"forbidden to an individual corporation, are 
likewise unlawful by a cooperative (94, pp. 48-49). 
Further in Maryland, and Virginia Fiilk Producers Associa­
tion, Ino. vs. United States in I960, the Supreme Court ruled 
that a cooperative is not vested with "unrestricted power to 
restrain trade or to achieve monopoly." Privileges accorded 
cooperatives in the nature of anti-trust exemptions extend 
only to their existence and they cannot use their position 
é 
to foreclose competitors, to destroy a competitor or to gain 
a competitive advantage. In essence, it is required that 
cooperatives be "fair competitors" (94, p. ^ 0). 
Finally the decision on the I962 Federal Trade Commission 
vs. Central Arkansas Milk Producers Association case may have 
very significant effects on future negotiations between dairy 
bargaining cooperatives and milk processors and distributors 
if rendered applicable to all dairy bargaining cooperatives. 
In his initial decision, the hearing examiner charged the 
association with a conspiracy to violate Section 2 of the 
Clayton ^ct as amended by the riobinson-Patman Act (price dis­
crimination clause) and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Com­
mission Act (unfair trade practice clause) (see 90, II7). 
Further, the association was ordered to 
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. . . cease and desist from er.g-ap-ing in or perform­
ing any of the following acts: 
1. Fixing or establishing for some or any purchasers 
of milk prices, terms or conditions governing the 
sale of milk to such purchasers when the prices, 
terms or conditions so fixed or established contain 
premiums, charges, fees or other exactions of money 
or any other thing of value, which are not the same 
as those contained in the prices, terms or condi­
tions governing the sale by respondents of milk of 
like rrade and quality to any other purchasers in 
competition with such purchasers. 
2. Urging, inducing, coercing, or attempting to 
urge, induce or coerce, any processor or handler 
of milk to buy or to contract to buy all or any of 
his raw milk requirements from respondents by using 
threats or other tactics suggestive of conduct cal­
culated to cause such processor or handler finan­
cial or economic disadvantage or loss. (117, op. 
61-62) 
Finally, it was ordered that the association 
. . . cease and desist from discriminating in price 
by selling such milk to any purchaser at a price 
higher than that at which it is sold to any other 
purchaser of milk of like grade and quality, where 
such other purchaser competes, in fact, with such 
unfavored purchaser in the processing, sale and 
distribution of products made from such raw milk. 
(117, pp. 62-63) 
Within the limits established by these Judicial deci­
sions, cooperatives must at the present time confine their 
commercial activities. A cooperative may acquire or retain 
monopoly power solely by the lawful means of attracting volun­
tary membership to attain market control. It cannot wield its 
bargaining power by blacklisting or boycotting dealers; how­
ever, •it can bargain collectively with these same dealers over 
the terms of trade within the constraints set out above. 
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Beyond this the same antitrust laws applicable to corporations 
are applicable to agricultural cooperatives. 
It has generally been felt that cooperatives, or any 
other party, has little to say about such judicial decisions. 
Obviously cooperatives cannot "make" laws in the sense that 
lawmakers make laws, but they can express their desires as to 
interpretations of and changes in the existing laws. That is, 
treating judicial rulings as an exogenous variable may be both 
unnecessary and irrational. 
The pattern of the effect of the antit-trust laws 
as they are administered by the Department of Jus­
tice are fairly well established. The policy of 
these laws administered by the Federal Trade Com­
mission is still in the formative stage. Every 
cooperative should follow this matter closely, 
since it is a matter of life or death to bargain­
ing cooperatives. Either interpretation of these 
laws must change, or the law itself must be changed, 
if cooperatives are to survive. 
So states Attorney Bussell (90, p. 27). 
Federal milk orders 
During their formative years, milk bargaining coopera­
tives attempted to bargain with milk dealers for a flat price 
which would be applicable to the entire supply of their mem­
bers' milk. Such attempts were generally unsuccessful, how­
ever, due largely to the characteristics of milk itself. Be­
cause of its bulkinëss and perishability, milk must be mar­
keted promptly; and since it is produced every day of the 
year, it must be continuously shipped to market even when 
prices are unsatisfactorily low. It is necessary, also, to 
maintain special transportation systems to g-.et milk from farm 
to market. Such transportation systems were largely operated 
by the milk dealers so that farmers did not have freedom of 
choice of markets. Furthermore, farmers were unable to carry 
out storage operations to balance the seasonal fluctuations 
in supply' and demand. Thus milk not needed for fluid use was 
purchased by processors to be manufactured into dairy products 
but at a.lox'.er price to producers than was milk used for fluid 
purposes. Consequently, producers sought an alternative out­
let for their milk in a higher priced fluid milk market. 
Cooperatives with excess milk either took fluid sales from 
other cooperatives by offering milk to distributors at lower 
prices, or refused to accept surplus milk from farmers at 
the flat price since it had to be converted into manufactur­
ing uses at a lower value (see 88, pp. 121-122, 131-133» HI, 
pp. 4-5). 
These pressures led to a breakdown of the flat price 
system and to the development of classified pricing systems 
and pooling arrangements which were designed to stabilize 
prices and enable all members to share in the fluid milk mar­
ket the year around. Under the classified pricing system with 
a pooling arrangement, a minimum price is established for each 
use-class of milk and each dairy farmer supplying milk to the 
market receives for each marketing period (usually one month) 
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• a blended or uniform price announced by the pool committee. 
Such pricing plans succeeded or failed depending on the 
extent to which milk producers and milk dealers could be per­
suaded to join in a market-wide program voluntarily. During 
the 1920*3 when industrial activity in cities was high, volun­
tary plans were successful. In the early part of the 1930's, 
however, some milk producers and dealers could not be per­
suaded to regain in the market-wide program and the plans 
failed to maintain satisfactory prices (111, p. 5)» Failure 
was due largely.to the fact that cooperatives could not fully 
enforce the classified system. That is, they could not prove 
dealer utilization in the absence of an effective audit of 
handler records and they could not p-et participation of all 
handlers or of all producers (see 40, pp. 27-40; ll6, pp. 1-
12). 
Milk bargaining cooperatives consequently felt that their 
local efforts needed to be complemented by some form of govern­
ment reenforcement. This was achieved by the inclusion of 
milk and dairy products in the marketing agreements section 
of the 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) which provided 
a system of "licenses" for handlers—devices designed to make 
the classified pricing; and pooling arrangements effective in 
the entire market. The 1935 AAA provided for marketing orders 
instead of licenses and the Agricultural Marketing Agreements 
Act (AJyiAA) of 1937 is largely a restatement of the provisions 
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relating to milk marketing contained in the 1935 AAA (see 
111, p. 5; ll6, pp. I-l to 1-5)- The expressed purpose of 
milk marketing orders under present legislation is (ll6, p. 
1-4) 
a-to bring all distributors (handlers) in a pre­
scribed marketing area under the scope of the 
regulatory mechanism, 
b-to place them all in the same competitive posi­
tion in respect to a minimum price for milk enter­
ing the same use, 
c-to provide for uniform participation in market 
sales value by'the several producers, and 
d-to overcome the instability of the fluid milk 
market inherent in classified price and pooling 
plans which cover only part of the milk entering 
the market. 
The 1962 Federal i-îilk Order Study Committee (II6, p. 1-21) 
outlined the major objectives of Federal milk marketing order 
programs as follows: 
a-to promote orderly marketing conditions for 
farmers specializing in the production of fluid 
milk and thereby improve their income situation 
at least in the long run; 
b-to administer and supervise the terms of trade 
in defined milk markets in such manner as to 
equalize the market power of buyers and sellers 
and attain reasonable competition but not local 
monopoly resulting in undue price enhancement; 
c-to assure consumers that they will have access 
to adequate and dependable supplies of high-
quality milk from the sources best suited both 
technologically and economically to supply these 
demands ; 
d-to complement the efforts of milk producers' 
organizations to maintain economic order in 
their industry, and to bring about the 
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co-ordination of price structures and market 
practices within and between marketing areas, 
between fluid- and manufacturing segments of the 
dairy industry, and between milk production and 
other lines of farming-; • 
e-to secure equitable treatment of all parties— 
producers, ^ dealers, and consumers, 'not only within 
each local"'or regional market but throughout the 
system; and 
f-to establish -such terms of trade under the orders 
as will combine maximum freedom of trade with 
proper protection of established producers 
against seasonal or other loss of outlets that 
would tend to demoralize markets and farming 
plans. 
Once an order has been put into effect in a particular 
market, every handler covered by that order is required to 
make monthly reports to a market administrator as to all milk 
handled by him shewing weights and tests of milk received and 
the uses to which this milk was put. The market administra­
tor then compiles the reports and computes the minimum class 
prices and blended prices that must be paid by handlers under 
the order. 
The marketing area of a given federal milk order is de­
signed to include that area in which the same milk dealers 
compete with e-ch other for the sale of milk and where such 
milk must meet essentially the same sanitary inspection 
standards. Since only handlers doing business within the 
defined marketing area must pay the minimum class price estab­
lished by the order, it is important to draw the boundary line 
where there are few sales moving across the boundary (see 111, 
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pp. 21-23). 
Most of the 82 federal milk market orders in effect at 
• the present time have established only two use-classifications 
for milk: 1) class I milk which generally includes "bottled 
products such as whole milk, flavored milk drinks, buttermilk, 
concentrated milk, and sweet and sour cream, ard 2) class II 
milk which includes all other milk products. The order then 
requires the establishment of minimum prices for each use-
class established. 
The Al^'lAA directs the Secretary of Agriculture to estab­
lish milk prices which reflect certain economic factors, which 
assure the production of a sufficient quantity of pure and 
wholesome milk, and which are in the public interest. 
The primary standard for establishing class I prices 
under the Act is that price which equates supply and demand 
in the market area. Formulas have been developed to estab­
lish and maintain such prices and are of two general types. 
The "economic formulas" relate fluid milk prices to selected 
economic factors (price of feed and available supply of feed, 
per capita disposable income, changes in the general level of 
wholesale prices, etc.) while the "manufacturing milk formu­
las" relate the price of class I milk to market prices of 
manufactured dairy products or the value of milk used for such 
purposes. Specified differentials are added to manufacturing 
values to account for the additional cost of producing milk 
100 
inspected for fluid use and other special economic conditions 
which influence the price of milk in city markets. These 
added differentials are designed to help balance the supply 
and demand of milk in the regulated market (111, pp. 25-27). 
Such price formulas are effective in bringing about many 
of the price changes needed in fluid milk markets; however, 
fluctuations in milk production and market sales frequently 
require changes in the relationships between milk prices and 
the selected formula factors. Such changes have been brought 
about by the operation of an automatic "supply-demand ad­
juster" in several markets. The supply-demand adjuster is 
designed to correct prices for maladjustments in supply and 
demard in the local market as a result of poorly established 
differentials between prices in fluid and manufacturing uses, 
as well as secular changes in supply and demand conditions. 
This device increases class I price when supplies of milk 
relative to class I sales are less than the "normal" or 
"standard" relationship of class I sales to supply (see 88, 
po. 146-14?). 
In establishing the price of other than class I milk, 
or, in general, of milk used for manufacturing purposes, 
handlers in fluid milk markets should not be encouraged to 
engage in manufacturing operations at the expense of their 
fluid milk sales. If such prices are established at levels 
higher than the competitive price for manufacturing milk. 
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more milk will be channeled into manufacturing relative to 
class I uses than is required to fulfill demand. Thus prices 
for milk used in manufactured dairy products are determined 
by either of the following general formula types: 1) formulas 
based on manufactured dairy product prices, or 2) formulas 
based on prices paid for milk by unregulated manufacturing 
plants. The formula differs from market to market since the 
volume of milk to be priced and the organization of the market 
for disposing of such milk varies considerably from market to 
market and the level of prices which will contribute to order­
ly marketing in one area may, as a result, be different from 
the prices needed in another (see 111, pp. 27-28). 
Thus minimum class prices are established by the order in 
the particular market and distributors are required to pay the 
minimum price even if they refuse to sign an agreement with 
the cooperative. This apparently gives producers more bar­
gaining power than they had prior to -federal legislation. 
Furthermore a federal order helps accomplish an objective of 
both the cooperative and milk dealer through the two-price 
1 ^ • plan. 
The law does not, however, forbid a dairy cooperative to 
negotiate prices in excess of these minimum prices. Further, 
if the cooperative (or any other interested party) deems the 
established minimum price too low, there is a provision allow­
ing that party to request a public hearing for the purpose of 
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presenting evidence with respect to the economic and marketing 
conditions which relate to the handling of milk in the market 
area for which amendments in the federal order are proposed. 
Pertinent evidence may include price and bargaining problems, 
interstate commerce, marketing institutions, the character­
istics of the marketing area, classification systems, health 
requirements, transportation systems, pooling arrangements, 
etc. (see 111, pp. 9-21). 
State and local regulations 
State and local milk regulations, in contrast to federal 
milk orders, tend to impede rather than facilitate the inter­
state flow of milk and thus pose a serious limitation to the 
efficient geographic distribution of milk production (115)• 
There are four primary ways in which state sanitary regula­
tions may foster undue restriction on the movement of milk 
within and between states (see 115» P- 19)» First they may 
prohibit certain activities such as the distribution of milk 
pasteurized in a plant located beyond the city limits. 
Secondly, regulations of different localities may differ only 
on details, such differences not beine of material public 
health, significance but tending to restrict the flow of milk 
between localities. Third, regulations may be discriminator-
ily applied and enforced. Finally, duplication of inspection 
with substantial inspection fees or other burdensome require­
ments may limit considerably the number of outlets to which 
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milk can be supplied. 
If these regulations limit the number of alternative out­
lets for the cooperative's class I and surplus milk, it may 
be to the milk bargaining cooperative's advantage to seek to 
eliminate or discourage such legislation. Regulations which 
are applied discriminatorily and to the detriment of a given 
cooperative or which result in unnecessary costs that ulti­
mately fall on farmer-members may be appropriate items for 
this bargaining association to seek to eliminate. Further 
governmental regulations may be an appropriate subject for the 
cooperative and milk dealer to discuss during negotiations. 
The cooperative, may, for example, seek to get the milk 
dealer's sanction or aid in lobbying for legislative changes 
or for new legislation. 
Summary of Hypotheses 
In the preceding chapter concepts related to the bargain­
ing problem and the relevant theory on bilaterally restricted 
competition, bargaining, and the cooperative were discussed. 
The Durpose of the present chapter was to use these concepts 
and theories in developing hypotheses as to the means at 
dairy bargaining cooperative's disposal with which to secure 
their bargaining objective. 
Several complications were met in this approach. In the 
first place, it •was deemed necessary to treat the cooperative. 
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not as a firm, but as an organization comoosed of several 
individuals who may or may not desire the same goal because 
of their different backgrounds or interests. Secondly, con­
trary to the assumptions of bilateral monopoly theory, there 
may be several dairy bargaining cooperatives dealing with the 
same milk handler and each cooperative will likely be dealing 
with several milk handlers. Thus we more truly have a 
bilateral oligopoly situation rather than a bilateral monop­
oly situation. Thirdly, the cooperative will rarely be will­
ing to bargain on an all-or-nothing basis if it can make 
higher profits for its members by negotiating different prices 
for milk used in fluid and non-fluid milk products. Moreover 
there is considerable evidence of the existence of surplus 
milk, indicating that rather than bargaining over the price of 
that quantity of milk which maximizes the joint profits of 
processor-distributors and cooperatives, the two parties bar­
gain over the price of that quantity of milk which the coop­
erative has available. Finally, it was"found that consider­
able activity by governmental agencies is exerted in coopera­
tive bargaining both in the pricing of milk and in regulating 
or restricting the activities of the cooperative. 
These considerations suggested several hypotheses which 
we shall attempt to verify in the next t'^ro chapters. On the 
basis of a priori knowledge gained from organization, eco­
nomic, and bargaining theory, the relationships between the 
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relevant variables are hypothesized to be as shown in Figure 
3.1. Factors affecting the variables which we have described 
to be the components of the base of a cooperative's bargain­
ing power are shown in circles at the right and -to the bottom 
of this flow diagram. Positive and negative signs on the 
arrows arain indicate the sip-n of the functional relationship 
between the corresponding variables. 
It is postulated, at least initially, that the dairy bar­
gaining cooperative's objective is to maximize the net returns 
to members for their milk and that it will therefore attempt 
to bargain over the price of milk. It is further postulated, 
however, that the cooperative's aspiration level and level of 
knowledge about the relevant variables in the base of its 
bargaining power are important factors affecting 1) the estab­
lishment of the bargaining objective, 2) the way in which the 
bargaining objective changes during the bargaining process 
and finally 3) realization of the bargaining objective. Rele­
vant information may be obtained from the bargaining sessions 
as well as from various other sources. 
Also it is hypothesized that the conduct of firms on the 
processing-distribution side and the conduct of nearby coop­
eratives in their negotiations with handlers will influence 
the bargaining ability of a given cooperative. 
Finally it is hypothesized that the realization of the 
bargaining cooperative's objective will be more probable 
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1) the greater is the cooperative's type I bargaining power, 
2) the greater is the cooperative's type II bargaining power, 
and 3) the easier it is for the cooperative to obtain recog­
nition from milk dealers as the exclusive bargaining agent of 
its members. On the basis of this general hypothesis, three 
main groups of subhypotheses were developed and are to be 
tested—those having to do with securing recognition, those 
having to do with type I power, and those having to do with 
type II DOwer: 
1-Hecognition 
a-Cairy bargaining cooperatives are able to secure 
recognition from milk dealers as the exclusive 
bargaining agent for their members. 
b-fiecognition will be higher the larger the volume 
of milk handled by the cooperative. 
(1) dairy bargaining cooperatives have uniform 
contracts with members with provisions allow­
ing the cooperative to impose penalties on 
members for non-compliance with the terms of 
the contract. 
(2) dairy bargaining cooperatives will offer vari­
ous services to their members other than bar­
gaining for the price of milk in order to in­
crease or preserve volume. 
(3) mergers and federations are sought by dairy 
bargaining cooperatives in order to increase 
volume. 
2-Type I Bargaining Power 
a-Dairy bargaining cooperatives offer economic gains 
to milk dealers in return for the higher price they 
are seeking for members' milk. 
. b-Bairy bargaining cooperatives seek governmental 
legislation in their favor and press for revisions 
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or changes in the interpretation of existing 
judicial decisions which would increase or serve 
as a substitute for their type I bargaining 
power. 
3-Type II Bargaining Power 
a-Dairy bargaining cooperatives will not call a milk 
strike in order to force the bottler to accept 
their terms. 
b-Dairy bargaining cooperatives have several alterna­
tive outlets for their class I and non-class I 
milk, know the percentage of their milk supply each 
outlet can absorb, know the additional cost of 
shipping milk to the alternative outlets, and know 
the products produced at each alternative outlet. 
c-Lairy bargaining cooperatives have a thorough 
knowledge of the conditions of demand for the 
final product. 
d-Dairy bargaining cooperatives know the alterna­
tive sources of milk which will replace the supply 
of each of the milk dealers with which they bargain 
and the difference between the market price and 
the prices at these alternative sources. 
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CHARACTERISTICS OP COOPEHATIVi'S STUDIED 
AND THEIB MARKET ENVIEOMENT 
Location and Size 
To obtain the necessary information with which to test 
the hypotheses proposed in the previous chapter, managers of 
ten different bargaining cooperatives were interviewed. A 
specific set of questions was utilized in an attempt to keep 
the interviews going in a systematic manner (see Appendix A). 
The interviewees v.'ere, however, encouraged to expand on any 
topics peculiar to their individual situation that seemed 
relevant for the purposes of this study. It was hoped that 
a sufficiently wide range of information would be available 
to test the hypotheses based on a priori information and in 
discovering additional factors affecting the outcome of bar­
gaining. 
Six of the cooperatives studied are located in Iowa, one 
in Nebraska, two in Illinois, and one in Michigan as listed 
in Table 4.1. The specific location of each is shown in 
Figure 4.1 and size and volume characteristics of each are 
noted in Table 4.1. The size of the cooperatives studied 
varied from one having 14 members to one having 12,000 members 
in 1963. Corresponding variations in volume of grade A milk 
handled during I963 is noted in Table 4.1 for these same coop­
eratives. 
Table 4.1. Membership and volume of cooperatives studied, I963 
Cooperative 
Membership 
Percent 
of total 
producers 
Total in area®' 
Volume of grade A milk 
Pounds Percent 
Total per of total 
pounds member in area®' 
1--Burlington Cooperative Milk Producers 
16 
(000) (000) 
Association, Burlington, Iowa 14 3,428 244.9 25 
2--Cedar Valley Cooperative Milk 
54 390.6 Association, Waterloo, Iowa , 320 125,000 54 
3--Des Moines Cooperative Milk Marketing 
259,633 Association, Des Moines, Iowa 912 
-Eastern Iowa Cooperative Dairy Producers^ 
70 284.6 70 
4. 
Association, Cedar Hapids, Iowa 430 55 135,589 315.3 55 
5--Mississippi Valley Milk Producers 
186,300 Association, Mollne, Illinois 540 50 345.0 50 
6--Nebraska-Iowa Non-Stock Cooperative 
486,900 Milk Association, Omaha, Nebraska 1, 489 97 327.8 95 
7--North Iowa Cooperative Milk Marketing 
62 60 Association, Mason City, Iowa 51 25,000 403.2 . 
8--Sioux City Milk Producer's Cooperative 
168 66,929 Association, Sioux City, Iowa 100 398.4 100 
9--Pure Milk Association, Chicago, 
Illinois 12, 000 40 2,700,000 225.0 40 
10--Michigan Milk Producers Association, 
Detroit, Michigan 11, 917 79 2,898,496 243.2 57 
^iiach cooperative's procurement area is outlined in Figure 4.2. The percent­
ages reported here are estimates provided by the respective cooperative managers. 
The exact numbers of grade A producers and volumes of grade A milk in these areas 
are unknown at the présent time. 
^These two cooperatives have recently merged but were in existence as indi­
vidual cooperatives during I963. 
For Identification of 
cooperatives see 
Table 4.1 
Figure 4.1. Location of cooperatives studied 
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In addition to the great variability in size, it is noted 
that membership as a percent of total grade A producers lo­
cated in the cooperative's procurement area and volume as a 
percent of total volume in the same area vary considerably 
among the cooperatives studied. 
Several factors may be responsible for this fact. In the 
first place, visual inspection of Figure 4.2 reveals consider­
able overlap in procurement areas of the cooperatives located 
in the Northern and Eastern parts of Iowa while practically 
none exists in the Western part of the State.* Overlapping 
procurement areas undoubtedly exist between the Chicago and 
Detroit cooperatives and large nearby cooperatives in such 
markets as South Eend, Milwaukee, hockford, and Toledo as 
well, but the extent to which this occurs is presently un­
available. In addition there are several smaller dairy 
cooperatives not shown on the ma-o having members' who reside 
-
within these procurement areas—particularly in the Chicago, 
Detroit, and Central and Eastern Iowa markets. Finally in 
some markets there are a number of "independent" producers 
or producers supplying milk directly to handlers and thus not 
a member of any cooperative. 
*The procurement areas of the Des Koines and Cedar Hapids 
cooperatives are combined into one area in Figure 4.2 reflect­
ing the entire procurement area for the recent merger of these 
two cooperatives. 
Procurement area of: 
I I one cooperative * 
1%^ two cooperatives 
H three cooperatives 
(Numbers in the nine pro 
areas correspond to th 
numbers as listed in T 
urement . 
cooperativ 
le 4.1) 
H 
H 
W 
Figure 4.2. Approximate procurement area of cooperatives studied, I963 
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External Factors Affecting the Cooperative's 
Bargaining Ability 
Structural changes in the dairy industry 
Cne reason for the development of dairy bargaining coop­
eratives, as noted earlier, was the marked trend toward larger 
and fewer milk processing and distributing firms. There is 
considerable evidence suggesting that this trend is still in 
view (see 9» 59» 108, 110). The growth of handlers is con­
sidered to be the result of several factors including an in­
crease in plant specialization, new and lower cost transporta­
tion facilities, the increasing sale of milk through chain 
stores, and new innovations in processing and packaging which 
result in significant savings to larger firms. Further a 
large portion of the growth of these firms is due to mergers 
or acquisitions (77, 78, 110) and to the development of "cap­
tive"" stores (7» P« 48) (i.e., small neighborhood stores 
served by a handler under the same ownership generally carry­
ing such items as milk and milk products, bread, eggs, cer­
eals, candy, tobacco, etc.). 
On the basis of results obtained in a Virginia study. 
Commons et . (28) concluded that small bottling plants can 
compete with larger firms on a cost basis. For example, a 
bottlini? niant producing a daily output of 2,700 quarts was 
found to have processing costs of only about one cent more per 
quart than a plant producing a daily output of 15,000 quarts 
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when both were producing at capacity. A more recent investi­
gation casts some doubt on this conclusion (120). Furthermore 
it has been fairly well established that considerable econ­
omies of scale exist in the manufacture of non-fluid milk 
products (see e.g., 64, pp. 34-38). 
Regardless of the possibility or impossibility of achiev­
ing economies of large-scale operations, bigness gives milk 
handlers potential market advantages which fall under the 
category of "power" advantages (110). In general such 
handlers are large laultiproduct firms operating in several 
different markets possessing power by their position in the 
local market as well as by their activities in other markets. 
Because of its larger volume, the large multiproduct firm 
is in a strong position to cut prices below those of its 
smaller competitors and, if necessary, sustain a loss from 
profitable operations in other markets. Either as a result 
of the ensuing price war or simply as a result of being forced 
to lower prices in order to maintain its volume, the smaller 
firm having less total profits with which to absorb a loss 
from lower retail prices may be unable to pay the cooperative 
its asking price. In addition this small firm may even be 
forced out of business and hence the cooperative will lose an 
outlet for a portion of its milk supply until such time that 
a new outlet is found. 
Furthermore large firms are in many cases able to prac­
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tice price discrimination by underpricing smaller firms in a 
distant market. This again may result in the closing of one 
or more small firms in the distant market and in a lost out­
let for the cooperative's milk. Even if the smaller firms are 
still able to operate, the cooperative's ability to negotiate 
a substantial premium (i.e., a price above the federal order 
minimum price) may be seriously impaired. 
Finally large national chains operating specialized 
processing plants may be in a position to divert surplus milk 
at the federal order minimum price to one or more of its pro­
cessing- plants while the cooperative could divert this surplus 
milk at a premium to other outlets. For example, in order to 
sell class I milk at a premium to a large national chain, the 
cooperative may also have to sell some non-class I milk to 
this handler. It is possible that the proportion of the 
cooperative's class I milk taken by this handler is so large 
that the cooperative would be willing to settle for no premium 
on the class II milk rather than take a chance of losing the 
outlet altogether. 
As indicated in Table 4.2, growth of handlers and handler 
mergers was considered to be a major structural change affect­
ing the bargaining ability of eip-ht of the cooperatives inter­
viewed— the Moline and tiason City cooperatives did not con­
sider this an important factor. The ability of larger firms 
to survive at lower prices and to initiate price wars result-
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Table 4.2. Number of cooperatives interviewed indicating 
their bargaining ability was affected by various 
structural changes in the dairy industry 
Stoructural change affecting 
the cooperative's bargaining ability 
Number of 
cooperatives 
Growth of handlers and handler mergers 8 
Large quantity buying by a single retail unit 6 
Competition from handlers in other markets 
due to different federal order prices 9 
Competition from handlers in other markets 
due to a desire to expand total market area 9 
Competition from handlers in other markets 
due to bulk shipments from these handlers 0 
ing in lost outlets and in difficulty of maintaining a premium 
as discussed above was felt to be the major impact on these 
cooperatives' bargaining ability. None of the cooperative 
managers, however, felt that the ability of national chains 
to divert milk at lower prices was a factor in their bargain­
ing ability. 
The desire and ability of larger handlers to sign up 
their own independent producers was.also considered a hindrance 
to the cooperative's bargaining ability. In the first place 
if the handler is able to encourage cooperative members to 
resign, the cooperative may lose part of its volume needed 
to gain recognition from the handler. In the second place if 
the handler is able to sign up independent producers fairly 
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easily he may be reluctant to pay a premium to the coopera­
tive . 
Larger handlers are in a better position to sign up inde­
pendents since 1) they can afford the extra expense of hiring 
a full-time individual for the purpose of securing independent 
producers and encouraging cooperative members to resign and 
supply directly to the handler, and 2) they may in some cases 
be able to pay the farmer a price for his milk which is higher 
than the net price he would obtain from the cooperative while, 
at the same time, paying him less or at least no more than 
the cooperative is demanding. That is, by selling directly 
to the handler, the farmer would not be subject to deductions 
from his paycheck which provide funds with which to operate 
the cooperative business. 
If the handler is successful in securing many inde­
pendent producers, the cooperative may be supplying a very 
small percentage of this handler's milk. Under such circum­
stances the cooperative may have little if any to gain by 
withholding milk from this handler. The handler would either 
be only slightly affected by the loss of milk or may be will­
ing to go great distances to secure additional milk even at 
higher prices in order to avoid paying the cooperative a pre­
mium. 
The disadvantageous effects of handler growth and mergers 
may in some cases, however, be at least partially outweighed 
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by the advantageous effects to a dairy bargaining coopera­
tive's bargaining ability. In the first place handler mergers 
may reduce the number of individuals with which the coopera­
tive must bargain and may thus reduce the overall costs of 
bargaining. 
In one case the cooperative and local handlers had worked 
out an agreement whereby the cooperative would take on as 
members those farmers supplying milk to the firm being ac­
quired by a local handler (whether this firm being acquired 
was located within or beyond the cooperative's procurement 
area). This may enable the cooperative to increase its con­
trol over the milk supply in its procurement area and, in 
addition, to reduce the costs of picking up and delivering 
milk to handlers by reorganizing its pick-up route. Further 
such an arrangement may serve as an additional service the • 
cooperative can provide handlers. That is, the local handler 
is spared an extra burden and expense as a result of the 
cooperative taking over the job of picking up milk from pro­
ducers previously supplying the acquired firm. 
A second structural change felt to be a significant fac­
tor affecting the bargaining ability of six cooperatives was 
large quantity buying by a single retail unit. The size of 
some retail accounts have reached such proportions in recent 
years that the handler cannot afford to lose them and still 
maintain his volume. Such accounts may be with national gro-
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eery chains such as Kroper or Benners or they may be defense , 
or school lunch contracts. In either case the handler will 
typically contract with these retail or government outlets 
for a delivery date and price far in advance of negotiations 
with the cooperative. Under such conditions the handler is 
certain of the crice he will get for his bottled milk and can 
use this as an argument for either paying no premium to the 
cooperative or for refusing to pay a higher premium. Thus 
the cooperative's job of bargaining for a hierher price is made 
much more difficult. 
This factor, however, was not felt to be a significant 
development affectire the bargaining ability of the coopera­
tives in Burlington, Koline, Mason City, or Sioux City—with 
the exception of Moline, all relatively small cooperatives 
operating in relatively small markets. In such small markets 
handlers have very few if any extremely large retail outlets 
with which to secure such contracts. 
Competition from handlers in other markets was felt to 
be an important factor affecting the bargaining ability of all 
of the cooperatives studied, and may be due to a lower federal 
order price in the distant nia.rkets or to a desire on the part 
of these handlers to expand their market area. In either case 
such competition may result in a lost market for the coopera­
tive's fluid milk sales unless another outlet can be found, 
and in a detriment to the cooperative's ability to negotiate 
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a premimi as discussed before. Competition from handlers in 
other markets due to different federal order prices was not 
considered an important factor by the Chicago cooperative. 
This is due to the fact that the federal order price in 
Chicago has generally been one of the lowest of all class I 
prices established by federal orders in the United States. 
Influence of nearby cooperative-handler markets 
In order to test an additional hypothesis proposed in the 
previous chapter, every manager interviewed was asked if his 
bargaining ability was affected by the results of negotiations 
between handlers and cooperatives in nearby markets and if so 
in what way. Without exception the answer to the first part 
of this question was in the affirmative. 
The interviewees felt that they would be in a strong 
position to negotiate a premium or an increase in their pre­
mium if one or more nearby cooperatives were similarly success­
ful, but,in a weak nosition to do so if nearby cooperatives 
were not this fortunate. The basis for such a feelir.g is the 
result of what may be called a modified version of the "whip-
saw" bargaining tactic of labor unions. The "whipsaw" tech­
nique, as used by labor unions, involves bargaining with one 
company at a time and using the gains won at this company as 
leverage on the remaining companies to force an agreement. 
The- same technique can be used by dairy bargaining coopera­
tives afrainst their local handlers; tut the modified version 
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involves using the gains won by a nearby cooperative as lever­
age aprainst the local cooperative's local handlers. 
The results of cooperative-handler negotiations in nearby 
markets not only influence the premium a cooperative is able 
to negotiate, but also the amount of milk to be sold and the 
bargaining strategy adopted. The data in Table 4.3 indicate 
that the handlers of all ten of the cooperatives studied could 
have obtained milk in six or more months of I963 at a lower 
price than they had to pay the local cooperative. Hence if a 
cooperative in one of these ten markets called a milk strike, 
his handlers would probably be able to get milk from an 
alternative source, if available, for a net price no higher 
than the cooperative is presently getting, .-is a result the 
cooperative in the striking market may lose a market for its 
milk during the strike and the cooperative members' income 
will decline since the withheld milk will undoubtedly have to 
be diverted to lower valued uses. 
Furthermore, unless prices are kept in line by the vari­
ous cooperatives, handlers may secure milk from ar. alternative 
source, if available, even if the cooperative does not call a 
milk strike. If the price charged by the Waterloo coopera­
tive, for example, plus transportation cost from Waterloo to 
Burlington is less than the Burlington cooperative is charging 
its local handlers, there is little reason to expect that the 
Burlington handlers would not purchase milk from the Waterloo 
123 
Table 4.3. Number of months during 19^3 in which handlers 
in a given market could have obtained class I 
milk cheaper from an alternative source^ 
Markets in which dealer's buying price was higher 
than dealer's buying price in the alternative 
source plus transportation cost from the 
alternative source to this market^ 
Alternative 
source 
M 
n 
E Kl -H >t 
o CD .a 4^ . •p 
-P o c cd •H •H bi o T4 O •y. o . -p 
C rH O QJ hi. 
k «cZ u E a c a o (—1 0) cd s: o o 5-1 
•p CO 73 rH eg CQ o -P 
c CD (U O B ce • «H . 0) 
« S: o o uc o iC CO o Q 
Duluth 8 
Minneapolis 
8 8 
7 1 
Winona 7 5 5 12 8 12 12 12 
Eau Claire 12 12 12 11 11 12 12 12 12 12 
Green Bay 6 1 4 4 12 12 
Madison 4 1 1 12 8 
Milwaukee 1 12 12 
Eeloit 9 8 1 9 5 5 12 12 
Eockford 12 12 1 12 8 8 12 12 
Mason City 4 8 
Waterloo 12 12 8 8 12 7 
Cedar iiapids 12 11 8 8 3 9 
Moline 12 4 4 4 10 
Des Moines 4 4 
Sioux City 
Cmaha 
Burlington 1 
Chicago 8 
South Bend 9 
Port Wayne 12 
Toledo 12 
Detroit 
^Source : Il4. 
^Transportation costs from the alternative source markets 
were assumed to be (3.4 + 0.l6 X) cents per hundredweight 
where A = miles between markets (see 22, p. 12). 
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cooperative. Thus there is good, reason for the cooperatives 
to attempt to keep prices in line in two.or more markets so 
that it is not advantageous ..for a given cooperative's handlers, 
to secure milk from a cooperative in another market. 
Some of the managers interviewed attempt to work together 
to keep dealer's prices in line in different markets—largely 
through federated activities as will be- discussed in more de­
tail later. Further some cooperatives refuse to ship milk 
into markets in which another cooperative is attempting to 
gain a reasonable premium by withholding milk. The Chicago 
cooperative endorses this practice (see 75» D. 62). In addi­
tion the manager of this cooperative felt that some nearby 
cooperatives would return the favor if needed in the Chicago 
market. 
However this spirit of cooperation does not exist among 
all dairy cooperatives. In one instance the Chicago coopera­
tive withheld milk from an Illinois handler who refused to pay 
the cooperative's asking price. In order to keep the outlet, 
however, the cooperative was forced.to lower its asking price 
since an Iowa cooperative had agreed to ship milk to this 
handler at a price lower than that for which the Chicago 
cooperative was withholding. In another case, a fluid milk 
cooperative in northwestern Iowa, not located in a federal 
order market, is alleged to charge handlers in its market a 
price considerably below the f ederal order price in the Omaha 
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and Sioux City markets thus %akin^ it nearly impossible for 
the Omaha and Sioux City cooperatives to negotiate a premium 
on class I milk. Further this cooperative has refused to 
agree to an expansion of the federal order market which would 
include its marketing area and which would facilitate the 
process of keeping prices in line in these markets. Such 
actions on the part of nearby cooperatives seriously restrict 
the effectiveness of a withholding action in those markets 
with higher prices, as well as all other cooperative bargain­
ing activities. 
A successful strike may be beneficial not only to the 
cooperative calling the strike but to cooperatives in nearby 
markets as well. In i960, for example, the Detroit coopera­
tive withheld milk from one handler in order to force this 
handler to agree to pay a premium that had recently been nego­
tiated with the remaining handlers. This one handler did 
eventually agree to pay the premium. It was argued by the 
manager of the Chicago cooperative that this action was of • 
considerable value to the Chicago cooperative members since 
it made the Chicago handlers awaz-e of the possible success of 
a strike and thus less reluctant to negotiivte with the coop­
erative and settle for reasonable demands. 
Finally some cooperatives attempt to pattern their bar­
gaining tactics after those of the larger and more successful 
bargaining cooperatives. Although this does not seem wide­
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spread, three cooperative managers did mention that they 
attempted to do so or at least thought they could learn 
something from the experiences of the Chicago and Detroit 
cooperatives. 
Federal milk order regulations 
The general characteristics of federal milk marketing 
orders- were outlined in the previous chapter. The purpose of 
this section is to discuss some of these features in more 
detail as they are related to price determination in the 
specific markets under consideration in this study. 
It will be recalled that milk marketing order regulations 
apply to the purchase of milk for sale in a designated market­
ing area which is designed to include all of an area where 
milk dealers compete with each other for the sale of milk. 
The approximate marketing areas of 18 different milk market­
ing orders located in the North Central kegion are outlined • 
in Figure 4.3. This includes all of the milk marketing orders 
in Nebraska, Iowa, .Minnesota, Wisconsin, and ^ichi^an. It 
will be noted in comparing Figures 4.1 and 4.3 that every 
cooperative studied except Burlington is located within the 
marketing area of a federal milk marketing order. 
Previously we stated that the market administrator of 
each order is required to establish minimum prices to be paid 
by handlers for each class of milk received in that order. 
The establishment of these minimum prices is to be done in 
& 
For identification of 
Federal orders see 
Table 4.4 
Figure 4.3. 
ro 
-o 
Approximate marketing areas of several Federal milk marketing 
orders in the North Central States, I963 
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accordance with a precise set of rules which differ consider­
ably from order to order. In Table 4.4 are outlined these 
rules for the 18 different milk marketing- orders shown in 
Figure 4.3- In the first column of this table is recorded 
the "basic formula price" for each order. With the exception 
of orders 63, 70, 78, and 79> each order in this table uses 
the average price per hundredweight for manufacturing grade 
milk paid by unregulated plants in Wisconsin and Minnesota as 
the basic orice formula. None of these orders use an 
"economic-type" formula. 
The class I differential, designed in part to balance 
the supply and demand for milk in the market, varies consid­
erably from order to order. Furthermore, to take into account 
the seasonality of milk production, this differential varies 
throughout the year in a given order. In the Chicago order, 
for examnle, the class I differential is ^1.10 in august, 
September, October, and November (the low production months); 
10.90 in December, January, February, and July; and jO.70 in 
March, April, Kay, and June (the high production months). 
The basic formula price for orders 63, 70, 73» ard 79 is the 
Chicago class I price and for order 44 the Northeastern Wis­
consin class I price; consequently, the adjustment in the 
second column of Table 4.4 fo.r these five orders represents 
a transportation cost differential from Chicago or Northeastern 
Wisconsin to the respective markets. 
Table 4.4. Class prices in several North Central federal order markets, June 1963^ 
Basic Class I Supply- Class Class 
formula differ­ demand I II Blend 
Order number and name price ential adjustment price price price 
30-Chicago 43-07 #0.70 —^pO « 24 #3.53 :63.28b #3.34 
31-South Bend, LaPorte, Elkhart 3.07 0.90 - 0.02 3.95 3.140 3.58 
38-Hock River Valley 3.07 0.72 - 0.24 3.55 3.08 3.40 
39-Kilwaukee 3.07 0.68 - 0.24 3.51 3.08 3.41 
40-Southern Michigan 3.03 1.23 - 0.45 3.86 3.08 3.51 
42-Muskegon 3.08 1.05 — - 4.13 3.08 3.71 
43-Upstate Michigan 3.08 1.05 — —  4.13 3.01^ 3.49 
44-Mich. Upper Penin. (Zone 2) 3.78e —  —  3.78 3.08 3.43 
45-Northeastern Wisconsin 3.07 0.54 - 0.24 3.37 3.O8 3.25 
51-wadison 3.07 0 .68 - 0.24 3.51 3.08 . 3.34 
^-Source: 2?» 112. 
Basic formula price for preceding month (4p3.0? ) DIUS a differential of 4$^ 
less the supply-demand adjustment. Class III price equals basic formula price for 
current month. 
GPrice of Chicago 92-score butter (57'970) times 4.2, plus the price of dry 
skim milk at country plants (14.18^) minus 5*5^ times 8.2. 
^Average of prices paid farmers at eight nearby manufacturing plants in Wis­
consin and Michigan. Class III price equals Class II price less 20^. 
®Class I price in the Northeastern Wisconsin order plus a location differ­
ential of 41^. 
Table 4.4. (Continued) 
Basic Glass I Supply- Class Class 
formula differ­ demand I II Blend 
Order number and name price ential adjustment price price price 
63-Quad Cities-Dubuque 3.53^ 0.20 3.73 3.08S 
3.02" 
3.43 
65-Nebraska-Western Iowa 3.07 1.40 — — 4.47 3.71 
66-Sioux City 3.07 1.40 4.47 2.89I 3.45 
68-hinneapoll8-8t. Paul 3.07 0.69 3.76 3.08 3.48 
69-Duluth-Superior 3.07_ 0.75 — —  3.82 2.87 J 3.27 
70-Cedar hanids-Iowa City 3.53% 0.15 — — 3.68 3.088 3.34 
78-North Central Iowa 3.53^ 0.15 — — 3.68 3.088 3.56 
79-Des Moines 3.67k 0.35 4.02 3.088 3.69 
fciass I price in the Chicago order. 
^Average of prices paid farmers at six manufacturing plants in Illinois and 
Iowa. During June I963 this price was identical with the basic formula price for 
the month. 
hprioe of Chicago 92-score butter times 4.24, plus the price of dry skim milk 
at country plants times 8.2, less 60^. 
iprice of Chicago 92-score butter times 1.25 less 8^, all times 3*5i plus ly^, 
plus 3$z! for each full l/2d that the price of non-fat dry milk solids (15*05f^) is 
above 75^ per pound at Chicago. 
•TPrice of 93~score butter at Chicago times 4.24, plus the price of spray 
process dry milk at Chicago times 8.2, less 75.252^. 
kciass I price in the Chicago order provided the effect on this price of the 
supply-demand adjustment in the Chicago order is limited to 10^. 
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The final adjustment factor noted in Table 4.4 is the 
supply-demand adjustment which was described earlier. Al­
though there is no supply-demand adjustment listed for 11 - of 
these orders, five use as their basic formula price the class 
I price of orders which do have a supply-demand adjustment. ' 
The federal order minimum price on non-class I milk is 
based on 1) prices paid farmers by unregulated handlers for 
manufacturing grade milk or 2) on some combination of whole­
sale prices of manufactured dairy products. There is again 
considerable variation between markets on the determination 
of non-class I milk prices as shown in Table 4.4. Neverthe­
less the formulas used are designed to relate these prices to 
the value of milk used for manufacturing purposes. 
Since different prices apply to milk disposed of in the 
various classes established in each federal order, a method of 
pooling or a method of distributing the total returns from the 
sale of regulated milk among producers at a uniform price, is 
used in conjunction with classified pricing. The AJyiAA of 1937 
provides for one of two pooling methods in each and every fed­
eral order—a marketwide "DOOI or an individual-handler pool. 
Under a marketwide pool, the total money value of all 
milk delivered by producers to all regulated handlers is com­
bined into one pool and adjusted for butterfat and producer 
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location differentials.The pool is then divided by the 
total amount of producer milk which is priced under the order 
resulting in a uniform or blend price per hundredweight of 
producer milk. Each producer receives this blend price minus 
his respective butterfat and location differential. 
In an individual-handler pool, the same computations are 
made in arriving at each handler's value of milk, and all pro­
ducers supolyire- a particular handler are paid the same uni­
form or blend price per hundredweight before adjustments are 
made for the producers' location and butterfat differentials. 
Under this type of a rooling arrangement, if the proportion of 
milk used in the different classes varies among handlers, pro­
ducers supDlying one handler will receive a uniform price 
which differs from that received by producers supplying other 
handlers in the market. There were 12 such pools in the 82 
federal order markets ip I963, two of which were the North 
Central Iowa order and the Michigan Upper Peninsula order. 
The remaining 70 orders used a market-wide pool (see 112). 
*In practice there are additional adjustments to be made 
on the pool for such things as 1) the value of overage in pool 
plants, 2) inventory changes, 3) audit credits or debits, and 
4) producer-settlement fund charges. Since each handler prob­
ably will have different utilization percentages and is re­
quired to pay at least the uniform orice to all producers from 
whom he buys milk in a market wide pool, each handler pays 
into or takes out of a "producer-settlement" fund the differ­
ence between the uniform price and the utilization value of 
his milk. This results in an "equalization" of the cost of 
milk among.all handlers and thus allows a uniform price to be 
paid farmers. 
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Individual-handler nools tend to distribute the available 
surplus milk among handlers according- to their fluid sales and 
are rarely found in markets with a low class I utilization or 
where surplus milk is unevenly distributed among handlers. ^ 
Handlers with a higher proportion of class I sales would pay 
a higher blend price and thus attract producers who were pre­
viously selling to a handler with a lower class I utilization. 
There would thus be a tendency for each handler to have the 
same class utilization percentages. 
If, however, one or more "olants could process surplus 
milk more efficiently than other handlers so that if concen­
trated in such plants this milk would return a higher price to 
producers than if distributed among several other plants, such 
an even distribution of the surplus milk would probably not be 
in the best interests of handlers, producers, or consumers. 
Under a market wide pool a concentration of surplus milk can 
be achieved since all producers share the entire class utili­
zation of the market (see 111, pp. 28-29). 
Before the blend price is announced, a final adjustment 
needs to be made—the seasonal adjustment dictated by the 
seasonal incentive plan adopted to even out production during 
the year. Cf the 82 markets regulated by a federal order in 
1963, 74 used either 1) the seascral class differential, 
2) the base-excess plan, or 3) the "Louisville" plan. The 
seasonal differential has been defined and illustrated above. 
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Adjustments for these are made, of course, before the milk is 
pooled. Adjustments for the latter two are, made in conjunc­
tion with and after pooling;, respectively. 
under the base-excess plan a producer earns a production 
base equal to his production durinp designated short supply 
months. This base then becomes his claim to a pro rata share 
of total base milk during the part of the year in which pro­
ducers are paid on base—usually the flush months of March 
through July or, as, in some markets, the year-round. Gnce a 
producer's base is established he is paid the base price for 
quantities of milk delivered up to the amount of his base 
during the following flush season, and a lower (excess) price 
for any additional milk delivered. The total payments for 
base and excess milk equal the total payments which handlers 
are required to pay for the milk at class prices, excess milk 
is generally nriced at or near the class II federal order 
price and base milk priced so that the above equality holds. 
This type of seasonal incentive plan is used in the Chicago, 
Des Koines, Quad City-Dubuque, Muskeron, and Southern Michigan 
orders as well as in 33 others (see 112). 
The "Louisville" or take-out-and-pay-back plan, on the 
other hand, requires that a certain amount be deducted from 
the producer's milk check during the flush season, pooled, and 
paid back at some designated rate for a selected period during 
the short production months. The Sioux City and Nebraska-
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Western Iowa orders alonr with eleven others use this type of 
seasonal incentive plan (see 112). 
After these adjustments have been made, the order blend 
price can be announced. If an individual-handler pool is used 
a weighted average of all the different handler's blend prices 
is announced. Similarly if the base-excess incentive plan is 
used a weighted average of the base and excess prices is 
announced. If the "Louisville" plan is adopted the amount to 
be deducted from or added to the producers' milk check is 
deducted from or added to the blend price before announcement. 
The blend prices sc calculated for 18 orders in the North 
Central region are recorded in Tabic: 4.4. As pointed out 
earlier, the fedeial order minimum prices establish a lower 
limit to the bargaining ranjre. They cannot, however, be 
interpreted as the "zero-profit limit" of the producer group. 
One would expect'the blend prices to be no lower than the pro­
ducer group's "zero-profit limit" but the author is aware of 
no reliable data to prove or disprove this hypothesis. The 
cost of oroducing milk varies considerably fro% farm to farm 
depending on the herd size, milk production per cow, labor 
charge, sources and cost of feed, milking facilities, and 
management level. Hence on some farms the blend price may, in 
fact, be below the cost of producing milk. 
In general one would expect a high and positive correla­
tion between the percentage class I utilization and the blend 
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price on the "basis of the pooling procedure. In addition, 
of course, one would expect a positive correlation between 
the blend prices and the class I prices or in general of the 
level of class prices established by the various orders. But 
since the class prices are established in part to reflect the 
added cost of moving milk from the heavy surplus production 
region—Wisconsin and Minnesota, the center of which is com­
monly assumed tc be iau Claire, Wisconsin (see 4)—to the 
individual order markets, one would expect the blend price to 
be TDositively related tc distance from this surplus region. 
• AS.has been demonstrated above, however, there are sev­
eral other factors of possible importance in determining the 
level of blend prices—seasonal incentive plans, pooling 
arrangements, basic price formulas, as well as supply-demand 
adjustments. A knowledge of the influence of each of these 
variables on blend trices could be extremely valuable to dairy 
bargaining cooperatives in determining the strategy tc be 
taken in federal order hearings and in determining what revi­
sions to seek in federal order price formulas. 
In order tc evaluate the combined influence of these 
variables on the blend price, the following statistical model 
was specified on the assumption that there is no interaction 
between the several factors: 
137 
(4.1) Y, = z f + '<11 r r e^kCijk + 
j=l k=l j=l k=l 
4 m 
Y j= 
where i = 1, 2, . . 82 federal order markets, 
- , 
"^21 Z y jk^ijn + fi 
m = 4 if j = 1; 
= 2 if j = 2, 3, or 4, 
Dj_-Li = 1 if market i has a seasonal class differential 
only; 
='0 otherwise, 
Dii2 = 1 is market i has a base-excess plan; 
= 0 otherwise, 
= 1 if market i has the "Louisville" clan; 
= 0 otherwise, 
= 1 if market i has no seasonal incentive plan; 
= 0 otherwise, 
Dapi = 1 if market i has an individual handler pool; 
= 0 otherwise, 
Di22 = 1 if market i has a market-wide pool; 
= 0 otherwise, 
D^o-i = 1 if market i has ar. economic-type basic, price 
formula ; 
= 0 otherwise, -
^i32 = 1 if market i has a manufacturing-type basic 
price formula; 
= 0 otherwise, 
^i4l = 1 if market i has a supply-demand adjuster; 
= 0 otherwise» 
^i42 ~ ^  if market i has no supcly-demand adjuster; 
= 0 otherwise, 
Yj_ = average annual I963 blend price in market i in 
cents per hundredweight (112), 
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Xii = distance from Eau Claire to market i (miles), 
X2i = average annual I963 class I utilization percentage 
in market i (112), 
^ j_ = a normally and Independently distributed random 
error with mean, zero, and variance, uncor-
. related with X]_ and 
Because of thé restribtively hig-h multicollinearity -be­
tween some of the dummy variables and the product of dummy and 
X variables,* the alternative but equivalent model, 
(4.1') Yi = ttoDi + aixDiii + ai2Dii2 + +. • 
^22^122 + 0320132 + Oi^l^i^l + (BoOl+BllDiii+ 
9l2Dil2+Bi2Dii2+82lCi21+G3lDi2i+84iDi4i)Xii + 
( )iiDiii+%i2Dii2+yi3Dii3+y2lDi21+ 
*3l2i3i+%4l&i4l)^2i + ^i» 
was used where the additional dummy variable, D^, equals unity 
for all i markets. The coefficients of model (4.1') were 
lated by least squares and are as follows : 
A 
Co = -124.400 (154.042) = 0 .008897 (0 .033707) 
a i l  = 29.702 (129.419) Gil ~ 0 .071670- (0 .036319) 
^12 = 8.060 (127.575) ^12 
= 0 .046360 (0 .033095) 
^14 = -279.910 (190.173) = 0 .022630 (0 .035834) 
&22 = 129.356 ( 79.377) ^21 
= 0 .023950 (0 
CO CM CM 0
 
A 
?32 - 154.980 ( 75.050) ^31 
= 0 .067660 (0 .102082) 
041 = 41.040 ( 43.271) 041 = 0 .033240 (0 .016919) 
*One zero-order correlation coefficient was as high as 
0.998 which exceeded the level of a "program stop" in the IBM 
7074 multiple regression program. 
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%o = 7.43350 (2.23782) 
Vil = -4.91900 (2.28037) 
$12 = -4.43400 (2.21885) 
giQ = -4.26510 (2.74549) 
?21 = 1.28251 (1.01136) 
foi = 1.67920 (1.44806) 
nil = -0.95180 (0.58087) 
H2 = 0.9983. 
Standard errors of the coefficients are given in parentheses 
following each coefficient. In addition a matrix of variances 
and covariances is provided in Appendix Table B.l so that the 
variance of a prediction based on model (4.1') can be com­
puted . 
Since the entire population of federal order markets was 
used, if the variables are measured without error the "t" test 
used to test the significance of an estimated regression co­
efficient may not be appropriate. If the estimated coeffi­
cients do not equal the population parameters it is because 
of errors of model specification; not because a sample of the 
population was used. Nevertheless use of the "t" test in a 
probability sense may be justified on.the assumption that the 
dependent variable is subject to random fluctuations even when 
all the knoT«m influencing factors remain the same. Unfor­
tunately this .assumption can'never be tested since we cannot 
reconstruct the year I963. 
From model (4.1') it is seen that for a market having the 
first characteristic of each classification, the expected 
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value of Y given -^2» E(y/Xi, X2, 11, 21, 3I, 41), 
is ttQ + 0-22 + O-ij,! + (Bo+G2i+821+B2i+B4i)%i + ( ^11"*"^21'*'^31"'" 
^4l)^2" Similarly K(YjXi, X2, l4, 22, 32, 42) = Qq + a^zj, + 
Û-22 °-32 ^0-^1 ^0-^2' Continuing in this fashion and 
equating expected values to the appropriate combination of 
GjkS, Sjjj-s, and iTj^^s, one could derive the parameters of 
model (4.1) fron; those of model (4.1') and thus establish the 
forrcal equivalence between the two models. The coefficients 
of model (4.1) need not be derived, however, since by using 
the parameters of model (4.1') one can compute intercept, "a, 
/I 0 
and slope, g and a, coefficients for each of the 32 possible 
combinations of classifications and characteristics according 
to the above expected values. 
The latter coefficients are shown in Table 4.5 where the 
subscripts s, t, u, anc v correspond to the following redefi­
nition of dummy variable?; 
Diik - ^ ils s = 1, 2, 3» 4; 
^i2k ~ ^ i2t ^or t = 1, 2; 
^i3k ~ ^ i3u for u = 1," 2; and 
^i4k ~ ^ i4v V = 1, 2. 
Thus, for example, t = 2 indicates that market i has a market-
wide pool while V = 1 indicates that market i has a supply-
demand adjuster. Iiow various expected values can be deter­
mined directly from the coefficients shown in Tables 4.5— 
e.g., û(y|XI, Xg, 13, 22, 31, 42) = 4.956 + 0.09913? X^ + 
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Table 4.5» Parameters for estimating- "blend price under 
various combinations of classifications and 
characteristics in federal order markets 
Seasonal 
incentive 
plan 
Pool 
plan 
Basic 
price 
formula 
Supply-
demand 
adjuster 
Intercepts 
S • 
Slope coefficients 
Y 
(s) (t) (u) (v) 
1 1 1 1 -53.658 0.210417 4.52441 
1 1 1 2 -94.698 0.172177 5.47621 
1 1 2 1 101.322 • 0.142757 2.84521 
1 1 2 2 60.282 0.104517 3.79701 
1 2 1 1 75.698 0.186467 3.24190 
1 2 1 2 34.658 0.148227 4.19370 
1 2 2 1 230.678 0.II8807 1.56270 
1 2 2 2 189.638 0.080567 2.51450 
2 1 1 1 
-75.300 0.185107 5.00941 
2 1 1 2 -116.340 0.146867 5.96121 
2 1 2 1 79.680 0.117447 3.33021 
2 1 2 2 38.640 0.079307 4.28201 
• 2 2 1 1 54.056 0.161157 3.72690 
2 2 1 2 13.016 0.122917 4.67870 
2 2 2 1 209.036 0.093497 2.04770 
2 2 2 2 167.996 0.055257 2.99950 
3 1 1 1 -83.360 0.161377 5.17831 
3 1 1 2 -124.400 0.123137 6.13011 
3 1 2 1 71.620 0.093717 3.49911 
3 1 2 2 30.580 0.055477 4.45091 
3 2 1 1 45.996 0.137427 3.89580 
3 2 1 2 4.956 0.099187 4.84760 
3 2 2 1 200.976 0.069767 2.21660 
3 2 2 2 159.936 0.031527 3.16840 
4 1 1 1 -363.270 -0.138747 9.44341 
4 1 1 2 -404.310 0.100507 10.39521 
4 1 2 1 -208.290 0.071087 7.76421 
4 1 2 2 
-249.330 0.032847 8.71601 
4 2 1 1 
-233.914 0.114797 8.16090 
4 2 1 2 -274.954 0.076557 9.11270 
4 2 2 1 -78.934 0.047137 6.48170 
4 2 2 2 -119.974 0.008897 7.43350 
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4.8476 X2. 
Some very striking differences are noted among the co­
efficients in Table 4.5* For markets with no seasonal in­
centive 'olan, for example, the intercepts, a, and slope co­
efficients on X]L, 3, are in general quite low in contrast to 
those for markets with a seasonal incentive plan, while the 
sloTje coefficients on a2, Y , are relatively large. In fact if 
the coefficients for each of the four seasonal incentive plans 
at any given combination of pool plan, basic price formula, 
ard supply-demand adjustment Provision are compared, a dis-
tinct pattern will be noted among the as, 8s, and Xs—i.e., 
if the pod r)lan, basic price formula, and supply-demand ad­
justment provision are fixed 
-A. -A A 
^Ituv ^ °'2tuv > ^ 3tuv ^ ^4tuv' 
^Ituv ^ ®2tuv > ^3"tuv > ®4tuv' 
/s XV /\ 
^Ituv ^2tuv "C ^ tuv ^ ^4tuv 
for each of the eight possible combinations of t, u, and v. 
Further study of Table 4.5 reveals the following additional 
patterns existing among the coefficients: 
(1) if the seasonal incentive plan, the basic price 
formula, and the supply-demand adjustment provision 
are fixed 
/I 
°-sluv < '^s2uv» 
®sluv > ®s2uv' 
\/ ^ 
Vsluv x' Vs2uv 
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for each of the l6 possible combinations of s, u, 
and V ; 
(2) if the seasonal incentive plan, the pool plan, and 
the supply-demand adjustment provision are fixed 
^stlv °-st2v* 
^stlv ^ ^st2v' 
"^stlv ^ ^st2v 
for each of the l6 possible combinations of s, t, 
and v; 
(3) if the seasonal incentive plan, the pool plan, and 
the basic price formula are fixed 
°-stul > &stu2* 
^stul > ^ stu2» 
A A 
^stul < Vstu2 
for each of the l6 possible combinations of s, t, 
and u; 
(4) if the seasonal incentive plan and the supply-demand 
adjustment provision are fixed 
^ ^ ^ /V 
"^sllv ^s21v 'C °''sl2v \^s22v' 
A ^ ^ ^ 
®sllv ^  ^s21v ^sl2v > ^ s22v' 
A /\ /\ 
^sllv ^ '^s21v ^  ^sl2v ^ <^'s22v 
for each of the eirht possible combinations of s 
and v; 
(5) if the seasonal incentive plan and the basic price 
formula are fixed 
%s2ul > &s2u2 > &slul > G'slu2» 
^slul '> ^s2ul > ^ slu2 ^  ^s2u2' 
^s2ul ^s2u2 < ^slul < ^slu2 
IW 
for each of the eight possible combinations of 
s and u; 
(6) if the seasonal incentive olan and the pool plan 
are fixed 
^st21 > ^st22 >^stll > ^8tl2' 
A. A A. A 
Bstll > Bstl2 > ®st21 > ®st22' 
•?st21 < Vst22 < Vstll < Atl2 
for each of the eip-ht possible combinations of 
s and t; 
(7) if the basic price formula aiid ^he supply-demand 
adjustment provision are fixed 
'^12uv °'22uv >^J.cVLV >°'lluv >%luv >^3luv.>°^42u.v >^^luv» 
 ^ /\ 
®lluv ^  ^12uv >®21uv "^^31uv >®22uv >"4luv >®32uv ^ ^42uv» 
and 
12uv ^  ^2uv '^^32uv ^ ^lluv '^^21uv "^^luv ^2uv ^ ^luv 
for each of the four possible combinations of u 
and V ; 
(8) if the pool plan and the supply-demand adjustment 
provision are fixed 
/V /\ -A A. A. /\  ^ A\ 
^It2v^^2t2v >^3t2v >"ltlv >^2tlv >°^3tlv ->^^t2v >^4tlv' 
6ltlv> G2tl7 >63tlv>3lt2v >84tlv >R2t2v >%t2v >^t2v, 
and 
A A. A. A 
^lt2v ^^2t2v <^t2v ^ ^tlv <^2tlv ^^tlv ^ ^4t2v ^ ^tlv 
for each of the four possible combinations of t 
and v; 
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(9) if the pool plan and basic price formula are fixed 
^Itul ^ °'2tul >°-3tul ^ °-ltu2 >°^2tu2 ^ '^3tu2 ^ '^^tul >°'4'tu2» 
®ltul>'^2tul >^ltu2 >^3tul >^2tu2 >®4tul >"3tu2 >®^tu2» 
and 
A.  ^ /N  ^  ^
^Itul ^  ^2tul <^3tul <^ltu2 <^2tu2 ^ %tu2 ^^tul ^ %tu2 
for each of the four possible combinations of t 
and u; and 
(10) if only the seasonal incentive plan is fixed 
"s221 >^s222 >^sl21 >^s211 >^sl22>^s212 >"^8111 >^sll2'. 
^slll > ®s211 >^sll2 >^s212 > ^sl21 >Ss221 >^8122 >^s222» 
and 
^s221 < >8222 <^sl21<Vs211 <^sl22 <^s212 <4lll <^112 
for each s. 
Finally it will be observed that if only the pool plan is 
fixed, if only the basic price formula is fixed, and if only 
the supply-demand adjustment provision is fized three addi­
tional D&tterns could be added to this list. 
It is interesting to note that in each of the eleven pat­
terns presented the intercepts, a, and slope coefficients on 
A 
X2, y, are ordered in exactly opposite directions. The order-
in.p- of the slope coefficients on X^, B, however, - do not con­
sistently follow that of either a. or Y. It can be verified 
that the sari.e conclusions hold also for the three patterns 
not shown. 
-•i comparison of coefficients, however, does not allow one 
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to r:ake any generalizations about the magnitude of the blend 
price to be expected in various markets. To accomplish this, 
specific values of and X2 must be used tc compute the blend 
price on the basis of the information in Table 4.5. The means 
of the variables usee co estimate the coefficients of model 
(4.1') are given in Appendix Table B.2 and may be used to make 
such computations.. It m^ be more meaningful, however, to 
predict the blend price with other values of these variables. 
For example, to predict the blend -orice for a market with 
= 318 and X2 = 39 if this market used the base-excess plan 
(s=2), the market-wide pool plan (t=2), ar.d the manufacturing 
milk price formula (u=2) in conjunction with no supply-demand 
adjuster (v=2), line 16 of Table 4.5 would be used. The pre­
dicted blend price is 302.55 cents per hundredweight and its 
variance computed from Appendix Table 3.1 is 387.4452 cents 
per hundredweight. 
Since the Chicago federal order market had the same values 
of ^2 and A2 in I963 but did use a supply-demand adjuster, one 
may wish to compare the above predicted price with the actual 
1963 Chicago blend price of 3^7 cents per hundredweight. We 
see that the predicted price was lower than the actual. Using 
the two-tailed "t" test we find this predicted value to be 
significantly different from 34? at the five percent confi­
dence level. Thus assuming that the absence of a supply-
demand adjustment in the Chicago federal order would not 
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affect class I utilization, we"conclude that the average 
annual I963 blend price in this market would have been lower 
without the supply-demand adjustment. 
It may not be valid, however, to assume that the class I 
utilization percentage will remain the same if a given char­
acteristic is substituted for another in any one classifica­
tion ard for the same market. A more acceptable procedure 
would be to determine what effect a lower (or higher) blend 
price would have on the supply of milk as well as on the de­
mand for class I and non-class I milk and, therefore, on 
class I utilization. This would necessitate solving simul­
taneously for class I utilization and blend price using demand 
and supply equations and the appropriate equation from Table 
4.5. 
The information in Table 4.5 thus indicates two impor­
tant facts of value to dairy cooperatives as well as to policy 
makers. In the first place, with a given utilization per­
centage and at a given distance from the surplus milk produc­
tion area, blend prices can in general be expected to be quite 
different ir markets with 1) different seasonal incentive 
plans, 2) different pool plans, 3) different basic price 
formulas, and 4) a supply-demand adjuster or no supply-demand 
adjuster. Further in each of these four classifications the 
blend price can be expected to increase (decrease) at differ­
ent rates as the market's class I utilization percentage 
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increases (decreases) and as the market under consideration is 
located more (less) distant from the surplus milk production 
region depending on the particular characteristic the market 
possesses. This information could be useful to dairy coop­
eratives for the reasons pointed out previously. In addition 
it may prove useful to the administrators of the federal milk 
order program 1) in evaluatirp proposed changes in a given 
federal order, 2) in advising the proponents of a new federal 
order, and 3) recommendir-F the provisions to be included 
in a new order. 
Babb and others (4, 115) have also used multiple regres­
sion to study intermarket milk price relationships. In these 
studies, however, the only independent variables employed were 
1) distance frorr. jziau Claire, Wisconsin and 2) class I utiliza­
tion. Hence only three coefficients were estimated—an over­
all a, g, and Y. But this procedure fails to consider some 
important factors affecting the blend price as the results of 
the present analysis clearly show. Thus the potential use­
fulness of the analysis is restricted and, more importantly, 
conclusions derived from it are likely to be in error because 
of serious errors of model specification. 
State and local regulations 
In some parts of the United States there are evidently 
state and local regulations tending to act as barriers to the 
shipment of milk between and within states (see above, page 
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102). The effect of such restrictive legislation is, as was 
noted before, to limit the number of alternative outlets for 
the cooperative subject to this restrictive legislation and 
thereby to weaken the cooperative's type II bargaining power. 
There are at least two instances in which the same type 
of legislation affects the cooperatives of concern in this 
study. Before milk may be shipped into the city of Burling­
ton the milk producer must receive a permit to do so and pay 
an inspection fee of ^10 per year. Thus any cooperative 
attempting to sell milk to Burlington handlers would face a 
stiff fee requirement if a sizable number of dairy farmers' 
milk was involved. Similarly, to ship milk into St. Louis, 
Missouri, a cooperative is presently required to pay four 
cents per hundredweight for an inspection fee unless waived 
by the local authorities. Such fee requirements do not abso­
lutely prevent the shipment of milk into Burlington and St. 
Louis—nevertheless they mean an additional expense that may 
in some cases make these markets an uneconomic alternative 
outlet and hence., reduce the cooperative's type II bargaining 
power. 
On the other hand, state and local regulations may serve 
as a substitute for a cooperative's bargaining power. For 
examnle several states have Grade A milk laws which require 
all milk sold for fluid purposes to be marked "Grade A". Such 
laws effectively prevent the use of ungraded milk for fluid 
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purposes and thereby eliminate an alternative source of milk 
for the cooperative's handlers. Also regulations of the type 
noted above for Burlington and St. Louis, if encouraged and 
enforced, may restrict the number of alternative sources of 
milk for the cooperative's handlers. 
Information Possessed or Secured 
AS witnessed by any number of publications dealing with 
farm bargaining, bargaining agents are continually emphasizing 
the need for increasing their knowledge about various aspects 
of their environment if they are to be successful in bargain­
ing over the terms of trade. It was previously hypothesized 
that dairy bargaining cooperatives have a fairly thorough 
knowledge of at least three aspects of their environment: 
1) the conditions of demand for the final product, 2) the 
alternative sources of milk for the cooperative's handlers 
and the cost to handlers of obtaining milk from these alterna­
tive sources, and 3) the alternative outlets available.for 
the cooperative's milk as well as the returns from these out­
lets. 
Demand for milk and milk products 
Attempts to test the first part of the hypothesis are 
extremely difficult and require a more detailed analysis than 
was possible in this study. Table 4.6, however, does provide 
151 
some indication of the extent to which the managers inter­
viewed attempt to keep informed about the changing conditions 
of demand for milk and milk products. One' manager listed 
only one of the eleven sources and a second only four.. The 
remaining eight managers listed at least six of the .sources 
shown in Table 4.6. This information gives us at least some 
indication that the greatest majority of the managers inter­
viewed attempt to keep up with the changing conditions of 
demand. 
Table 4.6. Number of managers interviewed securing various. 
types of information on the demand for milk and 
milk products 
dumber of 
Information secured cooperatives 
Supply-demand adjustment in effect in 
the order • 3 
Sales to handlers 8 
Henorts from handlers . 7 
Price changes at retail 6 
Changes in other federal order price formulas S 
Changes ir CCC support purchases of surplus 
products 6 
Changes in CCC support price level 6 
University outlook 4 
Success or failure of other cooperatives in 
negotiating with handlers 8 
Fare or trade publications 4 
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Alternative sources of milk for handlers 
Every manager interviewed was quite aware of the exist­
ence of and location of alternative supplies of milk. The 
principal alternative sources of milk mentioned were other 
dairy cooperatives located in Minnesota and Wisconsin as well 
as in Iowa. Furthermore the cooperatives studied provide an 
alternative source of milk for the handlers in other Iowa and 
non-Iowa markets. Most of the cooperatives mentioned as 
alternative sources of milk were located within the milkshed 
of federal order markets "but some were not. 
In addition to being aware of the existence, and location 
of alternative supplies of milk, the cooperatives studied— 
with the exception of the Chicago and Detroit cooperatives— 
were aware of the fact that their entire volume could easily 
be replaced by milk from these alternative sources. The 
amount cf milk received by handlers in several federal order 
markets in the %orth Central Region which was in excess of 
fluid milk or class I sales is shown in Table 4.?. This milk, 
it is hypothesized," could have been used as class I milk in 
other markets.* By comparing the total I963 volume of the 
*This does not, of course, exhaust the entire supply of 
surplus milk which could have been used for class I milk in 
other markets, but it is believed to represent the major por­
tion of the to ta':, since most of the major fluid milk markets 
are regulated by federal orders even though much of the area 
in some states is not regulated by a federal order (see Figure 
4.3)- adequate data with which to estimate the total amount 
of surplus milk available from unregulated markets in Wisconsin 
and I'iirne so ta is not available at the present time. 
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Table 4.7. Producer milk used for non-class I purposes by 
regulated handlers in several North Central 
federal order markets, 1963®' 
( 0 0 0 )  
Federal order market pounds. 
Chicago 3,596,662 
South Eend-LaPorte-Jilkhart 52,460 
Hock-rxiver Valley 26,292 
Milwaukee 127,615 
Southern Michigan 1,527,003 
Muskegon 4-3,112 
Upstate Michigan 26,772 
Kichip-an Upper Peninsula 33,266 
Northeastern Wisconsin 196,699 
Kadison 64,661 
Quad Citias-Dubuque 92,658 
Nebraska-western Iowa 105,754 
Sioux City •• • 19,154 
r.inneapolis-ot. Paul 420,008 
Duluth-Superior 69,049 
Cedar r.apids-IoT-va City 84,097 
North Central Iowa 38,083 
Des i-.oines 78,806 
^Source; 112. 
cooperatives studied as listed in Table 4.1 with the I963 
volume of surplus milk available from the markets listed in 
Table 4.7, it is easily seen that there was sufficient milk 
to replace the entire volume of any (but not all) of the coop­
eratives studied except Chicago and Detroit. 
The Detroit cooperative controls practically all of the 
milk produced in Michigan through its own operations and, as 
we shall see later,, through the operation of a federation of 
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all Kichip-an dairy cooperatives. Thus Detroit handlers would 
not be likely to secure milk from any other Michigan federal 
order market during a withholding action. Similarly, as we 
shall also point out in more detail later, Detroit handlers 
would probably get no milk from Fort Wayne or Toledo because 
of the existence of the Great Lakes kilk Marketing Federation. 
In addition, as argued previously, the Chicago cooperative 
would probably not supply milk to Detroit handlers during an 
attempt by the Detroit cooperative to negotiate a premi.um. 
For similar reasons, Chicago handlers are not apt to get 
milk from other cooperatives in Chicago, Michigan, Toledo, or 
Port Wayne during an attempt by the Chicago cooperative to 
negotiate a hiprher price for its milk—i.e., it was felt that 
the Kichir&n, Toledo and Fort Wayne cooperatives would not 
suoply the Chicago cooperative's handlers under these condi­
tions and there also exists a federation of Chicago area coop­
erative's. Further since the Chicago cooperative controls 
about ko percent of the total erade A milk production ir. its 
procurement area (Table 4.1) which includes the entire market 
area of the Milwaukee, Rock iiiver Valley, and South Bend-
LaForte-ilkhart federal orders and about one-fourth of the 
Kadison federal order (see Figures 4.2 and 4.3), it may con­
trol as much as 125 million rounds of the surplus milk avail­
able from these latter four federal orders. 
Combining the remaining amount of surplus milk in the 
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Milwaukee, Hock River Valley, South Bend-LaPorte-Elkhart, and 
Madison federal order markets with that of the other Wiscon­
sin, Minnesota, and Iowa federal order markets listed in Table 
4.7, we get slightly over 1.25 billion pounds of surplus milk. 
Assuming 15 percent of this surplus milk is needed to meet 
1) day-to-day fluctuations in milk receipts, 2) seasonal fluc­
tuations in milk receipts, and 3) day-to-day fluctuations in 
sales of milk products (see 121, pp. 5-6; 8, pp. 1-2), we are 
left with 1.06 billion pounds of surplus milk available to 
Chicago and Detroit handlers—enough to replace 39«3 percent 
of the Chicago cooperative's volume or 36.6 percent of the 
Detroit cooperative's volume. As will be noted in more detail 
later, the amount of the cooperative's volume replaceable from 
alternative sources may be an important factor in the coopera­
tive's desire to call a milk strike. 
Alternative outlets for the cooperative's milk 
Only two of the cooperatives studied shipped a substan­
tial volume of milk to fluid milk markets in the South. 
Waterloo shipped nearly 44 million pounds and Cedar Rapids 
8.3 million to bottlers in Arkansas, Tennessee, Georgia, 
Missouri, Texas, Louisiana, Florida, Colorado and Mississippi. 
The Omaha, Chicago, and Detroit cooperatives shipped an insig­
nificant amount to Denver, St. Louis, and Toledo, respective­
ly, as requests came from cooperatives in these markets. 
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The only alternative outlet for the cooperative's class 
I ar.d surplus milk suggested by the regaining cooperative man­
agers, however, was the surplus milk processing facilities 
owned by the cooperative or owned by nearby cooperatives. In 
general these were butter and non-fat dry milk processing 
plants. 
Evidently, if an alternative oiftlet was for some reason 
needed for class I milk, most of the cooperatives studied 
would market this milk in loicer-valued non-class I outlets 
rather than seek a higher price in a distant market. 
Bargaining Cooperative Objectives 
The sole objective of farm bargaining organizations is 
generally assumed to be that of negotiating the highest pos­
sible price for the farm produce. It cannot be denied that 
the cooperatives under study in this dissertation consider 
the above to be one of their bargaining objectives. Each 
manager interviewed was asked the following question; What 
do you seek to achieve when you bargain with handlers or what 
do you bargain for? The answer to this question was either 
1) "to secure the highest possible price for our members' 
milk," 2) "to secure the highest possible net return for our 
members' milk," or 3) "to secure the highest possible price 
for our members' milk consistent with maintenance of our class 
I sales." From the evidence presented in Table 4.8, one can 
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Table 4.8. Negotiated premiums of the cooperatives studied, 
1963 
Cooperative 
Premium on 
Annual 
average 
class I milk^ 
June 
June premium 
on class II 
milk 
Burlington^ 4^.300 àO.300 .ijjO.OOO 
Waterloo 0.075 0.075 0.000 
Des Koines 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Cedar kanids 0.075 0.075 0.075 
Moline 0.100 0.100 0.100 
Omaha 0.000 0.000 . 0.150 
Mason City 0.120 0.120 0.170 
Sioux City 0.000 0.000 0.100 
Chicago 0.530 0.760 0.200 
Detroit 0.840 0.870 0.000 
^•Source; 114. 
^Burlir.f^ton is not in a federal order market but at 
present negotiates a price for class I milk eoual to the 
ï'ioline class I price olus 30 cents per hundredweight. 
get an idea of the bargaining activity of the cooperatives 
interviewed. 
Ir addition during 1962-1964 several of the cooperatives 
studied negotiated a bulk tank premium as indicated in Table 
4.9. 'with the exception cf the Detroit cooperative, however, 
most cf these premiums were negotiated for the purpose of 
payinr the farmer for converting from can handling of milk 
to bulk handling and, thus, do not necessarily reflect the 
value of bulk handling to the bottler. Termination dates 
recorded in Table 4.9 reflect the fact that the length of. time 
over which these premiums were to rsmain in effect was deter-
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Table 4.9* Bulk tank premiums negotiated by the 
cooperatives studied, 1962-1964& 
Cooperative 
Premium 
(cents per cwt.) 
Termination 
date^ 
Burlington c 
Waterloo — — — — 
Des Koines Feb. '64 
Cedar xia^oids — — — — 
Omaha 15 Aug. '63 
Koline 10 Oct. '62 
Kason City — — — — 
Sioux City 15 June-'64 
Chicago 15 • Oct. '62 
Detroit 8c 
^Source; 114. 
more premiums reported after this date. 
^Included in premium reported in Table 4.S. 
^An 3 cent premium was in effect until September, I963 
at which time the premium was reduced to 5 cents. 
mined by the two parties so that producers' costs of convert­
ing to bulk handling would be recovered. 
Nevertheless the third answer to the question loosed to 
these managers suggested that there may be at least one other 
objective of some dairy bargaining cooperatives—to maintain 
their class I sales or to maintain a market for their milk. 
Consequently each manager v-as asked to rank seven alternative 
objectives in order of decreasing importance to the coopera­
tive. These alternative objectives together with their rank-
l6o 
ins: by each of nine different managers are recorded in Table 
4.10 (one cooperative manager failed to respond to this ques­
tionnaire). It will be noted that in only three cases was 
negotiating a price which would give members the highest pos­
sible net returr for their milk considered to be the most 
important objective of the cooperatives studied. Maintaining 
a market for members' milk was generally felt to be the most 
important objective of those considered while maintaining the 
past highest percentage of class I sales was most frequently 
ranked third or fourth. 
It is interesting to note that increasing the size of the 
cooperative's procurement area was a relatively unimportant 
objective of the cooperatives studied. Evidently volume is 
considered as a rather unimportant factor in determining what 
these cooperatives are able to negotiate. In fact two man­
agers indicated that "increasing volume means absolutely 
nothing to us if we are unable to achieve the other goals". 
There is undoubtedly some minimum level of volume, however, 
below which this objective would be ranked higher. 
The information contained in Table 4.10 merely suggests 
that dairy bargaining cooperatives place greater importance 
on some objectives than on others. It is not unreasonable to 
suspect that, in addition, these cooperatives have a multi­
dimensional bargaining objective or, more appropriately, a 
hierarchial goal system. The manager ranking the objectives 
Table 4.10. Importance of various objectives to nine dairy bargaining 
cooperatives studied 
Cooperative rankings^ Pooled 
3 5 "6 7 8 9 ranking 
1-Negotiatinp: a urice that will 
give members the highest pos­
s i b l e  n e t  r e t u r n  f o r  m i l k  1  3  5  4  2 . 5 2 . 5 1  5  1  2  
2-Kaintaining a market for 
members' milk 2. 1 I.5 1 2.5 1 2 3 2 1 
3-Maintaining past highest per­
centage of class I sales 5 2 3 3 2.5 4 3 4 A*. 3 
4-Securing 100 percent control 
of milk produced in pro­
curement area U 4 6 5 7 6 1 6.5 5 
5-Increasing the size of 
procurement area 7 7 7 7 7 6 77 6.5 7 
6-Negotiating for the esti­
mated value of services 
performed for handlers 3 & 6 5 & 5 5 6 3 6 
7-Maintainin? good relations 
with handlers ' 6 5 I.5 2 2.5 2.5 4 2 5 4 
•\ Hank correlation between cooperative rank-
inpTS and pooled ranking^ 
.643 .929 .704 .821 .889 .830 .929 .393 .722 
^Tied rankings are each assigned the average of the ranks they would have been 
assigned had no ties occurred. Cooperative numbers in this table to not correspond 
to the cooperative numbers as listed in Table 4.1. 
t'Spearrnari rank correlation coefficient corrected for tied rankings. To be 
significant at the five percent level this coefficient must equal or exceed 0.750 
and at the ten percent level 0.626 (see 57)* 
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as the second column of rankings indicates, for example, ex­
plained his ranking as follows; "Only if v:e have a market 
for our milk can we hope to maintain, our class I sales and not 
until i*:e are assured of a market, for our class I sales can we 
hope to bargain for the price of this milk. To support our 
bargaining ability we need to control the sunply of milk and 
to maintain good relations with handlers. Only after all 
these have been achieved will it benefit us to increase our 
volume." 
To test the null hypothesis that there is no agreement 
amonp- the nine rankings of the seven objectives, Kendall's 
coefficient of concordance, W, is used (see 57)• This coeffi­
cient provides a measure of the degree of association or agree­
ment among a set of k > 2 rankings. Its ranre is from zero 
to unity, zero indicating no agreement amonr the k rankings 
and unity indicating perfect agreement. (If k=2 then the 
Spearman rank correlation coefficient would be used which has 
a ranre of -1 to 1). ' 
The computed W for the da.ta in Table 4.10 was 0.615 which 
is found to be significantly different from zero at the one 
percent confidence level. Thus the null hypothesis must be 
rejected. On the basis of this test there is reason to be­
lieve that the nine cooperative managers were applying essen­
tially the same underlying standard in rankirg these objec­
tives. One estimate of this standard suggested by Kendall 
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(57) is the pooled ranking obtained by ranking each objective 
according to the sum of the ranks assigned to it, the one with 
the smallest sum being ranked first. If for two' or more 
objectives the sums are equal, we rank them according to the 
sum of squares of the individual ranks assigned to them, the 
one with the smaller sum of squares being ranked first. This 
pooled rankinr is shewn in the last column of Table 4.10. • 
Kendall has shown that th=e nooled ranking minimizes the 
sum of squares of the differences between what the totals for 
each objective are and whtt-the totals-would have been if all 
the rankings were alike.- 'ThiS;leads him to the conclusion 
that the pooled ranking is the "best" estimate of the true 
underlying standard. li-îpardless of the mathematical prop­
erties of this estimate, it i:r.plies that interpersonal com-
•oarisons of preferences are possible and in fact makes such 
comparisons. Whether cr not this assumption is justified re­
mains an unanswered question. 
In the present analysis VJ is not extremely large and 
there were several deviations from the pooled rankinr as evi­
denced by the Spearman rank correlation coefficients shown 
in the last row of Table 4.10. The pooled ranking indicates 
that the nine cooperatives ranked objective one as the second 
most important. However, three managers felt that negotiating 
a price which would give members the highest possible return 
for their milk was more important than any other of the seven 
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objectives while a fourth could not distinguish between the 
importance of this objective and of three others. The man­
agers giving these seven objectives the rankings indicated in 
columns three, four, and eight on the other hand felt that 
negotiating a Drice which would prive members the highest pos­
sible return for their milk was a relatively unimportant 
objective. 
This would suggest that different cooperatives have dif­
ferent aspirations, further examination indicates that each 
cooperative's aspirations may be conditioned by various fac­
tors peculiar to the individual cooperative. For example the 
three managers giving the first objective the highest rank 
had sufficient processing facilities to handle at least 60 
percent of their entire volume. Thus these three cooperatives 
would be assured of an outlet for most of their milk if they 
decided to withhold milk from handlers in order to obtain a 
higher price for members' milk. This is not true, however, 
for most of tne remaining six cooperatives. Hence the true 
standard which these cooperatives applied in ranking the seven 
objectives may well have been quite different from the pooled 
ranking shown in Table 4.10. 
Further insi.p-ht into the degrree to which various physical 
and environmental attributes of the cooperative may influence 
the cooperative's ranking of these objectives may be obtained 
by examining the correlation (or lack of correlation) between 
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the ranking of cooperatives having similar attributes. 
In matrices through Ag cooperatives (numbered to corre­
spond tc the cooperatives as listed in Table 4.10) are listed 
alone the top and left of each matrix in order of ascending 
magnitude of (k=l, 2, 8, 9, 11, IJ, l6)—i.e., that coop­
erative having- the lowest value of is listed first, that 
cooperative having the next lowest value of is listed 
second, etc.—where Xjj- is the attribute variable shown above 
the matrix. The number in each cell of each matrix is the 
Spearman rank correlation coefficient (corrected for tied 
rankings), , showing the correlation between cooperative 
i's and cooperative .j* s ranking of the seven objectives. All-
cells above the diagonal are filled in matrix A^ while in the 
remaining matrices correlation coefficients not significantly 
different from zero at the ten percent level were omitted. 
Finally the heavy lines drawn in each matrix enclose the ^'s 
for two groups of cooperatives—one group having a small value 
of Xjj and a second group having a relatively large value of 
Xjj. The attribute variables are; 
X]_ = percent of the local handlers with which the 
cooperative attempted to bargain in I963 who would 
bargain—i.e., the cooperative's ability to secure 
recognition as the exclusive bargaining agent 
(see also pages 187-191 below), 
X2 = volume per handler with which the cooperative 
bargained in 1963 in millions of pounds, 
Xg = handlers' buying price for 3«5 percent producer 
milk used for fluid use in 1963 in cents per 
hundredwe i ght, 
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Xo = percent of the cooperative's volume sold to 
class I outlets, 
annual average I963 negotiated premium, on class I 
milk in cents per hundredweight,. 
number of•class I handlers who would bargain with 
the cooperative in I963, 
percent of the cooperative's volume that could 
have been handled in the cooperative's own 
processing plant, and 
approximate number of dairy cows per thousand 
crop acres in the ccouerative's procurement area, 
1962. 
^10 ~ 
^11 = 
X13 = 
^16 = 
^1 
cooperative j 
7 8 
9 1 .833 .182 .847 .745 -.180 
ON 
.557 
ON 
7 1 .685 .714 .847 .117 .750 .864 .786 
3 1 .108 .6^5 .775 .883 .815 .685 
1 1 .450 .071 .321 .393 .393 
6 1 .118 .901 .795 .613 
8 1 .429 .510 .464 
4 1 .864 .715 
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•^lé 
cooperative j 
7 9 3 5 4 8 2 6 1 
7 1 .883 .685 .864 .750 .786 .847 .714 
9 1 .745 .847 
3 1 .815 .883 .775 .685 .645 
•H 
(D 5 1 .864 .714 .795 
> 
•H , 
eg 1 .714 .901 
^-1 „ CD 8 1 ft 
8 2 1 
6 1 
1 1 
i'.atrix Ag 
î'bw if cooperatives with similar attributes ranked, the 
seven objectives similarly, one would expect the correlations 
in the boxes in each matrix to be quite large. Further if 
cooperatives with dissimilar attributes ranked the objectives 
differently, one would expect the ps above and to the right 
of the boxes to be low or negative. Finally if cooperatives 
with dissimilar attributes did not rank the objectives differ­
ently, one may expect the high to be evenly distributed 
over the upper triangle of the matrix or at least not concen­
trated in the boxes. 
For the ten attributes considered the division of coop­
eratives into groups was made where a large gap existed in 
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the value of Xjj- between two cooperatives. For example in 
matrix A2 the ran^e in the value of X2 for the nine coop­
eratives was 3.43 - 27.12 million pounds while the difference 
between the value of X2 for cooperative k and 2 was 7*93 mil­
lion pounds. These divisions are still, however, quite arbi­
trary. Further the number of observations was extremely small 
and no adequate statistical test of either of the above three 
hypotheses seems to be available. Thus the analysis is sub­
ject to severe limitations. 
Nevertheless, some tentative conclusions can be reached. 
In matrices A^, Aj^, A^, Ag, and Ay, 59 to 84 percent of the 
y^s above the diagonal in the boxes were significantly dif­
ferent from zero at the ten percent level while less than ^ 5 
percent of the s in the area above and to the right of the 
boxes were significantly different froii zero at the ten per­
cent level (these percentages are tabulated at the right of 
each matrix near the appropriate area in the matrix). This 
indicates that most of the coopératives having similar Xj, X^, 
XiQ, -^11J and X]l3 attributes ranked the seven objectives 
similarly, while most of the cooperatives having dissimilar 
values of these five attributes ranked the objectives differ­
ently. 
As can be seen from matrices A2, A^, and Ag, however, this 
was not true for attributes X2, Xg, and X^^. In fact for X2 
and X5 a higher proportion of the were significantly dif­
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ferent from zero above and to the right of the boxes than in 
the boxes. Similar matrices for nine additional attribute 
variables (see Appendix Table B.3) produced results much the 
same as that for X2, Xg, and For some of these nine 
variables, however, lack of an appropriate point with which 
to segregate the cooperatives into groups prevented precise 
interpretation. 
Matrices through A^^ have been designed to enable one 
to determine the nature of the simultaneous influence of two 
attribute variables on the ranking of the seven objectives. 
In these matrices the cooperatives have been divided into 
four croups on the basis of the ti/o attribute variables 
indicated at the top of each matrix—the first group has a 
low value of both attributes, the second group a low value 
of the first attribute and a high value of the second attri­
bute, the third group a high value of the first attribute and 
a low value of the second attribute, and the fourth group a 
high value of both attributes (if no cooperatives fell into 
one of the four groups a blank space is left in the appro­
priate space in the matrix). The interpretation of these 
matrices is similar to that of the previous matrices. 
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Matrix A' 13 
Matrix indicates that most of the cooperatives with a 
high level of Xj ranked the objectives similarly regardless of 
the level of X]_'j while those with a low level of ranked 
the objectives differently than did those with a high level of 
X^. Thus X^ seemed to be the most influential of the two 
attributes. Similarly matrix A22 suggests that X^ was more 
influential on cooperative rankings than X^^. 
It is interesting to note that when X^ and were con­
sidered independently, 6l percent of the cooperatives having 
similar X]_ attributes ranked the objectives similarly while 69 
percent of the cooperatives having similar X]^^ attributes 
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ranked the objectives similarly. However in matrix the 
influence of X]_^ seems to be overshadowed by X]_. On the. other 
hand, as may be expected on the basis of matrices Aij, and Ag, 
seems to be more influential on cooperative rankings than 
X15. In addition matrix A^g indicates that most of the coop­
eratives with a high level of Xg ranked the seven objectives 
similarly regardless of the level of X2. 
In matrix A^^ we see that most of the cooperatives with 
a low level of X^^ or a,high level of X^^ ranked the objec­
tives similarly regardless of the level of Xg. Matrix A^^, 
on the other hand, does not indicate that either X^^ or X]_]_ 
has any dominatirg influence over the other. 
Thus there is considerable evidence suggesting that 
various physical and environmental attributes will be influ- -
ential in determining how a given cooperative will rank the 
seven objectives. If possible some quantitative measure of 
this influence would be desirable. The most appropriate 
analytical tool available seems to be multiple regression 
since it will 1) enable us to determine which characteristics, 
were most important in explaining why the cooperatives ranked 
the seven objectives differently and 2) provide a means of 
predicting how cooperatives will rank the objectives given a 
change in the level of one or more of their physical and envi­
ronmental attributes. 
As anplied to this problem the use of multiple regression 
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is not without limitations.* Since' we wish to explain coop­
erative rankings, rankings will be our dependent variable. 
This, however, requires that ranks be comparable between 
cooperatives and it is unknown at the present time whether 
this requirement is met. If dairy cooperatives have no more 
than the seven objectives, perhaps this is not such an unre­
alistic assumption. 
A separate analysis was conducted on each of the seven 
objectives with the nine rankings of these objectives as the 
dependent variable on the further assumptions that the ranking 
of objectives is independent and that the objective does not 
influence the cooperative's characteristics. All seventeen 
different attribute variables of the nine cooperatives rank­
ing these objectives were initially considered as possible 
candidates for independent variables in each analysis. 
Attributes not significantly correlated (as shown by the 
product-moment correlation coefficient) with the dependent 
variable at the 30 percent* confidence level, however, were 
eliminated from further consideration in the corresponding 
analysis (see Appendix Table B.^ for the correlation matrix). 
Since there does not seem to be any theoretical guide 
for eliminating additional characteristics, some criterion was 
needed to determine the independent variables to be used in 
each analysis if a choice was available. The procedure used 
was to fit by least squares, regression equations of the form 
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m ^ 
• (4.2) Yl = &i + ][: HA 
k=l 
(where is the ranking of objective i (i = 1, 2, 7) by 
each cooperative and the are the m independent variables 
representing various cooperative characteristics), using dif­
ferent combinations of Xj^. that were significantly correlated 
with The equation selected was that one which yielded 
regression coefficients significantly different from zero at 
the ten percent confidence level. If no independent variables 
were found to be significantly related to the dependent vari­
able, the model was reduced to Yj^ = where is simply an 
estimate of the mean of Yj_, Yj^. 
The selected equations with standard errors of estimates 
in parentheses are: 
(4.3) Yl = 0.00904 Xq - 0.03112 X13 
(0.00138) (0.01085) 
(4.4) Y2 .= .0.09754 X2 
(0.01455) 
(4.5) Y3 = 0.02777 X9 + 0.03349 Xi6 
(0.00928) (0.01390) 
(4;6) Yzj. =-0.08377 Xg + 0.08768 XQ 
(0.06958) (0.01775) 
(4.7) Y5 = 6.83333 
(0.11785) 
(4.8) Y5 = 0.06536 X^ - 0.02702 X^j 
(0.00465) (0.00921) 
= 0.8755 
= 0.8506 
R2 = 0.8954 
= 0.9102 
R2 = 0.9976 
e2 = 0.9836 
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(4 .9)  Yy = 2.01042 + 0.00722 + 0.02941 X13 
(0.23208) (0.'00335) (0.00506) 
• X . e2 = 0.9875 
where the Yi are numbered-to.correspond to the objectives In 
the order listed -in Table 4.10 and the Xjj- are as defined pre­
viously (see also Appendix Table B.3)• 
? 2 
In equations (4 .4)  -  (4.6) ,  the addition of Xf or X^ 
" yielded coefficients which were significantly different from 
zero at the five percent level. The inclusion of such vari­
ables results in a curvilinear relation between the Yj_ and X— 
i.e., in a nonmonotonic transformation. This, however, is 
not an order-preserving transformation and hence the squared 
terms were removed. 
Since the objectives were given a value of one if con­
sidered most important and seven if considered least impor­
tant, the derived equations and predictions based on these 
equations should be interpreted accordingly. Furthermore 
since the Yj^- are ordinal values no quantitative meaning should 
be placed on the predicted values—they should be used only 
in comparing (i.e., in ordering) the seven objectives. The 
predicted values will not necessarily fall within the I-7 
range as the objectives wefe ranked; however, their ordinal 
character will still be preserved. 
Judging by the coefficient of determination, B^, it can 
be seen that most of the variation in the Yj_ was explained. 
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In addition Snedecor's F for testing the null hypothesis that 
all coefficients estimated for a given equation are zero, was . 
significant.at the one percent level for all seven equations; 
therefore the null hypothesis must be rejected. 
The first equation indicates that, on the average, the • 
nine cooperatives considered the first objective less impor­
tant, ceteris paribus, the higher was handlers' buying price 
for producer milk. For a given price, on the other hand, this 
objective was ranked more important if the cooperative could 
handle a large portion of its total volume in its own pro­
cessing plant. Distance from Eau Claire was also significant­
ly correlated with but was not used in the equation be­
cause of its influence on the federal order class price and 
therefore on the handlers' buying price (see pages I35-I36 
above). Equation (4.4) suggests that cooperatives with a 
relatively large volume per handler considered maintaining a 
market for members'•milk less important than did cooperatives 
with a small volume per handler. Table 4.10 shows, however, 
that this objective was never ranked higher than third. 
It is interesting to note that the same characteristic, 
X^, was related to the rankings of the third and fourth objec­
tives and in the same general way—ceteris paribus coopera­
tives having a low class I sales percentage generally con­
sidered. these two objectives more important than did coopera­
tives having a high class I sales percentage. In addition 
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Xi6 was positively related to and X2 was negatively related 
to Y2j.. Evidently if the cooperatives in an area where dairy-., 
ing is rather unimportant (i.e., cooperatives for which X15 
is quite low) and with a relatively low volume per handler, 
say 10 million pounds or less, could find class I outlets 
for a relatively small portion of their milk, it was quite 
important for them to be assured of a market for all of their 
milk and at the same time to maintain their class I outlets. 
No cooperative characteristics were found to be signifi­
cantly related to . Using the two-tailed "t" test the mean 
of Y^ is found to be insignificantly different from seven at 
the one percent confidence level. 
Equation (4.8) indicates that, on the average, those 
cooperatives having more difficulty in securing recognition 
as the exclusive bargaining agent of their members and having 
more facilities for processing surplus milk consider nego­
tiating for the value of services a rather important objective 
as contrasted to cooperatives with a high level of few 
processing facilities. Finally equation (4.9) suggests that 
the more handlers with which a cooperative bargains and the 
more facilities it has for processing milk, the less important 
will it be for the cooperative to maintain good relations with 
handlers. 
The zero-order correlation coefficients shown in Appendix 
Table B.4 indicate that several other variables were signifi­
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cantly correlated with Y5 and Yy. The influence of these 
other variables was, however, overshadowed by the variables 
actually used. If there is good reason for expecting this 
to be true, equations (4.8) and (4.9) may be reasonable 
hypotheses; otherwise more observations would be desirable. 
As will be shown later, volume per handler, X2, is a 
factor in the determination of X^. Also the value of services 
provided handlers, X^, distance from Eau Claire, X^, and nego­
tiated premiums, X^Q, are expected to be influential in the 
determination of negotiated prices paid by handlers, Xg. 
Further, rather than being related directly to Yg and Yr,, we 
would expect on the basis of the hypotheses proposed pre­
viously (see Figure 3.I) that the negotiated price paid by 
handlers to the cooperative will be related to the rankings 
of these two objectives through its influence on other vari­
ables including X^i-
Also it seems reasonable to expect that the more members 
a cooperative has, X^^, the more outlets, X^^, will be needed. 
Finally dairy cooperatives whose entire volume is not replace­
able from alternative sources may be in a better position to 
withhold milk and thus may want the assurance of an outlet 
for withheld milk so .that this milk will not have to be 
dumped. Securing processing facilities is one way of getting 
this assurance. 
Thus the last two equations also seem to be reasonable 
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hypotheses as to how cooperatives will rank these objectives 
on the basis of various attributes peculiar to the individual 
cooperative. An indication of the predictability of these 
seven equations for the cooperatives in the sample is provided 
in Table 4.11. The for each cooperative were predicted 
and the seven objectives ranked according to these predicted 
values. The computed rank correlation coefficients between 
actual and predicted ranks for each of'the nine cooperatives 
were all significant at the one percent confidence level. 
Although several ranks were predicted incorrectly, in no case 
did the predicted rank differ from the actual rank by more 
than unity. Hence the derived equations were highly success­
ful in explaining the variation in cooperative rankings for 
a given objective, and equally successful as predictors for 
a given cooperative. The validity of these seven equations 
for cooperatives not in the sample, however, can only be 
determined by further study. 
The results of this analysis lead to two tentative con­
clusions of significance to the study of bargaining behavior 
and which are subject to refutation in further study. In the 
first place it was suggested that dairy bargaining coopera­
tives have a multi-dimensional or hierarchial goal system. 
If this is true the cooperative's preference function for 
various bargaining strategies may be lexicographically ordered. 
(see 89, pp. 232-234)—i.e., the cooperative may choose from 
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Table 4.11. Comparison between actual and predicted 
rankings for each cooperative 
Cooperative^ 
Untied rankings 
predicted 
incorrectly 
Spearman rank 
correlation 
coefficient^ 
1 0 1.000 
2 2 0.964 
3 2 0.955.  
4 2 0.964 
5 0 0.906 
6 2 0.955 
7 4 0.929 
8 2 0.964 
9 5 0.901 
^Cooperative numbers in this table correspond to those 
in Table 4.10. 
^Corrected for tied rankings. To be significantly dif­
ferent from zero at the one percent confidence level, this 
coefficient must equal or exceed 0.893' 
among all bargaining strategies that one which will yield a 
bargaining outcome satisfying his most important objective, 
his second most important objective, his third most important 
objective, etc. until no more objectives can be simultaneously 
satisfied. Thus if one could determine the importance of each 
of the several objectives to a given cooperative, one may be 
able to determine also what bargaining strategy will be sel-
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ected. 
Secondly it was suggested that the importance of various 
objectives to a given dairy bargaining cooperative will depend 
upon the peculiar attributes of the cooperative. Accordingly 
equations were derived which seem to be reasonable hypotheses 
as to the nature of this dependence. Although the method by 
which these equations were derived is subject to limitations, 
they provide a means by which one can determine the importance 
of various objectives to dairy cooperatives which appears to 
be superior to other existing means. 
Services to members 
Regardless of the cooperative's objectives, it operates 
for the mutual benefit of its members and if the members are 
not satified that their net returns as a member are greater 
than that of non-members, it Is unlikely that they will remain 
in the cooperative. Consequently we hypothesized that the 
cooperative would also provide non-bargaining services to 
members. The data in Table 4.12 showing the number of coop­
eratives providing the respective services supports this 
hypothesis. 
With the exception of the first three, there is no great 
obstacle to the provision of the services listed in Table 
4.12. Their provision is aimed at expanding the demand for 
the members' product, at increasing the efficiency of members' 
production, and at providing resources at a discount used in 
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Table 4.12. Services provided members by the cooperatives 
studied 
Cooperatives 
providing 
Service provided members the service 
Bargaining for the price of milk 10 
Bargaining for a service charge premium 10 
Bargaining for a bulk tank premium 9 
Conduct quality improvement work for use 
by members 10 
Conduct quality education programs for members 10 
Conduct quality control and inspection programs 10 
Test and weigh milk 9 
Help members achieve production efficiency 7 
Stock and distribute milk production supplies 10. 
Assemble market information for use by members 9 
Pick up and deliver milk 6 
Provide insurance policies for members 8 
Provide credit for members 6 
Acquire and maintain facilities for 
handling surplus milk 9 
Engage in local promotional programs 10 
Contribute to the promotional programs of 
the American Dairy Association 8 
the production of members* product—i.e., increasing net re­
turns to members by non-bargaining means—and is made possible 
through the large scale operation of the copperative and 
through quantity discounts secured by the cooperative. Pro­
vision of the first three—price enhancement or bargaining for 
a price which is higher than farmers could get by dealing 
individually with handlers—is an entirely different matter 
and is the subject of the next chapter. 
187 
MEANS OF SECURING BARGAINING GAINS . 
Recognition 
To test the hypothesis that dairy bargaining cooperatives 
are able to secure recognition from handlers as the exclusive 
bargaining agent of producer-members, each cooperative manager 
was asked the following question: Of those processors and 
distributors with which you attempted to bargain in I963, how 
many would and how many would not bargain with you? The re­
sponse to this question is recorded in Table 
Table $.!• Ability of the dairy bargaining cooperatives 
studied to secure recognition as exclusive 
bargaining agent, 1963 
Proportion of handlers 
Cooperative^ who would bargain^ 
1 99 
2 100 
3 94 
4 100 
5 100 
6 100 
7 93 
8 100 
9 33 
10 100 
^Cooperative numbers correspond to cooperative numbers 
listed in Table 4.10. 
^Does not include out-of-state handlers. 
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Most of these cooperatives seem to have little trouble in 
securing recognition from handlers. Only four were unable to 
bargain with all of the local handlers with which they attempt­
ed to bargain in I963• 
Two handlers with which one cooperative attempted to bar­
gain were able to get an adequate supply of milk from inde­
pendent producers and were even willing to pay thes.e producers 
five cents per hundredweight more than the cooperative Was 
asking. In the manager's opinion these two handlers were 
"out to ruin the cooperative". 
During I963 the Cedar Rapids cooperative was able to 
secure recognition from all handlers with whom it attempted to 
bargain. However, this cooperative failed to secure recogni­
tion from two of its local handlers in I96I because they felt 
the cooperative's asking price was too high. These two 
handlers then obtained milk from cooperatives in Minnesota 
and Wisconsin and from local independent producers. Finally, 
two national chains in the Omaha market refused to bargain 
with the Omaha cooperative over the price of milk in I963 
since they could obtain their mi'lk from producers in the 
cooperative's procurement area who were members of no dairy 
cooperative, and one handler in the Des Moines market refused 
to bargain with the Des Moines cooperative since this handler 
had established a source of milk supply from a cooperative in 
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another market.* 
It was previously hypothesized that if the cooperative 
does not have a sufficient volume of milk it will not be able 
to secure recognition from its handlers. Since a coopera­
tive's volume is, in part, a function of the proportion of 
producers" in the procurement area organized, the above cases 
lend some support to this hypothesis. Furthermore it seems 
plausible to expect that there is a point beyond which a 
larger volume would have no effect on the cooperative's abil­
ity to secure recognition (see 4, p. 18). 
To test the above propositions the following statistical 
model was proposed: 
(5.1) Xli = a + gXgi + Ci 
where X^i ~ common logarithm of the percent of the local 
handlers with which cooperative i attempted to 
bargain in I963 who would bargain with the 
cooperative, 
X2i = cooperative i's I963 volume per handler with 
which the cooperative attempted to bargain in 
1963 (million pounds), arid 
= a normally and independently distributed random 
error with mean, zero, and variance, cr2, 
uncorrelated with X2. 
*Two handlers in the Detroit market also refused to bar­
gain with the local cooperative in I963 arguing that the 
Detroit cooperative was their competitor since the cooperative 
owned a milk processing plant in their sales area. The coop­
erative subsequently sold this plant and, in return, the two 
handlers agreed to bargain with the cooperative. 
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This model was chosen since, providing p < 0, it yields 
an asymtote at 10^—i.e., as X2 approaches infinity, 
approaches 10°'—as well as a point of inflection in the posi­
tive quadrant at X2 = - A.P/2*. Since a value of X^ > 100 is 
meaningless we expect a ^ 2. Furthermore if the data corre­
spond to this model, it will provide some basis for testing 
the second proposition—namely that large volumes have only 
a slight effect on a dairy bargaining cooperative's ability 
to secure recognition. That is for values of X2 greater than 
or equal to zero but less than - À3/2 according to model (5«1) 
X^ will be increasing at an increasing rate while for X2 > 
-A3/2, X^ will be increasing at a decreasing rate. 
The following estimates with standard errors in paren­
theses for this model were derived by least squares from the 
cross-sectional data in Tables 4.1 and 5-lj 
a = 2.02906 (0.00799) 
3 = -0.57749 (0.02678) 
- Xè/2 = 0.66486 (0.03084) 
= 0.98309 
^ = 1.32972 
where = the percentage change in X]_ associated with a one 
percent change in X2. 
* X= logglO = 2.30259. 
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Using the one-tailed "t" test, the null hypothesis that 
a 4 2 must be rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis 
that a > 2 at the one percent confidence level but not at the 
0.25 percent confidence level. ^ and - Xg/2 are significantly 
different from zero at the 0.1 percent level. At various 
A 
levels of X2 we get the following results (where «T = (3lX.^ /ûX2 
= the absolute change in associated with a unit change in 
%): 
X2 
A 
0.66 2.000 44.23 
2.00 • . . . 0.665 18.28 
5.00 0.266 5.01 
10.00 0.133- 1.25 
15.00 0.089 0.57 
20.00 0.067 0.33 
On the basis of these results we conclude that there is 
a positive relationship between volume per handler and dairy 
bargaining cooperatives' ability to secure recognition as the 
A 
exclusive bargaining agent for their members. However ^ at 
A 
large values of X2 is quite small compared to S" at small 
A. 
values of X2. The decline in ^ as X2 increases leads us to 
suspect that there may be some motive for a dairy coopera­
tive's insistence, on maintaining a large volume, say 20 mil­
lion pounds or more per handler, other than that of securing 
recognition. 
As we have seen it is advantageous for a cooperative to 
control as much of the volume in its procurement area as pos­
sible in order to eliminate one alternative source of supply 
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to handlers—independent producers. In addition and as 
exemplified by the Chicago and Detroit cooperatives, if the 
cooperative has a large volume, there may be insufficient 
surplus milk from alternative sources to replace it and, 
therefore, all of the cooperative's handlers could not get 
milk from an alternative source. Further it is not unreason­
able to suspect that cooperatives could benefit from economies 
of large scale operations just as can processing firms—e.g., 
the costs of office operations and route pick-up and delivery 
may be lower for larger dairy cooperatives than for smaller 
ones. 
The 1963 annual operating costs per hundredweight of milk 
handled for six of the cooperatives studied exclusive of pick­
up and delivery and processing costs ranged in value from 3.O6 
to 6.00 cents. A simple regression of total volume (V) 'on 
operating costs (C) for these six cooperatives yielded the 
following results with standard errors of estimates in paren­
theses: 
(5.2) C =6.0059 - 0.9118 V = 0.6883 
(0.5003) (0.3078) 
Equation (5*2) indicates that operating costs per 
hundredweight decline, on the average, by slightly more than 
nine-tenths of one cent for every one billion pound increase 
in cooperative volume for these six cooperatives. Although 
the coefficient on V was significantly different from zero 
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at the five percent confidence level, it takes a rather size­
able increase in volume to have any appreciable effect on C. 
There are also disadvantages to increasing volume—i.e., 
1) a tendency toward reduced support given to the coopera­
tive's goals and 2) a possibility of an increase in the 
cooperative's proportion of surplus milk. Increasing volume 
may mean increasing the number of members within the coopera­
tive which tends to be accompanied by more intragroup conflict 
and by a reduction in group unity and cohesiveness. The end 
result may be a reduction in .the ^ount of support given to 
the organisation's goals (see Figure 2.3). 
Furthermore as a cooperative's volume increases with no 
corresponding increase in class I sales, the cooperative's 
volume of surplus milk relative to total volume will increase. 
As a result members' net price will be reduced. This latter 
consideration may in part explain why increasing the size of 
the cooperative's procurement area was not considered a very 
important objective by the cooperatives studied. 
Membership agreements 
Since' maintaining membership support is one prerequisite 
to maintaining volume, membership agreements were hypothesized 
to be an important means of assuring the cooperative of a con­
tinuing volume of milk. Every cooperative studied, with the 
exception of the Burlington cooperative, required members to 
sign a marketing agreement. On signing such an agreement the 
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producer agrees to consign to the cooperative all milk pro­
duced on the farm (except that consumed by the farm family) 
and to allow the cooperative to market this milk together with 
that of all other members as it deems is in the best interest 
of all members. Only one agreement specifically called for 
the cooperative to "negotiate and bargain for the producer". 
All agreements contained a duration of contract and an 
automatic renewal clause. Further some agreements stipulated 
the amount of the membership fee and the deductions or limits 
to the deductions to be taken from producers' proceeds from 
the sale of milk. Only four of the eight agreements, however, 
contained a breach of contract clause and stipulated the 
amount to be levied against the faulty party. 
Thus while membership agreements seem to be important to 
all but one of the cooperatives interviewed, breach of con­
tract clauses, as was initially suspected, do not. Bather the 
importance of the agreements seems to stem from the provision 
allowing the cooperative to act as the producers' marketing 
agent. There existed a feeling that a breach of contract and 
liquidated damage clause was useless because they either could 
not be enforced or were too difficult and time consuming to 
enforce. An important question then is what means does the 
cooperative employ to prevent a breach of contract. 
Four of the managers indicated that they have at one time 
or another been faced with the problem of individual members 
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negotiating with handlers directly for the price of milk. 
Only one of these cooperatives had a breach of contract clause 
in their membership agreement. This cooperative was, at the 
time of the interview initiating court proceedings in an 
attempt to collect damages from three producer-members. The 
only disciplinary action available to the remaining three 
cooperatives is, presumably, cancellation of the producer's 
membership which each cooperative reserves the right to do. 
Several managers pointed out that it is more Important 
to be able to prevent such problems before they happen rather 
than to be able to penalize members. In order to do this 
various services are provided members that are generally not 
available to nonmembers (see Table 4.12). Further, attempts 
to keep up membership loyalty are made through distribution 
of cooperative earnings, personal contacts with members by 
fieldmen, group membership meetings, and various reports in­
cluding monthly newsletters and market information letters. 
Mergers and federations 
One way for a dairy cooperative to increase its volume 
is to sign up more producers in its procurement area—either 
Independent producers or members of another cooperative—if 
it does not have 100 percent control of these producers. 
There are limitations to this type of activity, however. 
First it may lead to the existence of poor relations between 
two or more cooperatives. Secondly, adding more members and 
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therefore Increasing volume without at the same time increas­
ing the number of fluid milk outlets will result in an in­
creased percentage of surplus milk and in a lower net price 
to farmer-members. There was no evidence suggesting that 
any of the cooperatives studied attempt to secure the members 
of other cooperatives. Most of them do, however, attempt to 
sign up independent producers. 
Another method of increasing volume is through a merger. 
Since individual cooperatives lose their previous identity 
and autonomy in a merger by pooling membership, volume, and 
outlets for milk as well as all other resources, both of the 
above limitations can be eliminated through this method of 
increasing volume. There are, of course, problems that have 
to be worked out by all members in order to eliminate or 
reduce conflict within the new organization—e.g., how many 
members shall each cooperative contribute to the board of 
directors, who shall pay the burden of the previous coopera­
tives* debts, how shall milk be pooled (that is, how shall 
members of each cooperative involved in the merger share in 
the proceeds of the new cooperative), etc. 
There have been a large number of dairy cooperative 
mergers in recent years as a perusal of the trade journals 
will show. Table 5*2 lists the merger activity since 1958 of 
the cooperatives studied. 
A cooperative federation, in contrast to a merger. 
Table 5*2. Merger activity of the cooperatives studied 
Year 
Cooperative . Cooperatives acquired by a merger merged 
Des Moines Marshalltown Cooperative Dairy Marketing Association 
Grlnnell Cooperative Creamery 
Brooklyn Cooperative Creamery 
Ottumwa Cooperative Dairy Marketing Association 
Cedar Rapids Cooperative Dairy Company 
1958 
1959 
1959 
195? 
1964 
Moline Illinois-Iowa Milk Producers Association, Davenport 
Quality Milk Producers Association, Hock Island 
Dubuque Cooperative Dairy Marketing Association 
Buckhorn Cooperative Creamery, Maquoketa 
1959 
1959 
1962 
1962 
Chicago Prairie Farms Dairy, Bloomington 
Dalryland Farms, Chicago 
1958 
1962 
Detroit Farris City Dairy Cooperative 
Litchfield Cooperative Creamery 
Jordan Valley Cooperative Creamery, East Jordan 
Vacationland Dairy, Crystal Palls 
Cloverleaf Cooperative, Daggett 
Producers Dairy Cooperative, Menominee' 
Even Cooperative Produce Company, Even 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1962 
1962 
1962 
1962 
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involves a uniting of two or more cooperatives by covenant so 
that each of the participating cooperatives retains their 
local autonomy and identity. Thus the problems of consolidat­
ing two or more cooperatives into one are eliminated. This is 
not to say that a federation has no problems to meet. On the 
contrary, competition among member cooperatives is still pos­
sible even though one of the objectives of a federation is to 
coordinate the marketing activity of all cooperatives in the 
group. Further maintaining "esprit de corps" among member 
cooperatives may become difficult—i.e., a decision which is 
desirable from the long-run standpoint of all farmers involved 
in the federation may not be desirable to the members of one 
or more individual cooperatives in the short-run. Finally, 
pooling arrangements are again a problem to be worked out by 
the individual cooperatives in the federation. 
Two different types of federations may be formed. One is 
the regional federation which is exemplified by the following: 
1) United Dairy Producers Cooperative organized in i960 con­
sisting of the Des Moines, Cedar Bapids, Waterloo and Moline 
cooperatives; 2) Central Southwest Regional Stock Cooperative 
organized in 1964 consisting of the Omaha cooperative, the 
Denver Milk Producers Association in Denver, the Southwest 
Milk Producers Association in Wichita, the Central West Texas 
Milk Producers Association in Abilene, and the Dairy Farmers 
Cooperative Association in Albuquerque; and 3) the Great Lakes 
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Milk Marketing Federation organized in I960 consisting of the 
Detroit cooperative in Michigan, Northwest Cooperative Sales 
in Toledo, the Cleveland Milk Producers Federation in Cleve­
land, the Dairymen's Cooperative Sales Association in Pitts­
burgh, the Akron Milk Producers Association in Akron, and the 
Wayne Cooperative Milk Producers in Fort Wayne. 
An important objective of such a federation is to in­
crease the bargaining effectiveness of the entire group of 
cooperatives in the organization. The United Dairy Producers 
Cooperative Association was interested primarily in joint 
bargaining. Substantial overlapping in procurement areas of 
the four cooperatives in this federation as well as in the 
sales areas served by their handlers existed prior to the 
formation of United. In addition each cooperative was regu­
lated by a separate federal order and each negotiated inde­
pendently with local handlers. It was expressed that the 
resulting price differentials between markets led to the 
establishment of improper price relationships between the 
four markets. United was designed to cope with these problems 
through joint bargaining efforts. Further it attempted to 
capitalize on economies of scale in the marketing of milk by 
eliminating duplication of effort, by reorganizing farm-to-
market milk routes, and by operating a centralized sales 
agency to get more coordination with respect to off-the-market 
sales. United intended to repool the net proceeds of all 
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member milk and to redistribute the returns between members 
of the four cooperatives to offset any sudden or unusual 
changes in any one of the markets that would have a drastic 
effect on the price received by producers in•the-remaining 
markets. Unfortunately the pooling methods proposed and 
adopted were not mutually acceptable and the federation was 
officially dissolved in 1964. 
The Central Southwest Federation is so new that its 
operations are barely underway. Several proposed objectives 
of this federation were given however. In the first place 
there are two surplus markets—Omaha and Wichita—and three 
deficit markets—Denver, Abilene, and Albuquerque. Hence an 
initial goal is to set up a centralized agency for the effi­
cient distribution of surplus milk to the deficit markets. 
just how this is to be accomplished is yet to be determined 
but may involve joint pooling. Secondly this federation will 
attempt to reduce competition between the member cooperatives. 
Thirdly, a possible future activity would be joint bargaining 
so that the federation could bargain with 10-15 stores of a 
national food chain rather than each cooperative bargaining 
with two or three. Finally Central Southwest presently owns 
a bottling plant in Albuquerque with which it hopes to 
"stabilize retail prices" in that market by preventing price 
wars. 
The Great Lakes federation has a similar set of objec-
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tives; however, it has no processing facilities. The primary 
objective of this federation is to reduce competition between 
the six member cooperatives and to coordinate the movement of 
surplus milk between markets. Joint bargaining is also a pos­
sible activity of this federation—and was actually attempted 
once in the three Ohio markets primarily because the local 
cooperatives in these markets were unable to get together to 
work out a satisfactory joint bargaining program on their own. 
Additional advantages of federations listed by the man­
agers interviewed who were involved in one of the three fed­
erations mentioned were: 1) it allows the personnel of one 
cooperative to become better acquainted with the people from 
other cooperatives and with their specific problems, 2) it 
allows the trading of valuable information concerning the 
operations in nearby markets and the influence of these opera­
tions on one's own market and bargaining ability, 3) it allows 
the exchange of valuable information on conditions in the in­
dustry in general, and 4) it eliminates the problem of in- ' 
heriting extra surplus milk as a result of a merger. 
The disadvantage mentioned by all of the managers in­
volved in federations was the extreme difficulty of recon­
ciling differences of opinion among members of different coop­
eratives in the federation—e.g., what is good for the fed­
eration members as a whole is not necessarily equally good for 
the members of all cooperatives in the federation. Further, 
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_personal problems between officials of different cooperatives 
in the federation are difficult to avoid and at times may be­
come a threat to the effectiveness and existence of the fed­
eration. 
A second type of federated activity is exemplified by 
superpools—i.e., strictly joint bargaining efforts between a 
number of local cooperatives in which the milk supply of all 
cooperatives is pooled and the negotiated premium money is 
distributed to the members of these cooperatives on the basis 
of some predetermined pooling system. One superpool is in 
operation in the Chicago market .in which the Pure Milk Asso-. 
ciation is a member along with 23 other cooperatives. A • 
second superpool is in operation in Southern Michigan in which 
the Michigan Milk Producers Association is a member along with 
eight other cooperatives. The characteristics, and problems of 
these two federations are essentially the same as those of the 
three previously discussed. The difference is primarily in 
the emphasis placed on joint bargaining and in area covered. 
Federations do not increase the volume of any cooperative 
involved. Nevertheless they allow joint control over a larger 
volume of milk than that of any one cooperative in the federa­
tion. For example, since all cooperatives in the Chicago and 
Detroit area bargain jointly with handlers, if either of these 
groups of cooperatives decided to withhold milk from a handler 
this handler would have to go outside the local market to get 
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an alternative supply of milk unless local independent pro-
ducers could provide enough milk to meet his needs. This is 
presumably more important for superpools than for federations 
placing less emphasis on joint bargaining. 
Type I Bargaining Power 
One of the reasons why dairy bargaining cooperatives are 
able to negotiate a price for members' milk in excess of the 
federal order minimum price is that they are able to and do 
offer various services to milk.dealers in return. Table 5*3 
'contains a list of the services offered by each cooperative 
studied. 
It was felt by most managers that the cooperative's abil­
ity to full-supply handlers was the most important service 
they could offer. In full-supplying a handler the cooperative 
agrees to provide exactly that quantity of milk needed by the 
handler. If assured of a full supply of milk, the handler 
bottling milk only five days per week does not have to incur 
the costs of handling and storing milk received from producers 
during the remainder of the week if producers are unable to do 
so. Further under such assurance the handler need not worry 
about failing to meet the demand for his product each day 
since day-to-day variations in the handler's milk supply are 
eliminated (i.e., the cooperative agrees to find an outlet for 
any excess milk and to find an extra supply if the handler's 
Table 5*3• Services offered handlers by dairy bargaining cooperatives interviewed 
Cooperative^ 
Service offered 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 , Ô 9 10 
Producer check writing X X X X X X X X X 
Bulk handling of milk X X X. X X X X X X X 
Maintaining high quality milk X X X X X X X X X 
Product standardization X X X X 
Pull-supply contracts X X X X X X X X X X 
Wash handlers tanks X 
Diversion of surplus milk to: 
own processing plant X X , X X X X 
other processing plants X X X X X X X X 
Pick up milk of producers 
• supplying plants acquired 
by handlers X 
VALUE OF SERVICES OFFERED^ 
(cents per hundredweight) 34 . 17V2 20 12 V2 29 71/2 7 7 V2 30 10 
^•Cooperative numbers correspond to the cooperative numbers shown in Table 4.10. 
^Estimated by the respective cooperative. 
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demands cannot be met with member milk) . 
Every cooperative indicated that they full-supply hand­
lers; however, there were no legal instruments used in connec­
tion with this service. (One cooperative had written, full-
supply contracts with handlers which were drawn up in 1938 but 
considered out-of-date at the present time.) 
The value of these services to each cooperative, as 
listed in T^ble 5*3 is based on what the cooperative felt such 
services are worth to handlers. Five of the cooperatives 
negotiate a premium on class I milk equal to the reported 
value of the services they provide handlers. The manager of 
the Cedar Bapids cooperative placed a value on these services 
equal to one handler's estimate of what it would cost his firm 
to provide the same services. 
The variation in these values for the different coopera­
tives may be due to several factors. In the first place all 
cooperatives do not provide the same services to handlers— 
e.g., the fifth cooperative listed is the only one washing 
handlers' receiving tanks and the third cooperative listed is 
the only one agreeing to admit producers into membership who 
supply milk to a handler (either within or outside of the 
cooperative's procurement area) acquired by one of the coop­
erative's regular .handlers. 
Secondly different handlers will not place the same value 
on a given service. For example, with a full-supply arrange-
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ment, two different handlers may realize quite different • 
advantages as a result of being able to operate so as to meet 
demand the year-round. 
Further, different firms would not necessarily realize 
the same savings by converting from can to bulk handling of 
milk. In a study by Agnew (1) it was concluded that à bottler 
by converting from can to bulk handling of milk may be able 
to reduce the costs of receiving and cooling milk by 5 to 22 
cents per hundredweight if it continued an everyday pickup of 
milk and by 15 to 32 cents per hundredweight if it shifted to 
an every-other-day pickup of milk. 
If there were no non-price advantages to purchasing milk 
locally, it seems reasonable to expect that a handler would 
purchase milk from an alternative source if he could get it at 
a lower price. Thus if the price a handler pays the local 
cooperative exceeds that which he would have to pay to get 
milk from an alternative source, we may expect this excess to 
represent the value to handlers of obtaining milk from the 
local-cooperative. 
To determine the extent of this excess for each coopera­
tive studied we again take Eau Claire, Wisconsin to be the 
region of heavy surplus production and the alternative source 
of milk for the handlers of these cooperatives. On deducting 
from the average annual dealer's buying price for fluid milk 
in a given market 1) the average annual dealer's buying price 
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for fluid milk in Eau Claire, and 2) the cost of transporting 
milk from Eau C]aire to the given market, we arrive at the 
data presented in Table This data, then, is taken to 
represent an estimate of the value to handlers of securing . 
milk from the local cooperative in preference to securing 
milk from Eau Claire sources. 
Table Estimated average annual value to handlers of ' 
obtaining milk from the local cooperative, 1963^ 
Market cents per cwt. 
Burlington 23.0 
Waterloo 18.5 
Cedar Hapids 12.5 
Des Moines 27.0 
Omaha 31*0 
Moline 13«0 
Mason City 2^.5 
Sioux City 46.0 
Chicago 22.0 
Detroit 42.0 
^Source : 114. 
The data in Table 5*4 suggest that most of the coopera­
tives studied were adequately paid for services rendered 
handlers. In only one case was the value to handlers, of 
securing milk from the local cooperative as calculated lower 
*The same transportation cost function used in Table 4.3 
is assumed to hold here. 
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than the cooperative's estimate of the- value of services 
offered these handlers. On the other hand, for one coopera­
tive the value rec&rded in Table 5-^ exceeded the coopera­
tive's estimate of the value of services provided handlers by 
more than 20 cents per hundredweight. 
The mean value of the difference (d^) between the vàlues 
recorded in Table ^.4 and the estimates recorded in Table 5«3 
for each cooperative was 10.56 cents per hundredweight. The 
null hypothesis that this difference was equal (i.e., to the 
mean, d = 10.5^) for all ten cooperatives was clearly rejected 
at the one percent confidence level on the basis of the 
test for homogeneity.* This indicates one or both of two 
things—either handlers secure milk from the local source be­
cause of reasons other than merely to obtain the benefit of 
the services provided by the local cooperative, or the coop­
eratives studied underestimated the value of the services they 
provide handlers. In this study we shall assume that the 
latter possibility is not true although it must be recognized 
that this assumption is subject to doubt until such time that 
more reliable Information becomes available. 
Values similar to those in Table were computed for 
two markets in the Upper Michigan Peninsula and for three 
additional markets in Southern Michigan served by the Detroit 
^ (d-i - d)^/d = 30.686 with 9 degrees of freedom. 
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cooperative. These computations yielded ^5 cents for Kala­
mazoo, 38 cents for Muskegon, 3^ cents for Traverse City, 
10 cents for Marquette, and 12 cents for Sault Ste. Marie. 
The Detroit cooperative manager's explanation for the lower 
values in the Upper. Michigan Peninsula markets was that these 
two markets are closer to the alternative sources of milk than 
are the Southern Michigan markets and therefore dealers' buy­
ing prices in the Upper Michigan Peninsula markets must be in 
close alignment with dealers' buying prices in Wisconsin mar­
kets. This,.then, suggests that the more distant a market is 
from the surplus production region the higher will be the 
values recorded in Table ^.4. 
There would seem to be several other reasons why such 
wide differentials exist and are allowed to persist, however. 
. In the first place sanitary requirements for milk production 
are not universally the same and a price adjustment may be 
necessary in some markets to reflect the different costs asso­
ciated with meeting these different sanitary requirements 
(4<i, p. 95)' Secondly, the transportation cost function used 
in this analysis is only approximate—actually transportation 
rates are a subject for bargaining just as are milk prices. 
Thirdly, as one manager related, handlers in some markets may 
be willing to pay a higher price for the privilege of securing 
locally produced milk for local consumption—presumably for 
advertising purposes. Fourth, as has been demonstrated pre-
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vlously, some cooperatives have such a large volume that their 
milk could not be replaced from alternative sources either at 
the same or at a lower price. Hence handlers in these markets 
may be'more willing to pay a higher price than are handlers 
"in other markets. 
In an earlier chapter it was noted that milk handlers' 
are required to pay members of the cooperative (and non-
members as well) a price at least as high as the federal order 
minimum price. However if the cooperative considers this min­
imum price too low, it may present evidence in a federal order 
hearing justifying its claim for a higher minimum price. Also 
in the same hearing, handlers may present evidence showing why 
the cooperative's claim is unjustified. The hearing examiner 
presumably weighs the evidence and reaches a decision much the 
same as does an arbitrator in labor disputes. 
Hence the cooperative may have an opportunity in the 
hearing to obtain a price which will cover the value of serv­
ices provided handlers—i.e., bargaining may take place in 
the federal order hearing in the presence of a third party 
rather than around the bargaining table. If the cooperative 
is successful in obtaining such a price, one may expect the 
excess of the average annual federal order minimum class I 
price in the market over 1) the average annual dealer's buy­
ing price for fluid milk in Eau Claire and 2) the cost of 
transporting milk from Eau Claire to the given market to be 
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at. least as large as this cooperative's estimate of the value 
of services provided handlers. Or equivalently one may expect 
the values recorded in Table 5.4 less the negotiated premium 
on class I milk to be at least as large as the value of 
services provided handlers. This was in fact true for five 
of the markets listed in Table ^.4. 
• Multiple regression was used to establish the signifi­
cance of the relationship between the values recorded in Table 
5.4 and four of the above, hypothesized factors considered 
simultaneously. The following statistical model was spec­
ified; 
(5«3) + ^5-^5i ®6^6i ^7-^7i ^i 
where = estimated I963 average annual value to cooperative 
i*s handlers of obtaining milk from cooperative i 
(cents per hundredweight), 
= 1 if for cooperative i Xoj_ less the negotiated 
premium on class I milk equalled or exceeded the 
value of services provided handlers in 19^3» 
= 0 otherwise, 
X^j_ = cooperative i's estimate of the value of services 
provided handlers (cents per hundredweight), 
^6i ~ cooperative i's distance from Eau Claire, 
Wisconsin, 
Xyi = percent of cooperative i's volume replaceable from 
alternative sources, and 
^ j_ = an independently and normally distributed random 
variable with mean, zero, and variance, r2, 
uncorrelated with Xif, t h r ough Xy. 
Least squares estimates of the parameters of (5«2,) 
yielded values for a% and which were insignificantly 
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different from zero at the 20 percent confidence level. Con­
sequently the parameters of (5«S) were reestimated on the 
assumption that = By = 0 with the following estimates all 
significantly different from zero at the five percent level 
(standard errors of the estimates are shown in parentheses 
following each estimate): 
% = 10.9826 (2.3394) 
35 = 0.5572 (0.1688) 
36 = 0.0348 (0.0105) 
= 0.9844 
Approximately 98 percent of the variation in the values 
recorded in Table 5*4 is attributable to the combined linear 
influence of the three independent variables X^, and X5. 
Multiplying each 3j (j=4, 5» 6) and its standard error by the 
ratio of the standard error of Xj to the standard error of 
/ 
yields estimates of 3j independent of the units of measurement 
which indicate the relative importance of one independent 
variable over the other two as a factor in the determination 
of X^.* These estimates are:• 
*Such estimates are usually called "beta" or "standard­
ized" regression coefficients and must be interpreted with 
some caution. Strictly speaking they measure the proportion 
of one standard deviation by which the dependent variable can 
be expected to increase as a result of, ceteris paribus, a 
one standard deviation increase in the independent variable. 
With this interpretation in mind these coefficients may be 
used as an objective measure of the (continued on next page) 
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/ 
34 = 0.5196 (0.1107) 
3^ = 0.5162 (0.1564) 
36 = 0.3852 (0.1160) 
/ / 
Snedecor*s F for testing the hypothesis that 3^ = 3^ = 
35 = 0.5196 and that 3^ = 3^ = 3$ = O.3852 is 3.3I and 3*46 
respectively. Thus both hypotheses must be accepted at the 
five percent confidence level and we conclude that the three 
factors are of approximately equal importance in the deter­
mination of X^.* 
In addition to the factors specified above, differences 
in the elasticity of demand for fluid milk in the various 
markets may be expétted to account for some of the variation 
in the results recorded in Table 5«4« Lerner (68) has termed 
the ratio of monopoly profit's to total revenue an index of 
monopoly power, Pj^. Monopoly profits are defined as output, 
X, times the excess of average revenue, P, over marginal cost, 
MC. Since to maximize profits the monopolist must equate 
marginal cost and marginal revenue, MH, P^^ = X(P-MC)/PX = 
(footnote continued from previous page) relative importance 
of each independent variable on the dependent variable as 
described in the text since they are transformed into stand­
ard, directly comparable units. 
*To make this test, appropriate transformations must be 
made on the matrix of sums of squares and cross products, XK*, 
and on the standard deviation of the regression equation. The 
problem is essentially one of coding—i.e., each element, a^j, 
of XX' is divided by the product of two standard deviations, 
Sj_ and s <, and the standard deviation for model 5*3 is divided 
by s^, the variance of X^. 
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(P-MC)/P = (P-MH)/P = 1 - ME/P. And since Mfi/P = 1 + 
I'm = - where n= elasticity of demand. Thus Pj^ is a 
decreasing function of providing, of course, the demand 
curve is downward sloping. 
If we assume that the federal order minimum price for 
class I milk adequately reflects the difference in milk pro­
duction costs between the several markets, the cooperative -
with the higher monopoly power may be expected to secure a 
higher negotiated premium on class I milk. Consequently the 
values in Table 5«4 may be expected to be higher for coopera­
tives in markets where the demand for producer milk for fluid 
use is less elastic. 
In an attempt to verify this proposition, demand func­
tions were estimated for those markets in Table for which 
time series data were available using the statistical model 
(5-4) Sit = Gl + BlPlt + %lYlt + (it 
where Pj^^ ~ retail price of whole milk in market i and year t 
in cents per paper quart for the most common 
grade sold out of stores (ll4), 
= per capita consumption of fluid milk and f^uid 
milk products in market i and year t in pounds 
of 3-5 percent producer milk equivalent (113, 
114), 
Yit = per capita income in market i and year t in 
dollars (91), and 
£it = a normally and independently distributed random 
error with mean, zero, and variance, ir?, uncor-
related with P^t Yif 
Demand functions were estimated with consumption as the 
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dependent variable on the assumption that retail price and per 
capita income are predetermined and that errors in the retail 
demand equation are independent of errors in the retail supply 
equation for each market. It was further assumed that the 
retail price per quart for whole milk adequately reflects the 
retail value of all fluid milk products. Statistics obtained 
from the indicated regressions are recorded in Table 5*5• 
Since only the gs for Chicago and Detroit are significantly 
different from zero at the five percent level, only the first 
two equations in Table 5*5 will be used in the following 
analysis. 
It is assumed that a 10 percent retail markup for fluid 
milk and fluid milk products is typical in all markets (see 
13, p. 44; 58). Further the share of the market for a typical 
firm is assumed to be equal to the ratio of total producer 
milk used for class I purposes per regulated handler in the 
federal order to the per capita consumption of all fluid milk 
products (pounds of 3*5 percent producer milk equivalent). 
The 1963 share of the market so calculated for a typical 
Chicago handler was 103,22? persons and for a typical Southern 
Michigan handler 46,015 persons (112, 114). Cn the basis of 
these assumptions we get the following derived demand func­
tions for typical handlers in the two markets: 
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Table 5 * 5 '  Selected statistics from regression estimates 
of demand for fluid milk, and fluid milk 
products^ 
Market 
i 
A 
Gi Pi 
. h dt 
Chicago 573.8284 
(29.0762) 
-7.6043 
(2.2923) 
-0.0195 
(0.02-12) 
0 .8940 1.00 
Detroit 590.3142 
(45.8466) 
-9.6747 
(1.8713) 
-0.0071 
(0.0301) 
0 .8914 1.26 
Quad Cities 450.0986 
(65.2552) 
-0.2966 
(5.7674) 
-0.0505 
(0.0490) 
0 .5321 1.71 
Sioux City 553.4959 
(67.2360) 
-4.3442 
(4.6732) 
-0.0675 
(0.0353) 
0 .7058 1.74 
Omaha 431.8461 
(73.1027) 
-1.6435 
(5.3460) 
-0.0281 
(0.0389) 
0 .4024 2.14 
^Standard errors of the estimated coefficients are shown 
in parentheses. 
^The Durbin-Watson "d" statistic. Although the Durbin-
Watson tables do not extend below 15 observations, extrapola­
tion indicates that a "d" as low as 1.00 or. 1.26 for ten 
observations is an inconclusive test for positive autocorre­
lation. 
( 5 - 5 )  Qi = 59,234,584 - 872,245.56 - 2012.9 
for i = Chicago, 
(5.6) Qi = 27,163,308 - 494,641.11 - 326.7 Yi 
for i = Detroit, 
where = 0.9 = wholesale price per quart. These two 
equations have been plotted in Figure 5«1 at the I963 level 
of per capita income in Chicago and Detroit respectively. 
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70 T 
/Chicago handler* curve 
revenue curve 
revenue curve 
revenue curve 
Quantity of fluid milk and fluid milk products 
(million pounds 3.5^ producer milk equivalent) 
Figure 5.1. Average and marginal revenue curves for the 
typical Chicago and Detroit handler 
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This implies that the typical handler in Chicago and 
Detroit sells all of his milk to retail outlets. If, on the 
other hand, all of his milk is sold directly to homes, his 
demand curve would be the retail demand function from which 
the derived demand curve, (5'5) or (5-6), was derived. 
Accordingly the elasticity of demand, ^ , at the I963 price and 
consumer income would be the same as shown in Figure 5*1 for 
each market since we have assumed a constant percentage retail 
markup. Actually, however, handlers will ordinarily bottle 
milk for sale directly to homes as well as for sale to retail 
outlets. In this analysis we have assumed that the cost of 
delivering milk to homes is equal to the retail markup and 
thus only one demand curve need be shown for each handler. 
In order to derive the demand curve for class I milk for 
the Chicago and Detroit cooperatives, the spread between 
wholesale and cooperative price must be deducted from Pwj_ • 
Assuming this spread to be 12.85 cents per quart for the 
typical Chicago handler and 12.35 cents per quart for the 
typical Detroit handler (see Table 5-6 below) and constant, 
the elasticity of derived demand for class I milk at the I963 
level of per capita income and cooperative price is -0.2344 
for the Chicago cooperative .and -0.3489 for the Detroit coop­
erative. Analogous elasticities in Quad Cities, Omaha, and 
A 
Sioux City may be taken to be zero since the .3s for these 
markets were insignificantly different from zero (see Table 
219 
5.5). 
If the Lerner hypothesis is true, one may expect the 
values recorded in Table 5»^ for Omaha, Sioux City, and 
Moline to be approximately equal but higher than those re­
corded for Chicago and Detroit. Similarly the Chicago value 
would be expected to be no lower than that for Detroit. The -
data, however, do not conform to these expectations. 
One reason why the data do not support the Lerner 
hypothesis is readily apparent provided the derived demand 
curves represent the true demand curves for the Chicago and 
Detroit cooperative respectively and provided marginal costs 
to these cooperatives are nonnegative. Since these two coop­
eratives are operating on the inelastic portion of their 
respective demand curves for class I milk, they could in­
crease their net profits (if cooperative marginal costs are 
nonnegative) by selling a lo#er total volume of class I milk 
for a higher price to their handlers. Thus these cooperatives 
are not profit maximizers and the assumption on which the 
Lerner hypothesis is based is not met. They could, in fact, 
dump some milk and still be able to secure for members a 
higher net return for milk than members are presently getting. 
Presumably, however, there would be non-class I outlets avail­
able for this extra milk. 
Although not every handler has facilities for processing 
surplus milk, we will assume for illustrative purposes, that 
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the typical handler in Chicago and Detroit does have such 
facilities. If so the cooperative may find it profitable to 
encourage this handler to use less class I milk and more 
surplus milk. This can be shoiwn by an application of the 
price discrimination model of Chapter 3 (see pages 82-86 
above). . 
Expressing the derived demand functions for the two coop­
eratives in terms of price we obtain 
(5-7) Pii = 48.69 - 0'.00000115 Qn for i = Chicago, 
and 
(5.8) P^i = 40.98 - 0.00000202 for i = Detroit 
where = farm price of class I milk on a per quart basis 
and Q]_j_ = pounds of class I milk. Also if we take the elas­
ticity of derived demand for surplus milk to be -0.6 in both 
markets (see e.g., page 86 above), the farm price of surplus 
milk on a per quart basis in I963 to be 6.7 cents in both 
markets (the average I963 federal order minimum price for milk 
used for manufacturing purposes (112) converted to .a per quart 
basis), and the quantity of surplus milk purchased by the 
typical Chicago handler in I963 to be 51,380,900 pounds and 
by the typical Detroit handler in I963 to be 10,830,000 pounds 
(the quantity of surplus milk purchased by regulated handlers 
in the respective federal order markets per regulated handler, 
see 112), the following derived demand functions for surplus 
milk are obtained: 
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(5.9) P21 = 17.8? - 0.00000021 Q2i for i = Chicago 
(5.10) P21 = 17.87 - 0.00000103 Q2i for i = Detroit 
where P2i = farm price of surplus milk on a per quart basis 
and Q21 = pounds of surplus milk.* Finally we assume the 
typical handler in Chicago purchased 84,826,600 total pounds 
of milk and the typical handler in Detroit purchased 
25,922,800 total pounds of milk in I963 (total producer milk 
purchased by regulated handlers in the respective federal 
order markets per regulated handler, see 112). 
Under these conditions it can be verified by substitution 
into the first- and second-order conditions of the price dis­
crimination model that cooperative profits would have been 
maximized if Q^i ~ 24,797,79^ and Q21 ~ 60,028,806 for i = 
Chicago and Qij_ = 12,5^2,623 and Q2i ~ 13,380,177 for i = 
Detroit. In comparison to profits from the sale of class I 
and surplus milk purchased by the typical handler in each 
market in I963 at the I963 dealers' buying price for class I 
milk and the I963 federal order minimum price for surplus 
milk, the Chicago cooperative's profits would have been O.89 
cents per quart higher and the Detroit cooperative's profits 
would have been 0.33 cents per quart higher. Thus both coop­
eratives would have increased their profits had they encour-
*That is we are,assuming we know the price and quantity 
associated with a point or. the linear demand function at which 
the elasticity of demand equals -0.6. 
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aged the typical handler to take a smaller quantity of class I 
milk at a higher price and a larger quantity of surplus milk 
at a lower price. It is interesting to observe that the class 
I utilization percentage for the typical handler at the profit 
maximization solution is approximately ten percentage points 
lower than the actual I963 class I'utilization percentage in 
both markets. 
In a more realistic application of the analysis outlined 
here one would need to determine the actual cost functions of 
the milk handler and cooperative as well as the actual demand 
function for surplus milk in each market. Given this addi­
tional information one may obtain more precise results by 
applying the analysis to a specific handler or group of hand­
lers. Also given a knowledge of the cooperative's cost func­
tion one would be able to determine the results of decreasing 
(or increasing) the total supply of milk sold to a given 
handler. Nevertheless some points not otherwise obvious have 
been illustrated in the present example. There is, however, 
still another point that merits attention. This concerns the 
milk handler and his objective. 
Since the typical handler in Chicago and Detroit as de­
fined above seems to be operating on the inelastic portion of 
his demand curve, he may also be able to increase his net 
profits by operating at a lower volume and selling this volume 
for a higher price. Thus another advantage cooperatives may 
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be able to offer handlers is to convince them that they should 
take a lower quantity of class I milk at a higher price. If, 
in fact, the handler is operating on the inelastic portion of 
his demand curve, this may help to explain why milk handlers 
even tolerate a large superpool operation such as exists in 
Chicago and Detroit. 
On the other hand, milk handlers may not desire to max­
imize their profits. It has been argued that firms may seek 
a "satisfactory" rate of return on invested capital or a 
"satisfactory" profit level of a "satisfactory" share of the 
market, etc., rather than the maximum level of net profits 
(see e.g., 76, pp. 136-141; 12) depending upon their particu­
lar aspirations or their desire to make "persnickety calcula­
tions" or both (12, p. 24). Alternatively milk handlers may 
aspire to keep the spread between their buying price for class 
I milk and their selling price for processed milk in close 
agreement with that of milk handlers in other markets. This 
proposition is similar to Baumol and Quandt*s "imitative 
pricing rule" (12, p. 2?) except that in our case milk hand­
lers are hypothesized to imitate spreads rather than prices. 
One reason for such an aspiration on the part of milk 
handlers may be to attempt to avoid what Fellner (32, pp. 24-
25) regards as the "long-run consequences of violating accepted 
value judgments (that is of faring too well)". For example, 
legislative action which is undesirable to the milk handler 
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may be precipitated as a result of one or more firms maintain­
ing comparatively large wholesale price spreads. 
The data in Table 5*6 indicate.that for several markets 
in the North Central Region, the hypothesis may have some 
validity. The range in the computed wholesale price "spreads 
for the Moline, Hockford, Chicago, and Detroit markets was 
12.35-13'02 cents; for the iiau Claire, Superior, Green Bay, 
Table 5*6. Price spreads per quart for fluid milk in 
several North Central markets 
Market 
Wholesale price spread 
1963a 
Gross margin 
1960% 
Burlington 9.16 10.76 
Minneapolis 9.76 8.19 
Sioux City 10.57 12.10 
Omaha 11.12 10.15 
Port Wayne 11.23 8.51 
Toledo 11.28 8.80 
Eau Claire 11.63 12.10 
Superior 11.77 12.68 
Green Bay 12.04 12.36 
Detroit 12.35 10.17 
Moline (Hock Island) 12.59 11.56 
Chicago 12.85 11.98 
Hockford (Beloit) 13.02 11.59 
Des Moines 13.41 13.85 
Milwaukee 15.12 8.90 
^Source: 112, 114. Since 100 pounds of 3«5^ producer 
milk yields approximately 46.5 quarts of whole milk, the 
formula used to compute this spread was - Pf(0.4o5)"'l 
where P^ = wholesale price in cents per quart as defined in 
the text and Pf = handlers' buying price for 3«5,^ producer 
milk for fluid use in I963 in cents per hundredweight. 
^Source : 6. 
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Madison and Chicago markets 11.16-12.85 cents; and for the 
Toledo, Port Wayne, and Detroit markets 11.23-12.85 cents— 
differences of less than two cents per quart in each in­
stance . 
Using i960 data and retail price per gallon converted'to 
a per quart basis, Bartlett (6) has computed milk distribu­
tor's gross margins for 159 markets in the United States. 
These'margins are also shown in Table 5*6 for several mar­
kets in the North Central Hegion. One may expect the gross 
margins to be higher than the wholesale price spreads. How­
ever, Bartlett used retail price per gallon converted to a 
per quart basis which in general is much lower than retail 
price per paper quart. This may account for the fact that in 
nine of the 14 markets considered the gross margin was lower 
than the wholesale price spread. 
Further if the hypothesis is true, one would expect each 
market to be ranked approximately the same on the basis of 
the wholesale price spread as on the basis of the gross mar­
gin. Examination of the data shows that this is not the 
case. Nevertheless the range in gross margins for the groups 
of markets considered above was lO.i7-ll.98 cents, 11.52-12.68 
cents, and 8.5I-IO.I7 cents respectively—again differences 
of less than two cents per quart in each instance. 
These data at best only show that the wholesale price 
spreads in various markets may be quite similar—it does not 
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indicate why the similarity exists. Additional work needs to 
be done in order to substantiate the hypothesis. If, however, 
the hypothesis is found to be valid, it is easily seen that 
unless milk handlers are willing to raise retail prices, dairy 
bargaining cooperatives' efforts to secure higher prices for 
their members' milk may be much more difficult. Milk dealers 
may be quite insistent upon maintaining the target level 
wholesale price spread, and thus quite resistant to the coop­
erative's demands for higher prices. However if the milk 
dealer is operating on the inelastic portion of his demand 
curve, as in the present case, there is no reason why he could 
not maintain the target level price spread by raising his 
price to consumers and at the same time to the cooperative if 
he is also willing to sell less milk. But this in turn re­
quires the cooperative to be willing to sell less milk to the 
handler. 
In summary a dairy bargaining cooperative's type I bar­
gaining power will be influenced by at least three distinct 
factors—1) the cooperative's ability to offer various ser­
vices to handlers, 2) the existing governmental regulations, 
and 3) the nature of consumer demand for the final product. 
Services offered handlers vary from cooperative to cooperative 
but in general include full-supply contracts, diversion of 
surplus milk, maintaining high quality milk, bulk handling of 
milk, and producer check writing. 
As noted earlier federal milk order regulations serve as 
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a substitute for the cooperative's type I bargaining power by 
providing a multiple-price plan for producer milk as well as 
by providing an incentive for an optimal seasonal distribution 
of milk production. Furthermore as discovered in the present. 
• • • • ' • . , 
section, in some markets the federal order minimum price for 
class I milk is sufficiently high so that the local coopera­
tive is assured of the value of services provided handlers 
even in the absence of a negotiated premium. 
Although the Lerner hypothesis could not be accepted in 
this study, the nature of the handler's demand curve and of 
his position on this demand curve were found to be factors 
which may be of .considerable significance to the bargaining 
cooperative. It may be profitable to the handler, for in­
stance, to purchase less milk for a higher price. If so the 
cooperative may be able to obtain a higher price for its milk 
by encouraging the handler to take less milk. 
Type II Bargaining Power 
Attitude toward striking 
• Kost of the cooperatives studied showed little interest 
in calling a milk strike under existing conditions. Seven out 
of the ten managers stated that they would not call a milk 
strike under present conditions in order to obtain a higher 
price for milk (three of these seven implied that the only 
condition under which they would withhold milk from any hand­
lers is if one or more handlers became so antagonistic toward 
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the cooperative that the cooperative preferred not to conduct 
any business with them). The principal reason given by these 
seven cooperatives was that there is too much surplus milk 
available to handlers which would replace any milk withheld 
by the local cooperative and, therefore, that the strike is 
likely to be ineffective. Further once a strike is called 
and handlers obtain milk els.ewhere during the strike, the 
managers interviewed expressed fear that their cooperative 
would permanently lose an outlet for its milk. 
In 1961, for example, the Cedar Hapids cooperative with­
held milk from one of its handlers who.was previously taking 
nearly 60 percent of the cooperative's class I milk. At the 
present time this same handler is taking less than five per­
cent of the cooperative's class I milk in some months—the 
bulk of its milk coming from independent producers. Simi­
larly in 1952 a dairy cooperative in Kansas City withheld milk 
from one handler. It is reported that this handler now also 
obtains at least half of its milk from- independent producers. 
Thus the attempted ^ strikes not only failed to achieve their 
objectives but also provided encouragement for the handler to 
line up a permanent alternative source of milk. 
Other reasons given for not calling a milk strike were 
1) the cooperative and handlers have already agreed upon a 
reasonable class price through the federal order, 2) a strike 
could bring on a lawsuit, and 3) it is against the coopéra-
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tive's belief to call a milk strike. • 
All of the seven cooperatives expressing reluctance at 
calling a milk strike under present conditions were relatively 
small with an annual volume of less than 4-00 million pounds of 
milk—a volume which could easily be replaced by alternative 
sources of milk in Wisconsin and Minnesota. Two of the three 
cooperatives who would call a milk strike (Chicago and 
Detroit), on the other hand, had volumes in I963 of nearly 
3 billion pounds—a volume which could not easily be replaced 
as we have seen before. Finally the- three cooperatives who 
would call a milk strike under present conditions had an 
outlet for a sizable portion, if not all, of their milk supply 
in their own processing plants should they decide to withhold 
milk. This was not true for most of the remaining seven coop­
eratives studied. 
Two of the three cooperative managers indicating they 
would call a milk strike under present conditions implied that 
they would prefer withholding milk from one or just a few of 
their handlers rather than withholding from all handlers. One 
of the reasons for this preference was that the cooperative 
could then use the whipsaw technique in negotiating with the 
individual handler or small group of handlers. Further there 
was some reluctance to withholding milk from all handlers 
because it would more than likely have to be diverted to lower 
valued uses and thus result in lower prices to farmers (it was 
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universally felt that members would not consent to dumping 
milk). The third manager, however, indicated a preference for 
withholding milk from all handlers since it would be much more 
difficult for all handlers to find an alternative source of 
milk than it would be for just one. 
Two important factors, then, determining whether or not 
a cooperative will strike are 1) where the alternative sources 
of milk are located, the cost to handlers of securing this 
milk, and the probability that the cooperative's handlers will 
be able to secure sufficient milk from these sources to replace 
the milk being withheld, and 2) what the cooperative would do 
with the milk on hand. Other factors suggested by the man­
agers interviewed as requiring consideration before a milk 
strike is called included 3) whether the handler is a small 
independent firm or a national chain, 4) whether the resulting 
public reaction, if any, would be favorable or unfavorable to 
the cooperative and what legal repercussions are likely to 
result, 5) whether the economic conditions justify the coop­
erative's demand, and 6) whether members will back the strike, 
attempt. In determining how long the cooperative would with­
hold milk, the managers felt they would have to consider the 
expected public and legislative reaction, expectations of suc­
cess or failure, availability of alternative sources of milk, 
and member support. 
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Public reaction and length of strike 
An attempt was made to determine the importance of two of 
these factors—public reaction and length of strike—on dairy 
cooperatives' type II bargaining: power. Hypothetical condi­
tions' on 1) the availability of milk to consumers during a 
strike (available and not available) and 2) the length of the 
strike (one and two weeks) were constructed. Each manager was 
then asked to state that price for which he- would strike under 
these four hypothetical conditions. The response and conse­
quently the results were unsatisfactory in that the inter­
viewees were unable to relate the required information. Per­
haps one reason for the unsatisfactory results was that the 
interviewees could conceive of no situation under which they 
would strike or could not visualize the situation as construct­
ed in the presence of so much surplus milk. 
There was evidence from the conversation during the 
interviews, however, suggesting that public reaction is a very 
important consideration in some cases. In the larger markets, 
for instance, pressure may be exerted from the newspapers and-
even city officials on the cooperative"to call a halt to the 
strike. On the other hand, the expected length of a strike 
evidently has no effect on the price a cooperative will seek. 
Typical comments were "the length of a strike makes no differ­
ence—if we believe we should have what we are asking and if 
we are sure of getting it we would strike longer than two 
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weeks". 
Cost of a strike 
One of the major considerations involved in a coopera­
tive's decision to strike is, of course, whether or not the 
strike will be successful and the success of a strike depends 
in part on member support. Member support in turn depends on 
the expected loss and the length of time necessary to recover 
the strike losses. The losses accompanying a strike and the 
time necessary to recover these losses will vary from case to 
case. 
Let us assume a typical Iowa cooperative located in a 
federal order market to have an annual volume of 525 million 
pounds of 3.5 percent grade A milk and that 
(1) its average weekly June volume is 11,250,000 pounds 
of 3-5 percent milk, 
(2) its June class I utilization percentage is 65, and 
(3) the June federal order prices are #3*96 and #3*02 
per hundredweight for 3*5 percent class I and II 
milk, respectively. 
Cooperative gross income in June would then be $408,487.50 per 
week. 
If, on the other hand, this cooperative decided to call 
a milk strike which lasted throughout the first week in June, 
on all its handlers, and if it could find an alternative out­
let for only 10 percent of its class I sales at a net price of 
$3.96 per hundredweight, the remaining portion of its sales 
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going into alternative class II outlets at $3.02 per hundred­
weight, the cooperative's gross income in the first week of 
June would be reduced by $58,162.^0. Prom the data in Table 
5.7 we find the cooperative would have recovered this amount 
by the end of the l6th week if a five-cent per hundredweight 
premium on class I milk was negotiated and by the end of the 
24th week if only a three-cent premium on class I milk was 
negotiated. If the strike lasted two weeks, 28 weeks would 
bè required to recover the lost gross income if a five-cent 
premium was negotiated and 46 weeks if a three-cent premium 
was negotiated. 
Now, as a result of a one week strike, assume that 10 
percent of the cooperative's class I sales have been perma­
nently lost to class II outlets. Under these conditions, the 
cooperative would have had to negotiate a premium of 10.4 
cents per hundredweight during June on class I milk in order 
to maintain the weekly grross income of $408,487.50. Depending 
on the class prices in future months this premium may, of 
course, be insufficient to maintain this weekly income. 
Furthermore it will not allow the cooperative to recover any 
of the income lost during the strike. 
Finally let us assume that the cooperative also owns a 
butter-powder processing plant with a weekly capacity of 
8,750,000 pounds of 3*5 percent milk—i.e., a plant capable 
of handling 80 percent of the cooperative's annual volume. 
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Table 5*7• Cooperative's total and class I volume per week 
during a given month and amount by which total 
revenue from the sale of class I milk at a 
negotiated premium of three and five cents 
exceeds total revenue from the sale of class I 
milk at the federal order minimum price^ 
Additional revenue from 
Total Class I . the sale of class I milk 
volume volume at negotiated premiums of: 
Month per week per week 3^ 5^ 
(000) (000) 
pounds pouads 
June 11,250 7,313 #2,193 .90 #3,656.50 
July 10,625 7,438 2,231 .40 3,719.00 
August 10,000 7,700 2,310 .00 3,850.00 
September 10,125 8,505 2,551 .50 4,252.50 
October 10,875 9,461 2,838 .30 4,730.50 
November 11,125 9,123 2,736 .30 4,561.50 
December 11,250 9,000 2,700 .00 4,500.00 
January 11,155 9,036 2,710 .80 4,518.50 
February 10,250 7,995 2,398 .50 3,997.50 
March 11,250 8,775 2,632 .50 4,387.50 
April 10,875 8,265 2,479 .50 4,132.50 
May 12,500 8,625 2,587 .50 4,312.50 
^The cooperative's annual total and class I volume was 
allocated to each month on the basis of the actual monthly 
total and class I volume distribution for the Des Moines 
federal order in I962 and I963 (see 112). 
The average total cost function per hundredweight of milk for 
this plant is assumed to be equal to 72 - O.3 X where X = 
percent capacity,* and the plant produces 1.125 pounds of 
*This cost function is not meant to be representative of 
all such processing plants but is based on the reported costs 
of operating one such cooperative butter-powder processing 
plant at various volume levels. 
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butter per pound of butterfat (38» P* 11) and 8.6 pounds of 
nonfat dry milk per hundredweight of skimmilk (62, p. 4). 
Combining these assumptions the total returns to be dis­
tributed to members for the first week in June are found by 
the following calculations: 
Class I sales 7,312,500# @ #3.96 $289,575.00 
Class II sales 3,937»500# @ #3.02 118.912.50 
TOTAL aZVENUS PROK THE SALE OF FilLK $408,487.50 
BUTTEE-POWDEH PLANT OPERATIONS 
Butter sales 
@ 58j^ per pound $ 97*116.47 
Dry milk sales 
# 15.050 per pound 49,179«36 
TOTAL REVENUE PHOK PLAINT SALES $146,295.83 
Cost of raw milk 
3»937,500# @ 13.02 $118,912.50 
Cost of processing 23,034.38 
PROCESSING PLANT COSTS #141,946.88 
PROFIT PROM PLANT OPERATIONS 4.348.95 
RETURIcS TO BE DISTRIBUTED TO MEIffiERS #412,836.45 
Class II milk sales are included in total revenue from the 
sale of milk since members would receive this revenue even if 
the cooperative did not process surplus milk. Thus it must 
also be included as a cost to the processing plant. 
Now, however, if this cooperative called a milk strike 
and could find an alternative outlet for only 10 percent of 
its class I sales at a price of 3^.96, the remaining volume 
going to its processing plant and to other class II outlets, 
total cooperative returns to be distributed to members for the 
first week in June would be: 
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Class I sales 731,250# @ #3.96 # 28,959.48 
Class II sales 10,518,750# @ $3.02 317«666.25 
TOTAL REVENUE PHOK THE SALE OF MILK $346,625.73 
BUTTEB-POWDEE PLANT OPERATIONS 
Butter sales 
© 58^ per pound $215»814.38 
Dry milk sales 
# 15*05^ per pound 109,287.46 
TOTAL REVENUE FROM PLANT SALES #325,101.84 
Cost of raw milk 
8,750,000# @ #3.02 #264,250.00 
Cost of processing 36,750.00 
PROCESSING PLANT COSTS #301.000.00 
PROFIT FROM PLANT OPERATIONS 24.101.84 
RETURNS TO EE DISTRIBUTED TO MEMBERS 1370,727.47 
Since the cooperative can only handle 8,750,000 pounds of milk 
in its processing plant, 1,768,750 pounds must be sold to 
other class II outlets at $3.02. The revenue from the sale 
of all class II milk is again, however, included in total 
revenue from the sale of milk and is thus accounted for. 
The strike in this case would thus result in a reduction 
in the cooperative's net income per week of $42,108.88. From 
the data in Table 5*7 we find that the cooperative would have 
recovered the $42,108.88 by the end of the 12th week if a 
five-cent premium on class I milk was negotiated and by the 
end of the 21st week if only a three-cent premium on class I 
milk was negotiated. If the strike lasted two weeks, 18 weeks 
would be required to recover the lost net income if a five-
cent premium.was negotiated and 3^ weeks if a three-cent pre­
mium was negotiated. 
236 
These results emphasize the possible cost of a strike to 
producer-members under various conditions. The"cost is likely 
to be lower for members of a cooperative that has its own pro­
cessing facilities. For example, if the strike lasts' one 
week, in our hypothetical cases, the cooperative without pro-, 
cessing facilities would incur a loss in income from the sale 
of milk of nearly 52 cents per hundredweight while the coop­
erative with processing facilities would incur a loss in net 
income of only 37 cents per hundredweight. 
Nevertheless these losses seem to be substantial and may 
not be recovered before six months have elapsed if the coop­
erative is successful, as a result of an exercise of its type 
II bargaining power, in negotiating a premium with handlers. 
If, however, members are insufficiently endowed to withstand 
such losses, they are not likely to support the strike effort 
and thus the cooperative may never recover the losses. 
deducing alternative sources of milk to handlers 
In an earlier chapter it was postulated that a dairy 
bargaining cooperative's type II bargaining power will be 
lower if there are alternative sources of milk available to 
its handlers. On the basis of the information received from 
the cooperatives studied as recorded in the preceding section, 
the above hypothesis seems to be true. Therefore it seems 
logical to expect that if possible the cooperative will 
attempt to reduce the number of alternative sources of milk 
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to handlers. 
The most frequent means of reducing the number of 
alternative sources of milk to handlers mentioned was con­
solidation—federations or superpool operations and mergers. 
An outright merger of two or more organizations into a new 
cooperative was considered the better alternative although it 
has the limitations mentioned above. As we also have seen 
before there has been a good deal of merger activity among the 
cooperatives studied. 
Other means of reducing alternative sources of milk to 
handlers mentioned were 1) have a bottling plant in the area 
of alternative supplies so you can bid up retail prices in 
these markets and thus keep producers prices in these areas 
up, 2) use full-supply contracts so that you are assured of 
the outlet, and 3) sign up the independent producers. 
Legislation as a Substitute for Bargaining Power 
• All managers interviewed indicated that they participated 
in federal order hearings. Various objectives were sought in 
these hearings depending on the local situation. Seeking a 
higher class I price was the most frequently encountered 
objective. The reason for this is obvious—to increase member 
returns and thus serve as a substitute for the cooperative's 
bargaining power. Several managers also sought a higher class 
II price. For those cooperatives with no processing facil-
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Ities for surplus milk, this would also seem to be a "ration­
al" objective. 
For those cooperatives with facilities for processing 
surplus milk, however, a lower class II price may be a more 
realistic objective. Consider our hypothetical cooperative 
in the previous section havirg a processing plant. If this 
cooperative supplied 80 percent of all the milk in the order, 
independent producers supplying the rest, and if the class I 
utilization of nonmembers' milk was also 65 percent, the blend 
price to all producers in the order would be (assuming no 
negotiated premium for either class I or class II milk and 
ignoring the various adjustments that would be made in the 
calculation of the actual blend price): 
Cooperative class I jales 7,312,500# @ $3.96 = $289-,575'00 
Independent class I sales 1,828,^25# ® 3*96 = 72,393*75 
Cooperative class II sales 3,937,500# @ 3*02 = 118,912.50 
Independent class II sales 984,375# ê 3*02 = 29,728.13 
TOTALS 14,062,500# #510,610.38 
BLEND PiilCE TO ALL PEODUCEES IN THE MARKET $3.63 
If we further assume the cooperative requires a six-cent 
operating expense check-off per hundredweight of milk supplied 
by each producer-member, members would receive only #3.57 per 
hundredweight for their milk. In addition, however, members 
receive 3*9 cents per hundredweight from profits on plant 
operations (see page 234 above). Thus for all practical pur­
poses members receive a blend price of #3*609 per hundred-
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weight. 
If, on the other hand, the class II price were lowered to 
$2.84, the blend price to all producers in the market would be 
•i?3-578 instead of $3.64. But since the cost of raw milk for 
the cooperative's plant is now reduced by ^5*906.25» members 
will receive a 9«1 cent profit per hundredweight on plant 
operations. Thus members will again receive a price of %3'&09 
per hundredweight ($3'57S - #0.06 + $0,091) while nonmembers 
receive only $3»578. Under such circumstances there should be 
pressure for nonmembers to become members of the cooperative 
since they could receive more money for their milk as a member 
of the cooperative. 
Following the examples given in the preceding section, 
for a cooperative with surplus processing facilities net 
profits will be equal to the blend price times total volume 
plus profits from plant operations minus the cooperative 
operating expenses. That is 
(5.11) ir= PqXO + (PmXg - P2X2 - C1X2) - cgXo 
where 11= total cooperative returns to be distributed to 
members, 
XQ = total cooperative volume (hundredweight), 
X2 = class II volume handled in the cooperative's 
processing plant (hundredweight), 
.PQ = federal order blend price (dollars per hundred­
weight), 
P2 = federal order minimum class II price (dollars per 
hundredweight), 
^m ~ ^ b b ^d ^  d ' 
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Pb = price received by the.cooperative per pound of 
butter processed, 
= price received by the cooperative per pound of 
dry milk processed, 
Ab = pounds of butter produced per hundredweight of 
3.5^ class II milk, 
= pounds of dry milk produced per hundredweight of 
3'5% class II milk, 
C]_ = processing costs (dollars per hundredweight), 
C2 = cooperative ooeratin^ expense (dollars per 
hundredweight), and 
M = X2/X0. 
Now in a federal order market with a market-wide pool 
the blend price to members and nonmembers will be the same. 
Hence in order to employ the above described tactic the coop­
erative would want to exceed P^. It is easily seen that 
this will be true if 
(5.13) M(Pm - P2 - ci) - C2 > 0 
or if 
(5.14) P2 <Pm - - cgM-l. 
Thus the cooperative must seek a class II price which satis­
fies equation (5»l4)—in the example of this section P2 would 
need to be less than $2.959 per hundredweight. 
The effectiveness of this tactic then depends on the 
volume of milk handled in the cooperative's processing plant 
and on the level of existing prices and costs. If the coop­
erative is unsuccessful in obtaining a lower class II price 
it may still be able to manipulate variables so that equation 
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(5.14) is satisfied. It may, for example, lower or 02» or 
it may increase the proportion of its total volume handled in 
the processing plant. 
In any event seeking- a lower class II price may serve as 
an important means of reducing one alternative source of milk 
to handlers—independent producers—for some cooperatives. 
Further it exemplifies another way in which seeking appropri­
ate legislation can serve as a substitute for the coopera­
tive's bargaining power. This tactic has not been attempted 
by the cooperatives studied, however. The major "objectives 
sought in federal order hearings were higher class I prices 
and expansion of market areas. 
Other legislative or regulatory measures were also sought 
by these cooperatives. For example, the Omaha cooperative was 
active in and takes major credit for the Grade A milk law in 
Nebraska. In addition most of the cooperatives interviewed 
indicated that they work with the state dairy associations and 
with the National Dairy Association in seeking various legis­
lative acts. 
Finally a new organization—Associated Dairymen, Inc.— 
has recently been formed to seek higher prices for dairy 
products through appropriate legislation. Membership in this 
association is limited to- cooperative associations of pro­
ducers of agricultural products (including milk and milk 
products) and at the present time (June 1964) totals 23 coop­
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eratives. The primary purpose of this organization of rele­
vance to dairy marketing is outlined ir the following Resolu­
tion of Intent: 
Be it resolved that the primary purpose of the 
Organization is to study techniques "by which the 
price levels in markets of the Midwest and South­
west can be increased appropriately to return a 
reasonable price that will reflect a fair income 
for dairy farmers supplying fluid markets of the 
Midwest and Southwest. This may include the prob­
lems of inter-market price alignment and location 
adjustments, or such matters as may affect the 
ability of dairy farmers to obtain a fair price. 
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SUMMÀEÏ AND CONCLUSIONS 
Bargaining power was defined to be the degree of influ­
ence one party has over another to force concessions or to 
effect agreements on one's own terms, and was divided into 
two components—type I and type II. Type I bargaining power 
refers to the advantages that can be offered to the opponent 
in return for accepting one's terms or as a result of accept­
ing one's terms. Type II bargaining power refers to the un­
favorable consequences that can be forced upon the opponent 
for refusing to accept the stated terms. The purpose of this 
study was to discover the means available to dairy bargaining 
cooperatives to obtain bargaining power and therefore with 
which to seek their bargaining objective. 
The conceptual framework was based primarily on the 
bilateral monopoly model of economic theory with the dairy 
cooperative viewed as an organization. Consideration of the 
structure of the dairy industry, however, suggested that 
oligopoly-oligopsony is a more appropriate description of the 
environment in which dairy bargaining cooperatives operate. 
Several hypotheses were developed based on a priori informa­
tion derived largely from economic and organization theory 
and from laboratory experiments on bargaining behavior. A 
personal-interview survey of ten dairy bargaining coopera­
tives in the North Central Hegion was conducted in an attempt 
to obtain the information'necessary to test these hypotheses. 
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It was initially assumed that the sole objective of all 
dairy bargaining cooperatives is to bargain with milk dealers 
for a price which will give members the highest possible net 
return for their milk. The results of this study indicate 
that this assumption was invalid. Further a ranking of seven 
objectives by each of nine cooperative managers showed that 
only two considered this objective most.important. Maintain­
ing a market for members' milk was generally ranked most 
important by the nine managers, while increasing the size of 
the procurement area was generally ranked least important. 
The four remaining objectives--securing 100 percent con­
trol of the milk produced in the procurement area, negotiating" 
for what was considered to be the value of the services pro­
vided handlers, maintaining good relations with handlers,- and 
maintaining the past highest percentage of class I sales— 
were in general considered to be more important than increas-' 
ing the size of the procurement area but less important than 
maintaining a market for members milk. 
No consistent pattern of ranking was exhibited by the 
nine managers except as indicated above. Nevertheless a sig­
nificant coefficient of concordance among the nine rankings 
indicated that each cooperative was applying essentially the 
same underlying "standard" in ranking the objectives. On the 
hypothesis that this standard is a function of the coopera­
tives' individual attributes, an equation was derived for each 
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of the seven objectives with the aid of multiple regression 
analysis. These equations revealed how the cooperatives' 
individual attributes may be expected to influence their 
ranking- of the seven objectives. 
Seventeen different attributes were considered as pos­
sible candidates for independent variables in the regression 
analysis, but at most two were found to be sufficient to ex­
plain at least 85 percent of the variance in the nine rankings 
of each objective. However none of the available attributes 
were found to be significant factors affecting the ranking of 
one objective—increasing the size of the procurement area. 
The results of this analysis lend considerable support 
to the hypothesis that a dairy cooperative's aspiration level 
is an important factor to consider in determining its bargain­
ing strategy. For example if the cooperative's major objec­
tive or aspiration is to maintain its past highest percentage 
of class I sales, it may be willing to sacrifice some of its 
premium in order to achieve this objective. Thus its bar­
gaining strategy may be quite different than if its major 
objective is to achieve the highest possible net return for 
members' milk. Further each cooperative's aspiration level 
seems to be dependent on its peculiar characteristics and may 
thus be expected to change as its characteristics change. 
À second general hypothesis suggested was that the con­
duct of firms in the milk processing-distribution industry 
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and the conduct of other dairy cooperatives would be influ­
ential in negotiations between a dairy bargaining cooperative 
and milk handlers. Growth of handlers and handler mergers, 
large quantity buying by a single retail unit, and competition 
from handlers in other markets due to different federal order 
prices and to a desire to expand total market area were con­
sidered to be the major factors on the processing side affect­
ing the bargaining ability of the cooperatives studied. The 
impact of these factors on a dairy cooperative's bargaining 
ability is felt through either lost outlets for the coopera­
tive's milk or through greater difficulty in bargaining with 
handlers over the price of milk. 
Handler growth and mergers, however, may offer advantages 
to a dairy cooperative offsetting in part the disadvantages. 
The cooperative, for example, may experience a lower total 
cost of bargaining" as a result of having to deal with fewer 
firms. Also there may be an opportunity for the cooperative 
to increase its membership as well as the percentage of pro­
ducers organized. The latter may result from agreements with 
handlers to accept into cooperative membership those unorgan­
ized farmers previously supplying milk to the processing firm 
being merged or acquired by one of the cooperative's regular 
handlers. 
The results of bargaining between handlers and dairy 
cooperatives in nearby markets was also found to be influ­
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ential on the bargaining ability of the cooperatives studied. 
In the first place all of these cooperatives felt they would 
be in a strong position to negotiate a premium or an increase 
in their premium if one or more nearby cooperatives were sim­
ilarly successful, but in a weak position to do so if nearby 
cooperatives were not this fortunate. In addition some coop­
eratives evidently attempt to pattern their bargaining tac­
tics after those of larger and more successful cooperatives. 
Finally a milk strike, if successful, called by a cooperative 
in one market aày be beneficial not only to this cooperative 
but also to a cooperative in another market. That is handlers 
in the latter market, now being more aware of the possible 
success of a strike if called in their own market, may be 
more willing to make concessions to the dairy cooperative 
than before. 
Secondly the extent to which two or more dairy coopera­
tives are or are not willing to cooperate with one another in 
adopting mutually beneficial policies has in some cases a 
significant effect on their bargaining ability. For example, 
one of the cooperatives studied has, evidently on its own 
initiative, adopted the policy of refusing to ship milk into 
a market in which another cooperative is attempting to gain 
a reasonable premium by withholding milk. This policy is not 
adopted by all cooperatives however. As a result alternative 
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sources of milk are available to a cooperative's handlers 
and thus its type II bargaining power is limited. 
Further in an attempt to maintain or even increase the 
number of outlets for their milk, some cooperatives evidently 
deliberately keep prices to their handlers low in relation to 
prices sought by other cooperatives. Such a policy results in 
misalignment of prices in adjacent markets which again may 
seriously restrict a cooperative's type II bargaining power. 
By working together to keep prices in closer alignment and by 
jointly agreeing not to ship milk into another market in which 
a cooperative is attempting to negotiate a higher price by 
withholding milk, each cooperative may be able to negotiate 
higher prices and thus the members of all cooperatives may 
benefit. 
Adoption of such mutually advantageous and "cooperative" 
strategies, however, seems to be hindered by 1) each coopera­
tive's fear that their neighboring cooperative(s) will not 
adopt them, 2) by each cooperative's desire to become larger, 
3) by each cooperative's ignorance of the advantages of such ^  
cooperation, or 4) by each cooperative's felt need to serve 
its own members. In any event there are pressures encourag­
ing some to adopt retaliatory or non-cooperative strategies. 
If every cooperative is aware of the fact that each may be 
better off if they adopt a cooperative strategy, they may be 
involved in what game theorists call a "prisoners' dilemma" 
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game. That is, each player knows he will be better off if 
all choose a cooperative strategy, however, each player sees 
nothing to be gained by playing a cooperative strategy unless 
there is some guarantee that opponents or competitors .will 
also. 
Baumol argues that the "prisoners' dilemma" game is 
involved in the logic behind governmental control in a demo­
cratic society. Similarly it may be argued that federal milk 
marketing orders, cooperative mergers, and cooperative federa­
tions can be rationalized on the same grounds. Federal milk 
marketing orders are designed in part to keep prices in line 
in different markets. They accomplish this task by guarantee­
ing farmers in a certain area a minimum price for milk. Since 
prices established by milk marketing orders are only minimum 
prices, however, federal orders do not guarantee that price 
alignment between markets, or even within a given market, will 
be achieved. 
The same purpose can be achieved by a merger,* of course, 
in a given area since each cooperative involved in the merger 
loses its previous identity and falls under the same manage­
ment. A federation, on the other hand, will not necessarily 
result in the cooperation required. Nevertheless it does pro­
vide the type of atmosphere in which cooperatives can become 
more aware of the merits and demerits of cooperation. It is 
precisely for these reasons that dairy cooperative mergers and 
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federations are sought. A merger reduces the number of 
alternative sources of milk to the cooperatives' handlers and 
thus contributes to dairy farmers* type II bargaining power. 
Through closer coordination of the activities of several 
dairy cooperatives by joint bargaining programs or by various 
oral agreements among the cooperatives concerned, a federa­
tion attempts to do the same. 
On the hypothesis that dairy bargaining cooperatives will 
be in a better position to obtain their bargaining objective 
the greater is their type I and type II bargaining power and 
the easier it is for them to secure recognition from milk 
dealers as the exclusive bargaining agent of members, several 
sub-hypotheses were suggested and an attempt was made to test 
each. 
It was found that most of the cooperatives studied had 
little trouble in securing recognition from their bargaining 
opponents. Further a positive relationship was found to exist 
between recognition and volume per handler. As volume per 
handler increased beyond a level of nearly 7OO thousand 
pounds, however, the cooperatives* ability to secure recogni­
tion from handlers was found to increase at a decreasing rate. 
It seemed logical to expect that a dairy cooperative 
would, in order to maintain its volume, have uniform contracts 
with members with provisions allowing the cooperative to im­
pose penalties on members for non-compliance. All but one of 
». 
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the cooperatives interviewed required members to sign what are 
called marketing: agreements but only four of these agreements 
contained breach of contract clauses. 'In fact major emphasis 
was placed on preventing those acts which would constitute a 
breach of contract through such means as membership meetings, 
personal contacts with members, and most importantly the pro­
vision of non-bargaining services to members. 
Mergers and federations were initially suspected to be 
means by which the cooperative could increase its volume or 
control over volume; however, this did not constitute the 
principal motive for such activities as noted previously. 
Further there was little evidence that increasing volume per 
se was an important objective of any of the cooperatives 
studied. 
As was hypothesized the cooperatives studied offer sev­
eral services to handlers and ..in this way achieve type I bar­
gaining power. Such services include producer check writing, 
bulk handling of milk, full-supply contracts, diversion of 
surplus milk, etc. Furthermore existing governmental regu­
lations in some cases serve as a substitute for the coopera­
tive's type I bargaining power by establishing different min­
imum prices to be paid for different use-classes of milk and 
by providing a seasonal milk pricing scheme. 
A comparison was made between the negotiated prices in 
each market in which the ten cooperatives studied were located 
252 
and prices handlers in these markets would have had to pay to 
secure milk from an alternative source. This comparison 
indicated that the value to handlers of securing milk from 
the local cooperative was in all but one case greater than 
each cooperatives' estimate of the value of services provided 
handlers. A regression analysis revealed that the excess of 
dealers buying prices over the price at the alternative source 
plus transportation cost was, on the average, higher for those 
cooperatives placing a higher value on the services they pro­
vide handlers, for those cooperatives located further from the 
alternative source, and for those cooperatives guaranteed 
through federal order regulations of receiving a price in 
excess of the price handlers would have to pay to get milk 
from the alternative source which was sufficient to cover the 
estimated value of services provided handlers. 
The desire of dairy cooperatives to use their type II 
bargaining power seemed to be negatively related to the per­
cent of the cooperatives' volume that could be replaced from 
alternative sources. It was estimated that less than 40 per­
cent of the milk supply of two cooperatives indicating they 
would call a milk strike under present conditions could have 
been replaced from alternative sources. On the other hand, 
all of the milk handled by seven cooperatives indicating they 
would not call a milk strike under present conditions could be 
replaced from alternative sources. Other considerations sug­
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gested as requiring attention before a milk strike is called 
were 1) the number of handlers from which to withhold milk, 
2) the characteristics of these handlers, 3) what would be 
done with the milk withheld, 4) what would be the effect of 
resulting public reaction if any, 5) whether economic condi­
tions justify the cooperative's demands, and 6) whether mem­
bers will back the strike attempt. 
Most of the cooperatives studied were well aware of the 
location and existence of alternative supplies of milk which 
would replace some or all of their members' milk. They did 
not, however, indicate a clear notion of what it would cost 
handlers to secure this milk. Further with the exception of 
those normally shipping milk to deficit markets, most of the 
cooperatives studied listed only the processing facilities of 
their own or of other cooperatives as alternative outlets for 
their milk. 
Finally most of the cooperatives studied attempted to 
seek legislation which may serve as a substitute for their . 
type I and II bargaining power—e.g., higher federal order 
prices, and legislation discouraging the use of ungraded milk . 
for fluid milk and fluid milk products. Under certain condi­
tions it was found that a cooperative with processing facil­
ities may be able to reduce the number of alternative sources 
of milk to handlers by seeking a lower class II federal order 
25^ 
price. However there was no evidence that this tactic was 
used by the cooperatives studied. 
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SUGGESTIONS FOR PUSTHEE STUDY 
One of the results of this study suggests a rather simple 
procedure for predicting how a firm or, for that matter, any 
organization will rank a series of objectives on the basis of 
its peculiar characteristics. How successful the procedure 
is can only be determined by. further study. Since the true 
population from which the sample of ten cooperatives used is 
wiknown—i.e., the sample was not selected at random from a 
given population—statistical inferences made about other 
cooperatives from the results of this study may be inappro­
priate . Thus it would be desirable to test the validity of 
the equations derived in this study and to repeat the analysis 
on a larger and more representative sample. 
. A major limitation of the procedure used in this study 
is that it requires ranks to be comparable between firms. 
Additional interdisciplinary work may be desirable to deter­
mine the type of information needed to avoid this limitation. 
Social scientists who have had experience with similar studies 
may be able to provide valuable suggestions on such matters 
as questionnaire design, statistical analyses to be carried 
out, as well as scaling techniques to be used. 
In addition more detailed information on objectives, the 
procedure by which they will be sought, and the level of ' 
attainment which would be satisfactory before another objec-
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tlve is sought would provide further valuable insight into 
the behavior of a group of organizations. For example a dairy-
cooperative may seek higher net returns for members through 
negotiations with milk dealers, through federal milk order 
regulations, or by encouraging members to produce less milk. 
Similarly the cooperative may attempt to maintain its past 
highest class I volume by selling milk to nearby cooperatives' 
handlers or by seeking outlets in deficit markets. However 
this cooperative may not attempt to attain the first until it 
has achieved the latter. 
Further work on this aspect of the present study could 
contribute greatly to our understanding of the operation of 
the dairy cooperative as well as to our understanding of'.the 
bargaining process. For example, if the cooperative does in 
fact have a hierarchial goal system, then its preference func­
tion for the selection of a bargaining strategy may well be 
lexicographically ordered. That is, the cooperative may 
expect several different strategies to yield a bargaining out­
come satisfying its two most preferred objectives. But if 
only one of these strategies is expected to yield a bargaining 
outcome which also satisfies its third most preferred objec­
tive, this is the strategy adopted. 
In addition such a study may contribute to a larger study 
designed to evaluate the results of changes in structure and 
conduct in a given industry. For example the equations 
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derived in this study (or mdre appropriate ones if these are 
subsequently shown to be inadequate) to predict the coopera­
tives' rankings of the seven objectives may be incorporated 
into a sub-model depicting the interrelationships between 
decisions made by several dairy cooperatives. Such a model 
would also include demand and supply functions for each market 
and would allow for intermarket shipments of milk. Finally 
the model may include a bargaining sub-model in which nego­
tiated prices are determined subject to the existing institu­
tional constraints. 
Once the overall model is developed, the performance of 
this sector of the dairy industry under various changes in 
structural and conduct variables could be predicted by simu­
lation, and the resulting performance could be compared with 
some normative model. Finally, since the cooperatives' 
objectives would be determined in part by the resulting per­
formance, such a model would provide some basis for determin­
ing the extent to which performance affects conduct and 
structure. 
Since a dairy cooperative's bargaining ability will 
undoubtedly be influenced by milk handlers' aspirations, it 
would be desirable to make a study of milk handlers similar 
to the study reported here. Specifically more information is 
needed to prove or disprove the hypothesis that milk dealers 
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attempt to keep the spread between wholesale and producer 
prices in line with that of other milk dealers. 
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APPENDIX A 
2 7 2  - ,  
QU£STÎ0MAI5tE 
COOPERATIVE BARGAINIÎJG IN THE DAIRÏ IMDUSTET, 1964 
location and Characteristics of the Cocperatlve 
Ao Cooperative = 
City 
Bo On the attached aap please outline the production area da which jovr mercbsrs 
are located^ 
Co How many grade A mille producers vjere ]rcated in this area during 1963? 
Do How many of these producers were a«sabers of jmur cooperative in 1963? 
Eo Do you have contrasts with these members? ( ) Tes ( ) Nc^ 
lo Have any of your mesibets ever negotiated individual contrsd s with 
handlers? ( ) Yes ( ) No 
2o If sog how do you discover this and lYîaat do jt>u. do to discotxage it? 
Fo What percent of the grade A milk marketed in this area in 1963 cid yois? 
cooperative handle? 
Go IVhat percent of your grade A milk was handled in bulk in 1963? 
Ho Is your cooperative 3x>eated in a Federal Order Marfset? ( } les ( ) No 
—2— 
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Is »>»<« co^wrative the result of a merger or consolidation of two or more 
previous associations? ( ) Tes t ) Ko 
Previous Organizations 
%bat are your possibilities for combining with other organizations in the 
future? 
Are you at present a member of a federation of two or more cooperatives? 
( ) Tes ( ) So 
Cooperatives in . 
the Federation 
l«4Aat are the objectives of this federation? 
2-What do you considn* to be the major advantages and disadvantages of 
a federation? 
Coopérative Objectives 
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A. As & co<q)erative for daizy famers^ $Aat services do you provide menbers? 
Bargain for the price of milk 
Bax^ain for service charge premiums 
Ba^ftin for bulk tank premUans 
Conduct quality improvement work for use by members 
Cffiodaet quality in^rovement edoeational progrems for menbers 
Coodnot quality control and inspection progrems to insure ecatinaed 
acceptance of milk by handlers 
Test and wei# mUk 
Help menbers achieve increased production efficieoey 
Stock and distribute milk production supplies to members at a saving 
Assemble market information for use by members in planning production 
Pick up mUk at faxn and transport to handler 
PzwLd0 gtaap insurance 
Provide credit to meaibere 
Acqaire and maintain control over facilities for handling surplus 
milk 
Bagage in local promotional programs to Increase demand 
Contribute to the promotional programs of the American Dairy Assn« 
Others ^tecify 
Be Miat do you seek to achieve ndien you bargain with handlers or lAat do you 
bargain for? 
Co Of those processors and distributors with lAich you attempted to bargain in 
1963, how many would and how many would not bargain with you? 
( ) Would Bargain ( ) Would not Bargain 
Why would they not bargain with you? 
275 
D. What infoxnatim do you secure or lAat indicators do you watch to keq» 
abreast of the changing conditions of demand for milk? 
( ) Sc^ly>deaand adjuster in effect in the order 
( } Ssies to handlers 
( ) Sports fpom handlers 
( } Pzlce changes at retail 
( ) Changes in otiier federal wder Class I price formulas 
I } Chemges in CCC support purchases of sorj^us products 
( } Changes in CCC support price level 
I ) Dhlvarsity outlcdc 
( ) Success or failure of other coqperstives in their efforts to 
negotiate prices or service changes. 
( ) Other# Specify 
m* VBiat important ^%anges in the structure of the milk processing-distribution 
industry have occurred in the past 5 years that affect your bargaining ability? 
Large qjoanti^ buying by a sin^e retail unit 
Handler mergers 
Growth of handlers 
Ccnpetition troa handlers in other markets due to; 
different class prices 
a desire to aqpand total market 
bulk milk ^lipments from these handlers 
Other* Specify 
Vfo Alternative Outlets and Cosseting Sq^ùLies 
Ao What percwt of the milk handled by your cooperative in 1963 was* 
Class 1 milk 
Hm-Clase I milk* 
Bo Do you have a full«ssq>ply contract with any handlers? ( ) Tea ( } Ho 
®5-» 
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VJh&'t ware ttie outlets foP youy Class I ânâ noo-Class X milk, the peveeabago 
of your sigiply each outlet could absorb, the additional cost of 
shipping to alternative outlets, the prie© of milk at each outlet, and 
the proàjsts produced at each outlet during June, 196g. 
CLASS I 
Outlet 
 ^of yoxsr milk 
âapply each Out­
let can absorb 
Additional 
Cost of 
Shipping 
Price at 
each 
Outlet 
PHIRCIPAL DEALER OUTLETS 
ALTSaNATIVS DEALER OUTLETS 
'What was the average pries you were able to negotiate in 1963 for 
Class I milk? 
—6" 
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lOH-CLASS IHZLK 
Outlet 
% of your milk 
simply each Out­
let can absorb 
Products 
Produced 
Additional 
Cost of 
Shilling 
Price at 
each 
Outlet 
PRINCIPAL DEALER 
OUTLETS 
ALTERNATIVE DEALER 
OUTLETS 
Vlhat was the average price 70U were able to negotiate in 1963 for 
non-Clase X sdlk? 
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What ware the alt amative sott7e«s of milk fbr the principal handlers 
with i&om yon baz^ained ia 1963» aad the difference between the mintonp 
Class I-~p3xis-prea3iass price and the f«o«be |daat price for these 
alternative sources dxzring 1963, 
Sandler 
Alternative Scarce 
lAich yould replace 
yo«r supply 
Price 
Differential 
Bov «211 iAis psdse differmtisl need to be (in the li%% ran) before 
the handler secures milk from the alternative source? 
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Vhat maaas are at joor disposal with «hlsh to redno* the amber of 
alternative noaroes of ailk for tb.e handler» with «toi 70a bargain? 
3* Do Ww agpeeneots reaohed betwea nsaxtgr coopératives and handlers 
inflaanoe the agreeuents 70a negotiate with handlers? ( ) Yes ( ) No 
fdisre are these cocp-handler maxlwts located and in lAat way do the 
agreements reached inOumoe the agreements jott negotiate? 
7o Gains or Losses jnm can Offer to or Sgpoae on Handlers; 
A« What can yoa, offer handlers as a gnrap that individual faima^eembers 
could not offer? Bow moch, in cents per bgndred-#el^, do jan estimate 
each is wozth to handlers? 
# cut 
Pndoeer duck writing 
——— JBiûk hnndling of milk 
' Maintainti^ hi£^ qpali^ milk 
, • Pxodust Standardisation 
P%xll-9app3y Contracts 
Diversion of nm-ClAss I milk to: 
own prDcessing facilities 
I tie-In plants 
prpcesriLng fixas 
Other* S^ ooiQr 
TOTAL 
-9-
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Be Do yoa partisipate in Federal Order Hearings? ( ) Yes ( ) No-
What do 70a se^ to achieve In these hearings? 
( ) Different Class I price fomnlat ( ) Higher ( ) lower 
( ) Differaxb Class H price foxontlas ( ) Hitter ( ) Lower 
( ) Esqpand maxket area 
( ) Different pooJ.ing arrangement 
( ) Others Specify 
0» Have yott ever submitted aagr plans or suggestions as to new legislation 
or revisions in the intexpretatiOEi of existing legislation to the Depart» 
ment of Justice, to the Federal Tfade Coamisainif or to state and local 
anthoril^s? 
Do Do you engage the services of an attoxnej? ( ) les ( ) Ho 
What are his duties as your counsel? 
Eo Di 1950 a groqp of daizy fanaers in the Dulnth-aq^erior area 1A0 were 
organised into a union, called a milk striln at a Bsmfaetazing plant 
in Siq>ezlor« 
1, l&at factors do you believe this gvaap of farmers considered in 
establishing the price for «dxich they would strike? 
2. What factors do you believe this grmq* of famieta considered in 
determining how long tiiey would withhold milk? 
—10— 
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Let*8 asfltine that 70a and the milk dealer fall to reach an agreement, 
thxouc^ negotiations* on what 70U eoneider to be a reasonable price for 
milk* Wauld 70a call a milk strike? 
( ) No 
lo Why wuld you not call a milk strike? 
2o How wold the terns of the bargain then be established? 
( ) Tes 
lo What would you do with the milk on hand? 
2a Where would the handler's milk eome from to replace this 
milk you are withholding? 
When you consider a milk strike, do you cwiteugilate* 
( J striking all handlers with which you bargain 
( ) striki% one or just a few? 
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Table B.l. Elements of Inverse matrix for computing the variance of a predicted blend price^ 
°^ 11 "^ 12 °^ lii "^ 22 3^2 
=<0 
•^ 11 
«12 
% 
% 
Ao 
Ai 
?> 
<^ 21 
% 
1^1 
% 
2^1 
% 
3^ 3.7231510000 
-32.2576pk000n 
-27.9323590000 
-26.0783100000 
-13.2696090000 
-8.8995156000 
-5.710476200a 
-.000ùll721k 
-.0012365251 
-.0001721^73 
-.OOOILOILI6 
.0010611839 
.0015218945 
.000617U163 
-.0695599950 
.0893133650 
.0306789290 
-.3500909^ 00 
-.1700915500 
-.1361560000 
.0700369270 
37.9211050000 
35.078S77OOOO 
3I.57727OOOOO 
-.5619858500 
-2.6727.^73000 
.6118710200 
.000i3LIa55 
.OOIICII.3523 
.0001986363 
.0009111890 
-.000^ 398250 
-.00I47 610907 
-.000235171^  
.0102931220 
-.0524356350 
-.0092103011 
.1597781700 
-.0018276920 
.019071^ 930 
-.OOÙ7623968 
36.8183250030 
35.4127010000 
-2.5721506000 
-5.0II66I5000 
-.2926238700 
-.000146LLSI 
.0005379451 
.0000791061 
.0009937582 
-.0000931587 
-.0013934224 
.0000764840 
.0025339172 
.0000545617 
-.0195720760 
.4705996000 
-.02954805^ 0 
-.0600588350 
.0033069457 
81.8806320000 
-4.4253740000 
-4.3627588000 
-.9517973900 
.0077430126 
-.0071427733 
-.0076508277 
-.0061615900 
.O037991G3I 
.0014799231 
-.0004099^ 54 
-.7062934400 
.7109329200 
.7037665400 
1.1708679000 
-.0571437570 
-.0946177190 
.0112033640 
14.2651900000 
.6318460900 
1.9230337000 
-.0000022342 
.0004531396 
.0001713872 
-.0001204033 
-.0007819510 
-.0054559244 
-.0001702282 
.0383379760 
-.0546823410 
-.0285633740 
-.0602054560 
.1768523400 
.0934352530 
-.0238749110 
12.75222500m 
i.oo7445ooo( 
.000301065] 
.000048915: 
-,000041379! 
-.000680385c 
.000016042c 
.006998312: 
-.OOOI5223IE 
-.004531237c 
-.021339361c 
.010046550C 
-.053505160C 
.010100702c 
.071023230c 
-.013021192c 
Table E.l. (Continued) 
/^21 61 11 '12 
2^1 
% 
1^1 
1^2 
I 
.0000012427 
.0000021646 
•.0000000040 
•.0000162167 
..0000232798 
H.0000141534 
..0000121602 
-.0000207735 
•.0000307911 
.0000061772 
.0000235931 
.0000000210 
-.0000653712 
.00C1052129 
.0000463907 
.0000253618 
-.0000829993 
-.0002525810 
.0000298630 
.0000006481 
.0000068033 
..0000017565 
..0000074470 
..0000060639 
..0000012269 
..0000019924 
..0000035521 
.0113379560 
-.0110495580 
-.0109776070 
-.0108346400 
.0005616345 
.0009228764 
-.0006067811 
.0117732220 
.0109792270 
.0108794940 
-.0008389633 
-.0018039202 
.0002204837 
.0111465590 
.0107873530 
-.0004303111 
-.0005639618 
.0001268579 
^Only the elements on and below the diagonal are recorded since the netrix is symmetrical, 
(1. 1, ,1, Xf, . . r|, X'l, X'l, . . X|)j and Xg are the values of X]_ and Xg use 
O -2=44I ,69. For example, from model (4.1'), SdiX^, X2, 11, 21, 31, 4l) = °^q + '<11 +'=^41 + iPo 
specific values of Xi anc X2, say Xf and Xj, are used to predict T, the variance of this precic 
-2> -•'-2) sud C is the 11x11 matrix formed from the appropriate inverse el orients of this table. 
iicted blend price^ 
"^ 32 /o y^ ll /'12 /^ 13 
10000 
)09on 12.7522250000 
7000 1.0071150000 4.2391480000 
23^ 2 .0003010651 .0001139755 .0000025723 
1396 .0000189151 .0003217073 -.0000020306 .0000029864 
3872 -.000041379b .0003189772 -.0000022947 .0000021443 .0000024797 
4033 -.0006803850 -.0000750878 -.0000020322 .0000020826 .0000020406 .0000029072 
9510 .0000160126 -.0004045794 -.0000000415 -.0000006923 -.0000001132 -.0000000896 
9211 .0069983122 -.0023239666 t.OOOOOOjjUp -.0000026727 -.0000004513 -.0000004152 
22S2 -.000152231s -.0001501611 -.0000005508 -.0000000412 .0000001754 .0000000252 
9760 -.0045812870 .0482460890 -,0001302616 .0001294273 .0001325546• .0001187743 
3klO -.0213393610 -.0224341240 .0001267526 -.0001445678 -.0001308597 -.0001195820 
37lO .0100465500 -.0120059610 .0001319043 -.0001287154 -.0001321055 -.0001199835 
1:560 -.0535051600 -.0121968720 .0001285131 -.0001204662 -.0001272742 -.0001139107 
3kOO .0101007020 .0276157050 -.0000003867 .0000116679 .0000029052 -.0000011530 
2530 .0710282300 .0479629890 -.0000014374 .0000375997 .0000061950 -.0000046912 
9110 -.0130211920 -.0541842090 .0000019981 -.0000031198 -.0000036565 .0000015404 
'12 13 21 31 'hi 
^20 
1270 .0111465590 
940 .0107873530 
'633 -.0004303111 
0^2 -.0005639618 
837 .0001268579 
.0170657220 
0^007811739 
-.0012755831 
.0001352803 
.0023157790 
.001^035382 
-.0003613916 
.00b7l73939 
-.00061/^ 671 .0007639071 
rix is symmetrical. The variance of a predicted blend price is where = 
63 of %]_ and Xp used to predict Y, G is the matrix of appropriate inverse elements and 
+ °^11 + + (Po + hi * hi +,^ 31, + i^ Ll) l^ + (%o + *11 + ^21 + ^31 + * l^)%2' Sbus if 
ance of this prediction equals ' " " " " 
ts of this table. 
X-:;- where X* = (1, 1, 1, Xi, X]_, "L\, Xi, X]_, X2, l2> 
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Table 3.2. Means of variables used in blend price analysis®-
Means of product of d"mmy variables and 
Variables . Keans X]_ X2 
Y 437.195" 
Di 1.000 • 763.073 74.780 
Dii 0.280 227.329 21.146 
Di2 0.463 335.098 34.402 
D13 0.159 100.915 11.720 
Dii 0.098 99.731 7.512 
D21 0.146 107.927 12.280 
D22 0.854 655.146 62.500 
D31 0.110 118.159 7.524 
Do2 0.890 644.914 67.256 
0.720 554.159 54.171 
D^ 2 0.280 108.914 20.609 
^Source: 112. 
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Table B.3* Variables used in analysis of cooperative 
objectives 
Variables Description 
X]_ percent of the local handlers with which the coop­
erative attempted to bargain in I963 who would 
bargain 
X2 volume per handler with which the cooperative 
bargained in I963 in millions of pounds 
Xo estimated I963 average annual value to coopera­
tives' handlers of obtaining milk from cooperative 
Xif. 1 if X3 less- the negotiated premium on class I 
milk is at least as large as the value of services 
provided handlers ; 
0 otherwise 
X^ cooperative's estimate of the value of services 
provided handlers in cents per hundredweight 
X5 cooperative's distance from Eau Claire, Wisconsin 
X y  percent of the cooperative's volume replaceable 
from alternative sources 
Xg handlers' buying- price for 3*5 percent producer 
milk used for fluid purposes in I963 in cents per 
hundredweight 
Xn . percent, of the cooperative's volume sold to 
class I outlets 
Xjo annual average I963 negotiated premium on class X  
milk in cents per hundredweight 
X21 number of class I handlers who would bargain with 
the cooperative in I963 
X22 cooperative's volume as a percent of the total 
volume in the cooperative's procurement area 
(estimated by the cooperative) 
X]_3 percent of the cooperative's volume that could 
have been handled in the cooperative's own 
•pro ces sine- plant 
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Table B.3» (Continued) 
Variables Description 
cooperative's total membership (grade A producers 
only) 
per capita income in major metropolitan area 
served by the cooperative^ 
approximate number of dairy cows per thousand crop 
acres in the cooperative's procurement area in 
1962b 
1 for cooperatives located in an area where labor 
union activity was assumed to be relatively high; 
0 otherwise 
^Source: 91* 
^Source: Statistical reports from the various State 
Departments of Agriculture. 
Xi4 
1^5 
-^ 16 
1^7 
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Table B.b. Zero-order correlation matrix of variables used in analysis of cooperative ob, 
Variable X2 X^ X^ Xy Xg X^ 
X2 .7501 
^3 .1218 .1398 
.2593 -.0153 .L185 
-,hlOp —.22611 .6711 -.1083 
X6 -.0721 .l^W .6681 -.1055 .5899 
X7 -.1997 -.1415 -.245^ ,h750 -.4043 -.6019 
^8 .ooii5 .1600 .3281 .Oitl6 .6747 .9664 -.5842 
% .6203 .0640 .1601 .5532 -.3823 -.2137 .0573 -.0985 
1^0 . -.092$ -.0812 .2300 -.6020 .5612 .6496 -.9149 .5991 -.2762 
Xll .2321 .1532 .2058 -.L22h .3079 .5809 -.9855 .5576 .0084 
X12 .52I4.6 .5060 .5898 .7710 -.1345 .1681 .3109 .2962 .4641 
^13 -.5895 -.1120 .2310 -.4198 .5696 .7439 -.5741 .6429 -.4579 
.22ià .1678 .2^ 09 -.4438 .3599 .6207 -.9955 ..5960 •-.0273 
-.0178 -.0537 -.3757 -.2519 -.1499 .1552 -.5193 .0354 -.0312 
Z16 .2950 *3h7h .2219 -.5611 .3272 .5471 -.7280 .4959 -.0916 
X17 .liSol .5752 -.2677 -.3162 -.3897 .2565 -.3779 .1068 .1366 
Yl .1357 .3238 -.4676 .2030 -.4083 -.6492 .2773 -.6288 .1430 
-2 -.21^1 .Itoll .1956 -.0370 .1352 .2787 .2147 .2415 -.6902 
-3 -.2511 .0338 — « Oi+O 8 -.5253 .2112 .3602 -.0826 .2156 -.4320 
-I -.3L95 -.6639 .1696 .2151 .0353 -.0892 .2571 -.0268 .4363 
.3133 .2893 .362k .1472 .1670 .3382 -.2672 .3953 -.0524 
•^6. .6260 .5325 -.2061 .3872 -.5207 -.5338 .2426 -.44c4 .3778 
-7 -.3Ô0ii -.2567 .2873 -.5157 .5170 .7453 -.7346 .6754 -.3580 
^To be significantly different from, zero at the 1, 5^ 10, 20, and 30 percent confidenc 
as large as 0,7976, 0.6672, 0.5S23, 0.ii71ô, ?;id 0.359$ respectively. 
îrative objectives^ 
 ^ Xio -12 ^13 -^15 1^6 %17 
-.2762 
.0081 .8512 
.ii61;l 
-.4977 -.2620 
-.4579 .7402 .5582 -.4221 
-.0273 .5577 . .9951 -.2679 .5755 
-.0312. , .3538 .6196 -.3849 .4026 .5683 
-.0916 .7955 .6367 -.2370 .3393 .6994 .0137 
.1366 .1937 .4486 .0034 .0000 .4359 .5620 .4092 
.1430 -.4259 -.2636 .0082 -.7319 -.2770 .1222 -.2203 .1284 
-.6902 -.1314 -.2567 .2898 .0247 -.2101 -.2649 -.0076 -.0585 
-.4320 .3895 -.0299 -.3273 .3486 .0501 -.2727 .6377 .1796 
.4363 -.1458 -.2465 .0175 .1363 -.2649 -.3364 -.2660 -.4082 
-.0524 .1188 .2954 .3061 .0124 .2940 .3102 -.0271 .0000 
.3778 -.5846 -.1527 .430% -.7715 -.2079 .1372 -.il 253 .2041 
"•3530 .8348 .7178 -.3740 .9331 .7304 .3570 .4833 .1019 
confidence level, the coefficients in this table would have to be at least 
